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PREFACE
In recent years, the pervasiveness of the food crisis in Africa 
and its socially debilitating effects on the structure and 
continuity of African society, has underscored in increasingly 
stronger and more urgent terms, the need to approach with 
determination the question of food availability and security, 
with the object of producing insights and answers which would 
be of concrete use to policy-makers, planners, and scientists 
involved in the job of bridging the gap between food needs and 
available supply of sources.
For various reasons, Southern Africa has not been as serious a 
crisis area with respect to the availability and supply of food, 
as other parts and countries on the African continent. While 
this is the case, indications are that under changing or changed 
economic, political, social, ecological, and climatic conditions, 
the ability of the Southern African region to cope with its 
food needs may alter for the worse.
In order for a firm and controllable grip to be maintained on 
the situation, it is necessary for in-depth knowledge and 
information on the matter and attendant issues to be available 
to relevant and interested parties. Such data and studied 
insights would not only be useful for interested bodies in the 
region, but also further afield. It is in response to these areas 
of felt needs that this workshop was mooted by ISAS.
As a senior, and high-level institution in the area, with access 
to academic and scholarly expertise on such issues and related 
matters, ISAS presented a proposal for the workshop for the 
co n sid e ra tio n  of the T echnical C entre  for A gricultural 
Cooperation (Wageningen, The Netherlands) (CTA). The CTA, 
an EEC-A CP sub-agency, recognizing the importance and 
timeliness of the topic agreed to support the workshop.
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Participants were carefully selected from different countries in 
the reg ion , plus others from outside the region whose 
knowledge and contribution was considered useful or even vital 
to a meaningful workshop on the subject.
Objectives:
(1) Produce studied insights on the subject of Food Security 
and related issues in Africa.
(2) To solicit the views of policy-makers in the Southern 
African region on all matters relating to Food Security 
issues in the region.
(3) To collate up-to-date data and information which would 
help eliminate the emergence of food crisis in the region.
(4) To suggest concrete measures in both long and short- 
term s on how food availability and security can be 
guaranteed in the region.
The workshop was opened by the Acting Vice-Chancellor of the
N ational University of Lesotho, Dr. L.B.B.J. Machobane. 
Dr. Assoumou Mba, CTA Director, made the introductory 
remarks, the present editor gave the keynote address. Much of 
the work was facilitated by Mr. T.M. Narain of the CTA.
The idiom and views presented in this text are attributable 
only to their respective authors. Our thanks go to Dr. Mansa 
Prah for proofreading, and to Ms. Laura Bezuidenhout for the 
typesetting work of the text.
The Editor
MAN DOES NOT LIVE BY BREAD 
ALONE: BUT MAN CANNOT LIVE 
WITHOUT BREAD
Kwesi K. Prah
Introduction
In recent years, the issues of food inadequacy, underproduction, 
high prices, and the attendant problems of hunger, famine, and 
starvation has scorched the African earth. In one country 
after the other on the African continent, governments and 
leaders have been faced with undernourished, malnourished and 
economically helpless citizens whose daily bread in order to 
keep body and soul together has become increasingly elusive.
In turn , A frica’s dependency on the developed world has 
increased, with food aid becoming a growing component of the 
support we seek from the better developed part of the world. 
Once a net food exporter, today Africa must import huge 
quantities of food for its hungry millions. Africa is the only 
region in the world where population growth rates are out­
pacing food production. The annual income of the average 
African in 1985 was about 482 US Dollars. That was, 10 per 
cent lower than what it was in 1974. Its been estimated that 
about 60 per cent of African children under five are underfed. 
3 out of 5 Africans go to sleep every night hungry. During 
the past decade well over two million Africans have died out of 
hunger and starvation. Indeed more Africans die out of hunger 
and starvation than the other tragedy of numerous and endless 
wars which ravage our continent. Africa is the most critical 
area in the World Food Crisis.
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In the face of the daunting and harrowing facts about hunger, 
many back out on the score that it is virtually mission 
impossible . Some tackle the problem intellectually, while 
others manage to supplement this with praxis. Whichever way 
it may be in our individual or collective cases, the practical 
inevitability of hunger for such growing sections of the African 
population is terrifying in its brobdignagian proportions. Many 
prefer to ignore the harsh and raw realities of the implications 
of food shortage. Too often they consist of those segments of 
society who are invariably too far removed from the existential 
trials of the situation. There are others possibly on the 
philosophical right who would contend that most of the facts 
often marshalled forth to bring home the picture of hunger and 
food in se c u rity  a re  m erely  the  resu lt of in te llec tu a l 
p red ilec tions  and choice betw een rival and contending 
ideologies. Some provide a veneer or decor of comprehensive 
appreciation and sally forth with pretentious panacea for the 
food crisis. O thers prefer the smugness of facile over­
simplification of issues, which ducks questions or passes the 
buck. For Africans today, it is important to face squarely the 
plight of the millions that face starvation and undernutrition 
every hour of the day, for on empty stomachs and pinning 
hunger, development is impossible.
We may have possibly noticed that food security is often an 
instrument and expression of social and political power, for, 
food has throughout the world ceased to be merely produce 
cultivated to be eaten for the maintenance of dear life. It is 
today, for most, something that is cultivated in order to be 
bought, sold and manipulated for maximum gain. It is dumped 
on the high seas by some while others dream or only imagine 
it like a never-ending mirage.
There are those who are drawn into the production of what 
they cannot eat for prices which do not pay for their societal 
needs, while other subsidize the production of food which are 
u ltim ately priced out of the purchasing capacity of the 
wretched of the earth. While some are paid for keeping land 
unused, others starve.
2
In Southern Africa, the food crisis is increasing in dimensions. 
The crisis is severest in Mozambique. Apart from Malawi, 
Zimbabwe, South Africa and Swaziland, most countries in the 
region including Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia, Angola, Tanzania, 
Madagascar and Namibia are faced to various degrees with 
problems of inadequate food supplies. While the sub-regional 
problems with respect to food may not be as gigantic as is 
currently the experience of the Sahel-region in West Africa or 
the Horn of Africa, it needs to be emphasized that even here 
the problem is growing and increasingly out-pacing resources. 
Unless meaningful attention is drawn to these issues, and 
practical and far-reaching measures are brought to bear on the 
problem, we may discover in the not too distant future that 
the monster of starvation is claiming lives, the precious human 
resources needed for the development effort.
Food aid has helped sometimes in Africa to save the lives of 
countless people, particularly in emergencies as we have seen 
in recent years in the Sahel, and the Horn region. But it also 
needs to be said that food aid in most instances becomes 
politics. An instrument for holding sway and great power 
influence over the teeming and starving million of the globe. 
Hog diet is humanized while others waste the best. Food aid 
is an instrum ent of im perialist rivalry and politics. It 
undersco res the rea lities  of contem porary Third W orld 
dependency on the great powers.
Novel dietary habits and tastes are encouraged and then 
flooded with produce whose only true and real justification is 
profit-making within a global system of unequal exchange.[l]
Population growth patterns are crucial and of incontestible 
relevance. But such facts are also employed by some observers 
as scholastically ephemeral djinns and rationalized bogeymen.
The food crisis in Africa, has in the past two decades been 
underscored by the endemic famine and near famine conditions 
in parts of the Sahel, the Horn area, Northern Uganda, the 
S udan  and m ore recen tly  M ozam bique. As a g lobal 
phenomenon, no area or continent, has in recent years been
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confronted with the spectre of food inadequacy on any scale 
comparable to the African crisis of the past decade and a half.
In its report on Poverty and Hunger; Issues and Options for 
Food Security in Developing Countries (1986), the World Bank 
proposed  tha t the concept of Food Security  could be 
understood to mean: "access by all people at all times to 
enough food for an active healthy life". This formulation 
endorses two concomitant assumptions. Firstly there should be 
adequate  food supply for self-sufficiency to be viable. 
Secondly there is need for what is available to be distributed 
in such a way that it reaches all social elements.
Imperialism and the Food Crisis
One of the most striking features of the food problematique is 
the fact that the crisis of food insecurity does not derive from 
underproduction or the incapacity of technology, human 
resources, or capital to provide adequate food for the human 
population. Neo-M althusian arguments do not ultimately 
address the problem  satisfactorily. There is no inverse 
functionality between the growth rate of food production and 
the popu lation  grow th ra te . As has been agreed the 
functionality between these two variables is not mathematical 
but rather social. It hinges largely on the social relations of 
production and reproduction of material life. These factors 
determine ultimately the production distribution and exchange 
of food between nations and states, and also between social 
groups and classes in all countries.[2]
The irony of the food crisis in this respect was acidly 
described by the FAO Director-General, Eduard Saouma, on the 
occasion of the 2nd World Food Day in Rome, 1962.
Though there is sufficient food  for everyone, 500 
million people are still suffering from hunger and 
disease and even die because they are too poor to 
buy the fo o d  that is already there. In som e  
countries mountains o f food are stockpiled, while in
4
others hunger and poverty persist. The obese are 
seeking new cures and the malnourished are offered 
no remedies. Many pets are pampered while hungry 
children are forgotten.[3]
Saouma asks if this is not a strange and absurd phenomenon 
which fu tu re  econom ists  and h isto rian s  will consider 
"mysterious and inexplicable".[4] The whole problem hangs 
closely on to the global order of international capitalism.
In spite of this fact which any close historical analysis of the 
roots of the crisis may reveal, international institutions and 
agencies involved with the African food crisis have tended, as 
Mkandawire has pointed out, to treat the crisis as episodic, 
with the emphasis on ecological disasters. While obviously, 
ecological factors account partly for the crisis, the point needs 
to be assertively made that "social factors have been decisive 
even in those cases where ecological disasters would seem, at 
first sight, to have been the sole cause".[5]
The food crisis in Africa and the "Third World" is symptomatic 
of a w orld  d iv ided  be tw een  "haves" and "have-nots", 
neocolonies and metropolitan powers, superpowers and spheres 
of influence. It is a condition with a history, a history linked 
with colonialism.
Colonialism in as far as land and rural production relations in 
Africa were concerned, proceeded along two routes. Firstly, 
there were those areas in which land was expropriated as 
plantations for colonial produce, to be exported to the 
metropoles and the centres of international capital resources. 
Secondly, there were other areas in which peasant farming was 
productively appended to the developing global capitalist system 
as colonial cash crop producers. Both types of rural colonial 
economy in Africa resulted primarily in the alienation of rural 
producers from the means of production. Furthermore, the 
creation in some parts of Africa, particularly in the Sahel and 
Southern end of the continent of labour reserves and the 
abundant migratory labour, the imposition of various forms of 
taxes especially poll taxes in British Africa, the development of
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a consumer culture and the ubiquitous penetration of the cash 
nexus, accelerated the process of proletarianization in mines, 
construction, road-building, agriculture, etc.
While all this in practice and effect represented development in 
the productive forces, the erosion of backward precapitalist 
forms of production, it siphoned away labour from food 
production with limited cash and market value and directed 
labour time and labour power towards the production of items 
which were not locally consumed but vital for the operation of 
the international capitalist order.
Concluding Remarks
The post-colonial conditions with respect to food production, 
d is tr ib u tio n  and exchange in A frica  as con tem porarily  
experienced  is largely  an extension of the agricultural 
production edifice constructed under colonialism. Food aid and 
imperial largess would continue for the nearer future but 
ultimately, the solution of the African food crisis cannot be 
found through piecemeal approaches, or solutions which fail to 
situate the whole problem within the general context of the 
neocolonial condition. In essence, it is only a symptom of the 
crisis of neocolonialism and has wider sociological implications.
NOTES
1. See an excellent case study of wheat in Nigeria by Gunilla 
Andrae and Bjorn Beckman. The Wheat Trap, London.
1985.
2. Fidel Castro, The World Crisis, London, 1984. p. 179
3. E. Saouma. Quoted here from F. Castro. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
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NOTES
(Continued)
5. T. M kandawire, The State and Agriculture in Africa: 
Introductory Rem arks. In T. M kandaw ire and N. 
Bourenane (ed). The State and Agriculture in Africa. 
London. 1987, p.2
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THE CONCEPT OF FOOD SECURITY 
AND SELF-SUFFICIENCY
K. J. M. Dhliwayo
This paper presents SADCC’s concept of food security. The 
paper also presents highlights of the objectives of SADCC’s 
Food Security Sector, its Strategy and Regional Food Security 
Programme and projects that have been developed to address 
the problems of food security.
Evolution of SADCC Regional Food Security Programme
At the initial SADCC m eeting in Lusaka in April 1980, 
Zimbabwe was charged with the responsibility for developing 
and coordinating a Food Security Programme. One of the first 
steps taken by Zimbabwe was to establish an interministerial 
com m ittee. Subsequently two technical level meetings of 
officials of Agriculture Ministries of the nine SADCC Member 
States were held in H arare  in mid-1980 which laid the 
groundwork for a portfolio of regional food security projects.
The programme has since expanded to twelve projects. These 
projects are:
Project 1 : A Technical Assistance Programme designed to
achieve coordination and cooperation on all 
agrarian issues.
Project 2 : An Early Warning System for Food Security.
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Project 3 A Regional Resources Information System
Project 4 : A Regional Inventory of Agricultural Resource
Base
Project 5 : A Regional Food Reserve
Project 6 : Regional Post-Production Food Loss Reduction
Project 7 : Regional Food Processing Technology
Project 8 : Regional Food Marketing Infrastructure
Project 9 : Regional Food Aid
Project 10 : Recruitment and Retention of Professional and
Technical Staff in the Ministries of Agriculture 
in the SADCC Region.
Project 11 : Regional Seed Production and Supply
Project 12 : Improvement of Irrigation Management.
National Projects with a Regional Impact
The food security programme also provides support for a series 
of projects which, though national in character, when taken 
together contribute significantly to the achievement of SADCC’s 
overall food security objectives.
The national projects, which are identified by individual 
M ember States, are generally directed towards production 
enhancing activities which have an immediate impact on food 
supply. Notwithstanding the potential impact that these projects 
could have on the food producing capacities of Member States, 
experience to date has shown that, with the exception of the 
food aid related projects, it has proved difficult to mobilise 
international resources for the implementation of these national 
projects.
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In discussions with representatives of SADCC’s cooperating 
partners it has become apparent that greater emphasis must be
placed on the regional aspects of the national projects if they
are to receive support as truly regional projects.
SADCC’s new Strategy on Food and Agriculture has developed 
c rite ria  on which these projects should be selected for 
inclusion in the Food and Agriculture programmes. An appeal 
is therefore made to cooperating partners to consider these 
projects on the basis of the criteria that have been developed.
On the basis of the criteria, a reorganisation of all those
projects that have already been identified and submitted by 
Member States will be undertaken. All food security projects 
that have been identified will be reviewed by the Technical 
Sub-com m ittee on Food Security together with the Food 
Security Technical and Administrative Unit with a view to 
group them, to the extent possible, on a sector or functional 
basis, e.g. seed/input production, storage, irrigation, etc.
Once the common areas of these projects are identified, and 
the projects themselves subjected to and pass the technical and 
economic test, both the sub-committee and the unit can, 
perhaps with the use of short term consultancies/technical 
assistance, draw up a single project document. The document 
would clearly indicate those components to be implemented at a 
national level and those that can be implemented at a regional 
level to complement the national activities.
It is also anticipated that in addition to the national food 
security projects being identified by individual Member States, 
other national projects will be identified as a result of the 
implementation of the regional food security programme.
In some cases similar projects may be identified in two or more 
member countries. This will enable the Member State(s) 
concerned, with the assistance of the Food Security Technical 
and Administrative Unit, to prepare a coordinated project 
proposal that can be submitted to SADCC for action.
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Over a period of several months in mid-1980, the various 
committees reached the following conclusions about the nature 
of food insecurity in the SADCC region and the steps necessary 
to overcome them:
i) regional food security was interpreted to mean the 
the countries o f the SADCC Region should be assured 
o f food supplies, adequate in both quantitative and 
qualitative terms, to feed  the population o f  the 
region;
ii) food production in the region was considered about 
10% below food needs in the region;
iii) something less than 5% of the arable land in the 
region was used for farming in any one year, it was 
concluded that the region had the potential to attain 
food security by increasing its own food production 
and that this should be the strategic principle upon 
which to base its future food security policy;
iv) in December 1982, Zimbabwe established a Food 
Security Technical and Administrative Unit in the 
M in is try  o f L an d s , A g r ic u l tu re  and  R u ra l  
Resettlement to administer the regional food security 
programme.
Food Situation in the SADCC Region
Today, there are 70 million people in the nine SADCC states, 
up by 12 million from the 58 million when SADCC was 
established in 1980. The population in the region is growing at 
about 2 million per year and by the year 2000, there will in all 
likelihood be 100 million people in the region. Even though 
the rate of population growth is projected to level off at 2.9 
percent by the year 2000, the population in the SADCC region 
may double from 100 to 200 million sometime between 2020 and 
2030.
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With 50 to 80 percent of the population in the region deriving 
their livelihood and employment from agriculture and rural non­
farm employment, it follows that raising the productivity of the 
agricultural sector is essential for raising the average standard 
of living in the region.
Presently there is no definitive assessment of the changes that 
have taken place in the food economy of the SADCC region in 
1985 and 1986. The FAO report SADCC Agriculture: Towards
2000 (1984) has only managed to give a general picture of the 
economic situation in the region. Likewise, SADCC’s Macro 
Economic Survey, 1986 draws heavily on the FAO report and 
secondary data published during 1984. The Food Security 
Research Programme being conducted by the University of 
Zimbabwe in conjunction with Michigan State University has 
also produced highlights of some of the important changes in 
the food situation in the SADCC region. A report by Dr. 
Rukuni and Professor Eicher argues that the food economy in 
the nine SADCC states, can be divided into a maize belt of 
three countries, Zimbabwe, Malawi and Zambia, and sue food 
deficit countries. The maize belt has a backlog of farmer- 
tested maize varieties capable of producing significant surpluses 
for intra-regional trade. Since maize accounts for roughly 50 
percent of the calories consumed in Zimbabwe and Zambia, and 
70 percent in Malawi, it is im portant for food security 
researchers to identify the sources of the maize productivity 
growth and to assess the relevance of the maize production 
model for other SADCC states and for the sub-regions in 
Africa.
Currently, Zimbabwe has around two million tonnes of maize in 
storage which is equivalent to about three years’ normal 
domestic sales by the Grain Marketing Board (GMB). In 
addition, Zimbabwe has the equivalent of four years’ domestic 
sales (at present rates) of red sorghum in storage.
The sources of productivity of growth in maize, wheat, cotton 
and other commodities in Zimbabwe cannot be attributed to any 
single factor such as higher prices or favourable weather. For 
example, the source of genetic material for maize, wheat and
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cotton are a function of several decades of pioneering research. 
For example, in 1960 Zimbabwe became the first country after 
the U nited States to introduce hybrid maize (SR-52) to 
commercial farmers after 28 years of research on hybrids. 
Because Zimbabwe and Zambia were members of the Central 
African Federation when SR-52 was released, it was transferred 
to Zambia where it was quickly adopted by commercial farmers.
The maize revolution is unfolding in Zambia; new hybrids, and 
open pollinated maize varieties, higher producer prices, and the 
reorganisation of the seed parastatal along the lines of a 
public/private corporation, have propelled maize production.
In Malawi, maize is the staple food and it has been exported 
for seven of the past ten years. Maize production is based on 
open p o llina ted  varieties because hybrids acceptable to 
consumer tastes are not available. Malawi’s maize expansion 
appears to be a function of dramatically higher producer prices, 
shifting the relative price of maize vis-a-vis other crops, large 
fertilizer subsidies and a vigorous extension programme.
In summary, the causes of the maize revolution in Zimbabwe, 
Zambia and Malawi should be closely examined by food security 
researchers. It is generally believed that the surge in 
production in the maize belt is the cumulative outcome o f past 
a g r ic u ltu ra l research , a sub tle  array o f  in s titu tio n a l  
improvements and dramatic price increases beginning around 
1980. In short, a balanced package of technology and pricing 
policies is the hallmark of the maize revolution in the three 
countries. There are still a number of puzzles about the maize 
revolution that should be explored by researchers; ideally in a 
programme of comparative studies involving researchers from 
the three countries.
Policy-makers are now faced with some important policy 
adjustments in the maize belt. The central policy issue is how 
to promote efficient diversification into oilseeds, higher valued 
export crops (e.g. natural rubber), livestock and new products. 
The rapid increase in maize supplies in the maize belt should 
be followed by government policies and institutional innovations
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to expand employment for low income people in rural areas 
(maize for work programmes) and diversification programmes.
Development of the Concept of Food Availability 
and Access to Food
Ten years ago, two economists, Reutlinger and Selowsksy, 
published an influential monograph on Malnutrition and Poverty 
(1976).
The authors challenged the assumption that higher rates of 
food production, economic growth and market forces would 
bring about an improvement in nutrition in Third World 
co u n tries  within an acceptable tim e fram e. They also 
contended that an understanding of the causes of malnutrition 
or policy solutions would have to address the distribution of 
food among different groups in the population.
In 1977, an Oxford economist, A.K. Sen, published an influential 
paper on entitlements and famine and reinforced the view that 
poverty, or what Sen called the lack of entitlements (land, 
income, family support systems), is a major cause of famine and 
hunger. Sen also asserted that the prevailing view of the 
1970s, that famine was caused primarily by a food production 
shortfall, was a simplistic and outmoded concept. Sen later 
expanded his entitlement thesis in his celebrated book Poverty 
and Famine (1981).
The concept of food security came of age in the early 1980s. 
In an influential collection of essays edited by Alberto Valdes, 
Food Security for Developing Countries (1981), food security 
was defined as "the ability of food deficit countries or regions 
within countries, to meet target consumption levels on a year 
to year basis" a definition that incorporates the effects of 
both supply and demand.[1] In early 1986, the World Bank 
issued a food security policy paper Poverty and Hunger (1986) 
in which food security was defined as "access by all people at 
all times to enough food for an active and healthy life". Two 
essential elements are "the availability of food and the ability
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to acquire it".[2] SADCC accepts and agrees with this 
definition because it is not only simple by comprehensive and it 
reminds one that there are two interactive parts of the food 
security equation.
The two sides of the food security equation help provide a 
focus to the food security policy and research agendas in the 
SADCC region:
1) food availability through domestic production, storage 
and/or trade;
2) access to food through home production, the market 
or food transfers.
Food Self-Sufficiency
It is important to ensure that food security is not considered 
as being synonymous with food self-sufficiency. Food self- 
sufficiency is a narrower concept than food security. For a 
particular country, food self-sufficiency can be defined as 
achieving 100% of the staple food needs of a nation from its 
own domestic production and regardless of economic and 
climatic variations.
Given the varying agro-ecological zones of the region and the 
differing climatic conditions, it is almost impossible that all the 
countries in the region, or even parts of a particular country, 
could produce all essential food commodities in sufficient 
quantities to feed their local population.
Increasing the food self-sufficiency index of all essential food 
products therefore can only be an ideal policy objective. It is 
politically a sound objective but in some countries the 
objective cannot be economically attained. The major challenge 
for food self-sufficiency researchers or policy advisers to 
national governments is to compile and assess the real financial 
cost of increasing the self-sufficiency index of a particular 
commodity. One has to consider the cost of creating an oasis
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out of desert without being dragged into future economic 
dependency on external financial and other resources.
Food security is a much broader concept than food self- 
sufficiency. It recognises the constraints imposed by natural 
and technical endowments and acknowledges the need for some 
specialisation based on natural resource endowment and 
technical capability and the role of intra-regional trade on 
economic development.
SADCC Food Security
Food insecurity exists when there is not enough food for the 
people who need it. This situation can arise either because of 
problems in producing adequate food, distributing the food to 
the people who need it or because people cannot afford to buy 
the food that is available.
In many parts of the SADCC region, particularly in rural areas, 
seasonal food scarcity occurs annually before the next harvest. 
This happens when food from the last harvest runs out before 
the new harvest comes in.
Last year’s harvest may run out because enough food to feed 
the population may not have been produced. Until the new 
crop matures and is harvested, members of a household are 
hungry for weeks or even months at a time. Such seasonal 
shortfalls can be caused by a complete lack of food production 
caused by either droughts, floods or invasion of crop pests and 
diseases, or by inadequate food delivery systems or the lack of 
people’s access to food (effective demand). In the latter case, 
food may actually be present within a country or an area, but 
a large segment of the population may not have access to it 
simply because they lack adequate purchasing power.
The cost of the food may be so high that only the wealthy can 
afford it or that the poor people do not have the necessary 
cash to buy it even if it is available at a reasonable price.
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Food insecurity may also be due to the fact that delivery or 
distribution systems break down or lack adequate capacity to 
move food to those in need of it, causing food to pile up or 
even rot at docks or in silos.
In the SADCC region, the majority of people; men, women and 
children, who suffer from food insecurity (seasonal famine) live 
and work in rural areas. Many are landless labourers or
peasant farmers who either do not own land or lack adequate
productive resources with which to produce enough food for 
themselves. They often lack access to credit, agricultural 
inputs, adequate training and extension services and other 
technical and marketing facilities.
Food security of the region, therefore, can only be achieved 
when all the SADCC member states ensure that all members of 
their populations have access to an adequate diet to lead an 
active and normal life throughout the year.
Two essential and integral components of food security are 
food availab ility  (th rough  expanded production, stocks, 
commercial or other food trade, or through expanded aid) and
the ability of all people to acquire that food once it has been
made available.
Perhaps it should be emphasised that moves toward achieving 
national or regional food security begin at household/family 
levels, particularly in rural areas. Economic analyses indicate 
that, throughout the SADCC region, the bulk of people who 
suffer either seasonal or semi-permanent food insecurity are in 
rural areas. Their poverty or food insecurity problems are a 
result mainly, of low agricultural productivity, low incomes and 
inappropriate income distribution.
Objectives o f the SADCC Food Security Programme
Although the overall aim of the Regional Food Security 
Programme is to increase food availability so that the region 
can be more self sufficient in its basic food needs, the strategy
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of SADCC’s Food Security Sector clearly recognises that 
household, national or regional food security cannot be 
achieved from increased production alone. Food production 
needs to be complemented by increased cash crop production, 
enhanced com m ercial movement of food and agricultural 
products and inputs within and among Member States and the 
development of other activities that can generate employment 
and incomes, in order to ensure that people have both physical 
and financial access to food.
Within this broad aim, the three objectives of the food security 
programme are:
1) to satisfy the basic food needs of the population of 
the region and progressively to improve food supplies 
to all the people in the region, irrespective of their 
position in society;
2) to achieve regional self-sufficiency in food supply to 
the maximum extent possible in order to reduce the 
region’s dependence on external sources of food; and
3) to eliminate the periodic food crises which affect 
some areas or countries of that region.
SADCC Strategy on Food Security
The food security strategy focuses on a number of the major 
components of the food supply system, namely; improved food 
and agricultural production, food storage and processing, the 
distribution of food and other agricultural products on the one 
hand, and the accessibility of food to the majority of people in 
the region on the other hand.
It is strongly felt that the only long term solution to the 
problem  of food security in the region is increased food 
production because no amount of food aid or other palliatives 
can solve the problem in a substantive sense. However, the 
task of increasing food availability and accessibility has to be
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undertaken within a broad development framework which 
includes the development of other agricultural enterprises, the 
provision of fertilizers, pesticides, appropriate technology, 
provision of adequate training and extension services and the 
involvement of large masses of people, particularly the small- 
scale farmers and the landless in the process of development 
and employment.
The strategy for the achievement of SADCC Food Security 
objectives therefore  consists of eight principal elements, 
namely:
i) development of a mechanism for the exchange of
technical and economic information;
ii) reinforcement of national food production capacity;
iii) improvement of the food storage, distribution and
delivery, conservation and processing systems;
iv) development of cash crops and other agricultural
enterprises;
v) establishment of systems for the prevention of food
crises and the development of national food security 
strategies;
vi) establishment of programmes for the control of major 
crops and crop diseases;
vii) the development of skilled manpower; and
viii) the development of intra-regional trade.
i) Development of Institutions and Mechanisms for
the Exchange of Information
The exchange of information and experiences in 
agricultural production technology and food supply
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management is central to SADCC’s food security 
program m e. C o opera tion  in the exchange of 
information on food production, food supplies, crop 
prospects, regional resource bases, food trade, prices, 
and a variety of related subjects contributes to both 
collective and individual food security.
Much of the emphasis in the regional food security 
projects is on information gathering and exchange to 
provide inform ation necessary for planning and 
decision-making of governments on food matters. 
Three projects in particu lar, An Early Warning 
System for Food Security, A Regional Resources 
Information System  and A Regional Inventory o f 
Agricultural Resource Base are largely data-base 
o rien ted . The first and th ird  of these  have 
commenced im plem entation whilst the second is 
shortly due to commence a pre-implementation phase.
ii) Reinforcement of National Food Production Capacity
The SADCC countries collectively contain some of 
the most fertile agricultural land in Africa, yet few 
produce enough food to meet the ever increasing 
in ternal demand. Food deficit countries cannot 
continue indefinitely to cover their needs by ever 
mounting imports. A strengthening of SADCC’s 
agricultural production sector generally and its food 
production capacity in particular is a vital priority 
for the achievement of food security.
Despite the considerable agricultural potential of the 
region, there are significant natural and man-made 
constraints as well as a wide range of infrastructural 
and in s t i tu t io n a l  w eaknesses inh ib iting  rap id  
agricultural development. The main constraints and 
the ways to overcome them are discussed in SADCC 
Agriculture : Toward 2000 (F.A.O., Rome 1983).
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The reinforcem ent of national food production 
capacity will require the mobilisation of considerable 
financial and manpower resources. It will also entail 
institutional and policy changes to provide services 
and incentives to a large number and broader range 
of recipients than formerly, notably to small-scale 
farmers.
SADCC Member States appreciate that the extent to 
which food production can be increased will depend 
principally upon action taken at the national level. 
Individual Member States are engaged in a wide 
range of activities directed toward the enhancement 
of agricultural production in the region. Examples 
include:
* the development of new irrigation schemes and 
the rehabilitation of existing schemes;
* the expansion of the arable land base;
* the intensification of land use through the 
application of new techniques and technologies 
and resettlement programmes;
* the developm ent of new cultivars and an 
associated expansion of seed production and 
distribution facilities;
* the introduction of special programmes for the 
control and/or eradication of major pests and 
diseases affecting crop and animal production;
* the in troduction of special program m es to 
increase the availability of crop inputs;
* expansion of ag ricu ltu ra l cred it facilities, 
particularly for smallholders;
* improvements to rural infrastructure generally,
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and to the storage, marketing and distribution 
in particular;
* im provem ent and expansion of agricultural 
research extension and training facilities.
Action in these areas will continue and measures 
taken will be in accordance with national policies 
and p rio ritie s  and the capacities of individual 
Member States.
At a regional level, reinforcem ent of food and 
agricultural production capacity is addressed through 
cooperative programmes in SADCC’s Agricultural 
Research, Animal Disease Control, Soil and Water 
Conservation and Land Utilisation, and Food Security 
Sectors.
Within the food security programme, emphasis is 
placed on the detailed analysis of factors affecting 
regional food production with a view to providing 
Member States with comprehensive information which 
m ay be u sed  by th o se  re sp o n s ib le  fo r the  
development of national programmes. Information 
from these studies will also be used to identify areas 
for the developm ent of production improvement 
programmes involving regional cooperation.
Examples of work currently being undertaken are the 
p ro jec ts  on: the es tab lishm en t of a Regional 
Inventory o f Agricultural Resource Base, and the 
R ecruitm ent and Retention o f  Professional and  
Technical S ta ff o f SADCC Agriculture Ministries. 
Two other studies directed at enhancement of food 
production capacity, Regional Seed Production and 
Improvement o f Irrigation Management are due for 
the im plem entation as soon as funding can be 
secured.
Coordination in the production, procurement and
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supply of basic agricultural inputs is another area 
identified as a priority for regional cooperation in 
SADCC. Many of the fertilizers, pesticides and 
agricultural implements used are common to the 
reg ion’s agriculture. SADCC has the industrial 
capacity to produce some of these requirements. The 
Regional Resources Information Systems project, 
when operational, will be of considerable assistance 
in de te rm in ing  the reg io n ’s req u irem en ts  for 
agricultural inputs.
iii) Improvement of  the Storage, Marketing and 
Distribution System
Within SADCC, marketing outlets serving subsistence 
farmers and the traditional commodities produced by 
them are often limited. Small farmers often have no 
m arketing outlets for their produce even when 
governments have encouraged the growing of the 
crops concerned. The volumes handled by parastatal 
and cooperative marketing agencies in a number of 
countries have often declined while overhead and 
operating costs have continued to escalate. The high 
costs of operations restric t the possibilities for 
increasing producer prices and thereby encouraging 
outlet. Financial and management constraints have 
lim ited the pa rasta ta ls’ ability to handle crops 
efficiently and have caused delays in payments to 
farmers.
Improvement and upgrading of the delivery, storage, 
processing and distribution components of the food 
m arketing system are needed to utilise existing 
supplies m ore effectively and are an essential 
complement to measures to expand food production. 
The additional infrastructure required to improve 
crop marketing in most SADCC countries consists of 
improved trunk and feeder roads, expanded storage 
facilities as well as the adequate provision of trucks,
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rail-wagons and shipping by which produce may move 
from producing areas to consumption (or export) 
points.
U pgrad ing  of such fac ilities  will prim arily be 
u n d e r ta k e n  w ith in  th e  c o n te x t o f n a tio n a l 
development programmes. However, development 
undertaken within the context of SADCC’s regional 
transportation and communication programme will 
have an important bearing on the upgrading of the 
food marketing system.
W ithin the reg ional food security program m e, 
improvements to the food marketing system are being 
addressed through three projects. The first of these, 
Regional Food Marketing Infrastructure, is still in 
the feasibility study phase. The other two, Regional 
Post-Production Food Loss Reduction and Regional 
F ood Processing Technology are already being 
implemented.
The lack of sufficient numbers of adequately trained 
m anagem ent and opera tional personnel in the 
marketing institutions in SADCC has been identified 
as an important constraint to effective operation. 
The manpower training needs of the organisations 
involved in the various post-production food systems 
will be addressed in all three of the projects above.
iv) Development of Cash Crops and Other 
Agricultural Enterprises
There is substantial empirical evidence that expanded 
food production alone will neither eliminate hunger 
and starvation nor can it achieve household food 
security . Experience has shown that in some 
countries silos may be full and grain stock become 
an economic menace while hunger and starvation 
c o n tin u e  to  h au n t a large p ro p o rtio n  of its
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population. This, therefore, demonstrates the fact 
that it is not only the availability of food at a 
national level that assures food security at household 
level, but also the ability of the population to secure 
that food.
In economic terms therefore, food security can be 
seen as a function of, among other things, food 
production, food distribution efficiency and the levels 
and distribution of income among the population.
Given that incomes are an important factor in the 
achievement of food security, the Food Security 
Strategy seeks to diversify its activities to include 
those agricultural related activities that will generate 
employment and incomes for the population of the 
region. In any case, not all parts of the SADCC 
region or parts of the member countries can grow 
enough food for their respective populations. Yet, 
although some such areas cannot hope to attain food 
security through their own food production, they can 
achieve food security by engaging in other income 
generating activities that their resource endowment 
can allow. These activities will enhance their ability 
to purchase food from surplus producing areas or 
from the market.
Diversification, other than being a means for the 
achievement of food security, can also be regarded 
as a hedge against the risk of food crop failure or 
food commodity price instability.
Attempts will therefore be made to encourage those 
SADCC Member States that are producing far more 
than their domestic food requirements to diversify 
their production and include cash crops and agro- 
industries including fruit and vegetable canning 
industries, milling factories, agricultural inputs 
manufacturing factories, and the development of an 
informal sector capable of manufacturing simple but
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a p p ro p r ia te  farm  e q u ip m e n t, w a te r carry ing  
equipment, etc. Possibilities of moving towards some 
form of specialisation based on varying natural 
endowment and technical/economic abilities will also 
be encouraged. Specialisation in itself will facilitate 
the flow and exchange of commodities between and 
among SADCC Member States and hence contribute 
towards the m utual in tegration of the reg ion’s 
economies.
v) Establishment of Systems for the Prevention of 
Food Crises and Development of National Food 
Security Strategy
The establishment of a regional capability to respond 
to fluctuations in food supplies caused by crop 
failure, sudden shortfalls in world markets or major 
breakdowns in the chain of supply is essential to the 
achievement of regional food security.
Concerted regional action can provide early warning 
of the advent of drought and major crop pest and 
disease outbreaks; can help deficit countries to 
obtain imports more quickly from surplus countries 
within the region; may result in economies in 
procurement and the movement of supplies within the 
region; can improve the bargaining position of 
SADCC countries in international markets; can 
coordinate requests for emergency food aid support 
from donors; can provide infrastructure facilities for 
storage in the principal food surplus producing 
countries; and can provide easier and more reliable 
access to food reserves within the region at time of 
shortages.
The strategy adopted by SADCC to achieve this 
capability to respond to sudden food shortages has 
two main elements. The regional food security 
project An Early Warning System for Regional Food
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Security involves the establishment or strengthening 
of national early warning units in each Member State 
to g e th e r with the estab lishm ent of a regional 
coord inating  unit. The system combines crop 
forecasting with monitoring of food in store, within 
the marketing system and imports, and will enable 
countries to take timely action to avert forecasted 
food shortages.
The second element of the strategy to respond to 
sudden food shortages is encompassed in the regional 
food security project, Regional Food Reserves and 
Food Aid. The project will examine options to 
alleviate immediate constraints in food storage and 
distribution and define medium and long term policy 
measures required to bring about a regional food 
reserve system based on national structures.
Regional cooperation on food security is being 
strengthened by food strategy development at the 
national level. National food strategies seek to 
p ro v id e  a co h e re n t fra m e w o rk  o f  p o l ic ie s ,  
program m es and projects, directed to achieving 
greater fo o d  self-sufficiency through an integrated 
effort to increase fo o d  production, improve food  
c o n su m p tio n  and  e lim in a te  h u n g er. T h e ir  
development is a response to the recognition that 
individual projects can best realise their potential 
when they are part of more comprehensive national 
policies and with recognition of the need for greater 
concern  with the socio-econom ic dim ension of 
hunger, alongside food production efforts.
Some SADCC countries are currently preparing or 
implementing explicit national food strategies whilst 
others are developing policy programmes which 
implicitly incorporate the objective usually enunciated 
in n a tio n a l food s tra te g y  p ro p o sa ls . T hus, 
governments are attaching higher priority to the 
food sector by devoting more resources and closer
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a tte n tio n  to  it and by c re a tin g  a p p ro p r ia te  
mechanism s to coordinate the activities of the 
various agencies which are tackling the problems of 
food production, food consumption and food security.
Whilst the development and implementation of such 
national food strategy policies is the responsibility of 
individual Member States, SADCC believe that an 
exchange of information and experiences in this area 
would strengthen national food strategy planning and 
m anagem ent capacities. Accordingly SADCC is 
investigating the possibility of establishing some form 
of institutional arrangements within the regional food 
security programme for studying food strategies and 
o ther issues of agricultural policy on behalf of 
member countries.
The economic and ecological complementarities which 
characterise much of the national economies of 
SADCC are such that cooperation in the design, 
formulation and implementation of food strategies 
will have both national and regional benefits.
vi) Establishment of Programmes for the Control of 
Major Pests and Diseases.
Pre and post harvest crop losses from pests and 
diseases are currently estimated to reduce food 
availability by 30 to 40 percent or more. Grain 
losses alone possibly exceed grain imports by several 
hundred thousand tonnes. Each of the main cereal 
crops is susceptible to about half a dozen serious 
diseases and similar numbers of field and storage 
pests which cause substantial and in some cases, 
complete crop losses. The problem is not restricted 
to indigenous species. There are already a number 
of new pests and diseases that have been introduced 
into the region accidentally, for example, the great
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grain borer recently established in Tanzania from 
America.
Most member states have control programmes for the 
reduction of field and storage losses from pests and 
diseases that are constrained by a lack of sufficient 
funds, trained staff and appropriate technologies. 
However, the occurrence of most of the serious pests 
and diseases across all Member States suggests this 
as an ideal area for the development of regional 
cooperation. Possibilities exist for cooperation in 
the development of new resistant varieties; the 
deliberate introduction of natural predators and 
parasites; pest identification services; the transfer 
of successful technologies; the coordination of 
quarantine efforts; the preparation of advisory 
leafle ts; and in the research needed for the 
development of integrated systems of pest control.
vii) Development of Skilled Manpower
SADCC recognises that the expansion of food and 
agricultural production in the region is severely 
c o n s tra in e d  by a genera l sho rtage  of sk illed  
manpower and is acutely aware of the need for 
improved training programmes in the region. The 
assistance of SADCC’s cooperating partners in this 
important area is particularly welcome.
The developm ent and strengthening of national 
training institutions to meet regional requirements 
for technically trained personnel for an expanded 
food and agricultural sector is coord inated  by 
SADCC’s Manpower Sector. The specialised training 
requirem ents for particular regional and national 
programmes and project areas will, wherever possible, 
be addressed through the incorporation of specific 
training program m es as an integral part of the 
project proposals, as is the case in current regional
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food security projects. The role of the sector’s 
Technical Sub-committee in identifying specialised 
training needs and coordinating training programmes 
will also be enhanced.
viii) Development of Intra-Regional Food Trade
SADCC recognises the im portant role of in ter­
country food trade as a means of increasing regional 
food self-sufficiency. Indeed the enlargement of 
in tra -re g io n a l trad e  genera lly  is an essen tia l 
component of SADCC strategies for reducing external 
dependence and is explicitly recognised in the Lusaka 
Declaration. With the progress now being made in 
developing SADCC industries and intra-regional 
transport and communication, measures to remove 
constraints on trade are now being studied. Intra- 
regional food trade will directly benefit from such 
developments.
ow ever, th e re  a re  s ig n if ic a n t co sts  in the 
development of such trade in food commodities and a 
certain size market is needed to make investment in 
m arketing infrastructure cost-effective. In many 
cases present infrastructure has been designed to 
serve  "n o rth -so u th "  tra d e  w ith o u t reg ard  to 
economies which might be gained from promoting 
intra regional trade.
SADCC considers that another way in which its 
c o o p e ra tin g  p a r tn e rs  can p a r t ic ip a te  in the  
strengthening of intra-regional trade arrangements is 
by effecting triangular transactions through the 
purchase of food surpluses from one country in order 
to meet the needs of other deficit countries in the 
SADCC region . A part from  tra n sp o rt cost 
ad v an tag es , such tr ia n g u la r  tra n sa c tio n s  will 
stimulate and foster regional self-reliance.
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The development of intra-regional trade links could 
also allow SADCC countries to opt for a degree of 
specialisation in agricultural production in line with 
natural resource endowments, resulting in economic 
efficiency gains for the region as a whole.
The Regional Food Security Strategy is an integrated policy 
package and its major elements are complementary. The 
principal element of the strategy is the exchange of technical 
and economic inform ation, experiences and know how in 
agricultural production technology and food supply management. 
Cooperation on the exchange of information in agricultural 
production, food supplies, crop prospects, regional resource 
base, food trade, commodity prices and the constraints to the 
demand and supply of agricultural commodities, will contribute 
not only to regional food security, but also to the rapid 
development of the national economies. In this regard, closer 
links are being developed among SADCC’s Food, Agriculture and 
Natural Resource sectors and between these sectors and the 
other sectors in SADCC’s programme of action such as Trade 
and Industry, Transport, Manpower, Mining and Energy.
However, food security will not be attained merely through the 
exchange of ideas and skills at a regional level. At a national 
and village level, this inform ation must be used for the 
enhancement and reinforcement of national food production 
capacities, i.e. by the farmers and the supporting service 
institutions such as the credit, research, training and extension 
organisations.
It is at the national level that the most potent and effective 
instrum ents, prices, tax, m onetary, credit, budget, public 
investment, training and extension policies, are formulated and 
implemented with a view to encouraging farmers to increase 
food and agricultural production. It is more at the national 
level that these policy instruments have a greater reach into 
the rural food economy than any that may be conferred at a 
regional level. However, through regional activities such as 
short-term or in-service training, exchange of manpower at
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m iddle-m anagem ent level, problem -oriented seminars and 
courses, and through direct assistance in the planning and 
designing of projects, it is anticipated that national production 
capacities will be enhanced and strengthened. Through these 
and other regional activities, greater emphasis will be given to 
the analysis of alternative national and regional food security 
and agricultural policies and the exchange of experiences in 
appropriate public welfare interventions aimed at improving 
household food security.
The strategy fully recognises that food production per se does 
not, and will not, occur evenly among the SADCC Member 
States nor will it occur evenly in all areas in a particular 
Member State. Warehouses or silos in one Member State, or in 
one area of that country could be overflowing with surplus 
grains, but all this surplus would not contribute to food 
security unless there is an efficient system for the storage, 
processing, preservation, marketing and distribution of that 
food to where it is needed.
The food security strategy, therefore, recognises the need for 
an improved and efficient food storage and delivery system and 
the need to enhance intra-regional trade. A complementary 
way of ensuring greater national food security is to improve 
the ability of a country, both at the national and individual 
farmer level, to store grain effectively. It has been estimated 
that as much as 20% of food grains are destroyed every year 
by pests, rot and other storage rela ted  problem s. The 
percentage losses incurred in other more perishable food crops 
such as potatoes, vegetables or fresh milk are probably even 
higher.
The establishment of a regional food reserve system as an 
insurance against the risk of food insecurity or famine in the 
region is underway. The size of the regional food reserve, 
because it is not costless, will of course depend on what the 
SADCC M embers States are prepared to spend or invest 
collectively. In addition to providing a hedge against the risk 
of fam ine, and, therefore , improving food security, food 
reserves invariably have other externalities or benefits such as
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Apart from enhancing food security at regional, national and 
household level, inter-country trade and an efficient movement 
of agricultural commodities and inputs among Member States 
will also have positive consequences in other areas. It will 
expand the size of the SADCC market, make investments in 
marketing infrastructure much more cost effective and will 
encourage M ember States to venture into some form of 
specialisation, not only in agricultural production but also in 
other economic activities, in line with national resource 
endowments, technical and economic capabilities.
In economic terms therefore, food security can be seen as a 
function of, inter alia; increased food supply (either through 
own production, storage or food aid); efficient food delivery 
systems and the level and distribution of incomes (effective 
demand).
Experience has also shown that the production of food 
fluctuates more than the production of any o ther basic 
commodities. The production of the major grains (maize in 
particular) is subject to weather conditions and other hazards 
in alm ost every part of the region. When bad weather 
(drought) hits a small relatively poor country, localised famine 
or food insecurity results from a food shortfall. The very 
small-scale farmers (who are the majority) lose their only 
source of food and income. Shortages may begin which are 
bound to push up consumer prices and as prices rise, more and 
more of these poor farmers find it difficult to afford even a 
minimum diet.
Given that incomes are an important factor in the achievement 
of household food security, SADCC’s food security strategy, 
th e re fo re , seeks to expand its scope to  include those 
agricultural related activities that will generate employment and 
incomes for the rural population.
The strategy seeks to identify initiatives which can be taken at 
regional level to encourage those SADCC Member States that
consumer price stability or incomes to the farmers.
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are producing grain surplus to their domestic requirements and 
profitable trading outlets, to diversify their production. This 
could include cash crops, horticultural and industrial crops, 
dairy and animal products and the establishment of rural agro­
industries including fruit and vegetable canning, milling 
factories, factories for the manufacturing of agricultural inputs 
and the development of an informal sector capable of making 
simple but effective farm equipment.
Possibilities of moving towards some form of specialisation by 
Member States, based on varying natural resource endowment 
and technical economical capabilities, will also be encouraged 
and this, once adopted, will facilitate the flow and exchange of 
commodities between and among the SADCC Member States and 
hence contribute towards the integration of the region’s 
economies.
The strategy recognises that agricultural production, and food 
production in particular, is prone to changeable weather 
conditions and other hazards. Inadequate rainfall (drought) and 
invasion of pests and diseases, all affect the production of food 
crops even in highly sophisticated agricultural systems.
In this respect the strategy encourages Member States to 
establish systems for the prevention of food crises and food 
losses and to initiate programmes for the control of major crop 
pests and diseases. Concerted regional cooperation and action 
can provide early warning of the advent of drought; major 
crop disease outbreak; help deficit countries to obtain imports 
more quickly from surplus countries; coordinate requests for 
emergency food aid; provide facilities for food storage and 
provide easier and more reliable access to food reserves within 
the region.
The strategy also acknowledges that, skilled manpower, just 
like land, water, fertilizers and energy, is an important input 
to agricultural production. Skilled ^nd experienced manpower 
still poses a major constraint to agricultural production in the 
region. The strategy, therefore , incorporates manpower 
training in the Food Security Programme. This is to be viewed
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as an integral part of an effort to enhance the production 
capacities of Member States.
The development and strengthening of national and regional 
training institutions which complement project specific in- 
service training courses is being initiated and coordinated by 
SADCC’s Manpower Development Sector.
NOTES
1. A. Valdes and S. Siamwalla, Food Security for Developing 
Countries, 1981. p.l.
2. World Bank Report, 1986. p.l.
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FOOD SECURITY: 
HUNGER, POVERTY AND POLICY[i]
D. Faber and W. Tims
Introduction
Nineteen seventy-four was in many respects an extraordinary 
year for world economic relations. In the preceding years, 
global welfare had increased rapidly, but already then the first 
signals on the limits of growth were heard.[2] The 1973-1974 
biennium was a period of famine, especially in South Asia and 
consequently a period of a high grain prices in the world 
market. It therefore seemed that 1974 would be a turning 
point in history marked by changes in the international balance 
of power on energy (O PEC was founded) and declining 
economic growth because of limited availability and high prices 
of raw materials and environmental limitations to production 
possibilities. Also, it seemed to be the year of detente 
between East and West. Under such circumstances it was, 
certainly from a political point of view, understandable that 
much more attention was to be focussed on issues of income 
distribution. Already in 1973, Robert McNamara made proposals 
with regard  to g lobal a ttack  on banishing hunger and 
poverty.[3] At the same time the New International Economic 
Order had been placed on the agenda of almost every UN 
organisation, in order to give developing countries more 
financ ia l and econom ic decision-pow er. U nder those 
circumstances the World Food Conference took place in 1974 in 
Rome.
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In hindsight, one can say that this conference was probably the 
most successful of the many that took place in the seventies. 
New organizations were founded, and the power and political 
will to achieve the objectives of alleviating the poverty and 
hunger problem were pledged. Not all objectives were reached, 
like e.g. the size of development funds, the food reserve and 
the stabilization of the grain markets. Yet, the conference had 
a refreshing and stimulating effect. It is for that reason that 
1974 is taken as a point of departure. Two questions can be 
posed; what was the perception of the hunger and poverty 
issue, and secondly how have the perceptions and suggested 
remedies changed?
Perceptions, 1974-1985
In 1984 the World Food Council published a study on the 
realization of the 1974 World Food Conference objectives.[4] 
The report notes that 1974 marked the beginning of the end of 
the step-motherly treatment that food crops had been getting. 
In fact, the staple food supply became the thermometer of the 
welfare of a country’s economy and the agricultural sector 
would be high on every priority list.
Many conference participants were convinced that agriculture 
had just stepped into a new era, characterized by a short 
supply of food, that would hardly be able to keep pace with 
the rapid rate of population growth. Moreover, low reserves 
could lead to mass starvation. There was serious doubt as to 
whether major grain exporting countries were able to call forth 
sufficient production to meet the rising demand for grains, 
especially from the rapidly growing populations of South and 
South-East Asia and of the middle income and oil exporting 
c o u n tr ie s , as th e ir  per cap ita  incom es increased  and 
consequently the demand for meat and thus feed grains. High 
and rising grain prices were predicted. Therefore, the lowest 
income developing countries would not be able to satisfy their 
demand for food because of foreign exchange problems. Slight
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changes in the climate or in the balance of power might 
already lead to significant famines. Therefore international 
pressure was brought on by the conference in order to 
effectively work towards a more stable food supply and look 
for solutions of the hunger problem. This resulted in a number 
of new in ternational organizations (World Food Council, 
In te rn a tio n a l Fund for A g ricu ltu ra l D evelopm ent, the 
Consultation Group on Food Production and Investment).[5]
It was generally agreed that in order to solve the hunger 
problem food production in the food deficit countries must be 
increased, and if successful the problem would be solved within 
ten years, provided that annual growth of production was 4 
percent (as compared to 2.8 percent in the 15 years prior to 
that).
Increased food production in the developing countries and the 
consequent food self-sufficiency was seen as the best way to 
insulate a country against high world market grain prices. At 
the same time, international agreements on food reserves and 
food aid must provide the poorest developing countries with an 
increased m easure of food security in case of temporary 
short-falls.
Today, many of those assumptions, that were assumed to be 
valid in 1974, have been shown not to be so. Others were 
shown to be in themselves correct, but too limited. For 
example the fact that food was supposed to become increasingly 
scarce has not been borne out. Already in 1975 a slightly 
improved grain supply led to a decline in world grain prices. 
Compared to international prices of other commodities, in real 
terms, grains were in 1976 at a twenty-five year low and the 
price trend has since that time been downward. Since 1950, 
prices of wheat and rice have declined to about 50 percent, 
while maize and sorghum have also declined by more than 45 
percent.
It should be noted that these price levels were reached without 
rea lis ing  the M4 percent" objective of the W orld Food 
Conference. In the period 1973-1983 agricultural growth was
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One could regard the present situation as comfortable with low 
prices, excess stocks in many developing countries, excess 
production capacity, and with surpluses of grain in the USA 
and the EEC that are being kept artificially outside the market.
It is important to explicitly state this, as one may conclude 
tha t the  many s ta tem en ts  m ade by po litic ian s in the 
mid-seventies with regard to the food production situation were 
based on no m ore than a few years of below norm al 
agricultural production and therefore seem to be immediately 
ready to declare the immediate situation as a new trend for the 
future (i.e. the 1973-1975 period was rather an exceptional 
period of short supply and high prices). This shortsightedness 
has not been an unmixed blessing; the objectives of the World 
Food Conference in 1974 emphasized self-sufficiency and 
independence from the world food markets, while in fact 
because of the continuing declining world market prices did not 
make this necessarily the best alternative and could be even 
counterproductive.
However, what has been gained by the crisis is the much better 
understanding and assessment of the hunger and malnutrition 
problem. Hunger is no longer regarded as an incidental matter, 
rather it is a chronic problem of the fragile groups that are 
charac te rized  by poverty of resources and shortage of 
purchasing power. Nevertheless, the improved understanding 
and large grain supplies have not led to obvious solutions for 
these groups. Differences of opinion continue to exist as 
regards the long-term and short-term effects and the costs and 
benefits of various investment programs.[6]
However, a s tra tegy  solely focussed on increased food 
production, is not the solution, regardless of the fact that most 
of the poor find their livelihood in the production of food.
Finally, the past ten years has shown a shift of attention from 
Asia to Africa. Asia has been more successful in increasing 
food production and thus became less import dependent.
about 3 percent (excluding China).
39
However, it still has the largest number of malnourished people, 
although in terms of percentage of the population, there are 
considerably more malnourished people in Africa.
The Food Security Dilemma
The developments during the past decade and the increased 
understanding of the food problem as a chronic characteristic 
of most countries in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, has 
caused a more careful judgement to be made on possible 
alternatives for food policies in those countries. A major part 
of this wider discussion took place around the concept of "food 
security".
Initially food security was defined in terms of supply only. 
Increased  production and increased self-sufficiency, and 
consequently a number of measures regarding food aid and food 
reserves were linked with jt in order to secure access to food 
supplies outside the country in case of a short-fall; a very 
com m ercially-oriented definition, where adequate m arket 
facilities became the objective. However, this did not mean 
adequate food supplies for the people in those countries.
This limited definition of food security, has, for a number of 
years, led to discussion on international grain reserves and the 
increase of food aid, as well as discussion on the package of 
measures in developing countries to increase food production.[7]
As is w ell-know n, the in ternational negotiations on an 
in te rn a tio n a l food reserve  failed, due to irreconcilable 
differences between North and South, East and West, and even 
among industrialized countries. Food aid negotiations however 
did much better, thereby realizing to an important extent the 
objectives.
Extending the Objectives
The emphasis that was placed on. food production in developing
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countries led to much criticism on price policies in those 
countries. Many docum ents and studies pointed to the 
ill-effects of low prices, set by state-owned marketing boards. 
Price increases were essential to provide enough incentive for 
the farmer to produce for the market. Too low prices also 
hampered the introduction of appropriate technology, new crop 
varieties, land improvement and irrigation.[8]
However, price policies have shown that it is not sufficient to 
just increase farm-gate food prices, as only a very small part 
of the farmers produce a marketable surplus, while the majority 
of the population depends on the market for its food supply. 
Such a policy can therefore hardly be justified from a point of 
view of improved income distribution of food. Practically, 
higher producer prices causing higher consumer prices in the 
short term do not augur well with the actual consumer price 
policy. Governments have therefore monopolized grain food 
markets to maintain low food prices in the urban areas to such 
an extent that the domestic price in many countries has fallen 
below the world market price. Price increases tend to become 
great political hurdles; the 1987 developments of the Zambian 
maize flour price are a case in point.
Such political factors play an important role. The food prices 
often rem ain low, even if they go at great cost for the 
government. Too low food prices lead invariably to low food 
p roduction , in the m edium  and long run, causing the 
government to import increasing quantities of food grains at 
higher world market prices and therefore have to be sold with 
a subsidy. These subsidies are a source of increasing concern, 
as they comprise often a large and increasing part of the 
government expenditure and thus hamper long-term public 
investments like infrastructure, education, and health.
In 1979 the World Food Council started using the broader 
definition of ’food security’, defined as a function of all 
factors that maintain and improve per capita food consumption, 
in particular in the poor countries, of food production, of
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income distribution, and of foreign exchange earnings.[9] In 
terms of this definition the food problem will not be solved by 
stimulating economic growth and food production alone, unless 
an extra dimension is added, that concerns itself with increases 
in per capita incomes and consumption; especially as regards 
the poor. Also, equal emphasis should be given to the demand 
side and to the supply side of food.
Side by side with m easures to increase food production, 
guaranteed imports and stable market prices, measures are 
designed, directly or indirectly, that lead to improved access of 
the population to food. The two approaches of course meet at 
the point of food price policy. But could these two approaches 
be reconciled? Is there a price policy the effects of which are 
positive for both demand and supply?
Problems and contradictions abound, as it is extremely difficult 
to find an optimal and consistent policy for both sides: e.g. 
poor versus rich producers, poor versus rich consumers, 
consumers versus producers, urban population versus rural 
population and within each of these groups; and long-term 
versus sh o rt-te rm  effects. The ac tual policy of m ost 
developing countries with regard to the food situation does not 
nearly resemble what it should be if the stated objectives are 
to be pursued and obtained. However, such decisions are being 
taken every day. It is, therefore, extremely important that 
policy makers are made aware of the necessity to include and 
w eigh b o th  o b jec tiv es  equally  (o f p roduction  and of 
distribution) in their deliberations. Measures to improve food 
production, especially price policy, can only be justified if 
consecutively measures are taken that guarantee the poorest of 
the poor at least a minimum amount of food. This is not only 
socially justifiab le, but also because adequate food is an 
investment in the productive capacity of people.
Not only Third-world governments, but also donor countries 
must be made aware of the fact that it is equally important 
that funds be used for agricultural investment as it is to invest 
in food distribution systems.
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The Practice of Food Policy
The food situation and development in sub-Saharan Africa is in 
s ta rk  c o n tra s t w ith many o ther developing co u n tries . 
Agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa has been characterized by 
stagnating production of food and other crops and high 
population growth rates. Even though a number of countries 
have exhibited growth of about three percent (Cameroon, Ivory 
Coast, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, and Swaziland) during the 
1970s, thereby maintaining per capita availability, in many 
other countries this has not been the case. In those countries 
population growth has outstripped growth of agricultural 
production, resulting in even lower per capita food availability. 
Add to this the adverse weather conditions in many countries 
and the global economic recession that seems to have hit 
particularly hard in Africa and a rather complete picture 
emerges of the problems that have beset sub-Saharan Africa.
In about twenty countries per capita income growth was less 
than one percent over 1969-1970, while 15 countries showed a 
negative growth. In the least developed countries food 
consumption declined by almost 13 percent in the 1969/1971 - 
1979 period. Much like the per capita income, degree of 
literacy, and employment opportunities, the per capita food 
production in this subcontinent is also among the lowest in the 
world, notwithstanding the fact that this region is even more 
agriculturally oriented.
Because of stagnating agricultural production, food imports have 
increased  substan tia lly  and th e re fo re  also food im port 
dependency. A large part of the physical deficit, not based on 
effective demand but on minimum requirements, is donated as 
food aid. Prospects that this will change in the near future 
are bleak notwithstanding the fact that the past agricultural 
season has shown a quantum jump increase in food grain 
production.[10]
One of the underlying reasons of stagnating production may be 
found in the actual price policy. Because of this a large 
number of countries that were food exporting or self-sufficient
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1became food importing. Only in a number of cases can adverse 
weather conditions be blamed for it.
The major reason for such poor performance must be found in 
the high rate of population growth and in the low priority that 
governments have given to agricultural production.[ll] Many 
African governments now accept the criticism of the low 
priority they have given to the agricultural sector. This has 
been shown probably most clearly in the recent FAO - Regional 
Conference in Africa in September, 1986.(12]
Poor agricultural performance, it is well-known by now, has a 
number of side-effects. We already mentioned food import 
dependency and low per capita income growth. Another one is 
the large rural-urban migration stream as the rural population 
is forced to look for productive employment elsew here. 
However, industrial development in sub-Saharan Africa has not 
been such that the absorption capacity is large enough to 
accommodate the rural influx.
To be able to guarantee adequate food supply in the urban 
a reas , the governm ent has taken con tro l of the food 
distribution system. African governments have been extremely 
anxious to take over the food distribution system, to prevent 
manipulation of the market mechanism and the food supply. 
Only a few of such public m arketing organizations have 
succeeded in setting up a well-functioning food distribution 
system.
It is not necessary to recall here the urban bias that has been 
present in the development and agricultural policies of many 
African states. Especially low food prices for the urban 
consumers, have resulted in low commodity prices for the 
farm er, as only few countries can afford to pay farmers 
incentive prices and keep food prices to the urban consumers 
low by means of food subsidies or input subsidies to the 
farmers.
Also, the infrastructure necessary to process and move the 
ag ricu ltu re  p roduce to the urban centres has seriously
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deteriorated in the course of time, thereby aggravating the 
problems of marketing any surplus.[13] Not nearly sufficient 
investments have been allocated to the rural areas, in spite of 
the fact that more than two thirds of the population lives and 
works in rural areas.
Exports of agricultural com m odities are a major foreign 
exchange earner, with which part of the imports can be 
financed. Because government policy has favoured cash crops 
to food crops, commercial production of food crops declined 
even more. The production level of food crops became 
therefore more and more determ ined by the subsistence 
requirements of the farmers themselves. Because of this, 
urban food supply became problematic, forcing the governments 
to increase food imports. Moreover, over the past number of 
years, the prices of export crops have seriously declined, 
resulting in diminishing foreign exchange earnings. Also, 
over-valued local currencies have hampered exports of these 
crops, while export crops are often also heavily taxed at the 
borders, resulting in very low revenues to the farmer relative 
to world market prices (e.g. the farmers in Ghana and Ivory 
Coast, receive 30-40 percent of the ruling world market price, 
the remainder is government revenue).
In spite of the high export taxes, food crops have shown to be 
a feasible alternative. A number of countries however, such as 
Kenya, Malawi, Zimbabwe and Zambia have adjusted relative 
prices so that food crops are being favoured to export or other 
crops.[14] Import dependency, food security and balance of 
payment problems have caused the governments to stimulate 
domestic food production.
Another cause for low levels of production may be found in the 
man/land ratio, the level of technology applied, and the degree 
of mechanisation. Research has shown that sub-Saharan Africa 
agriculture suffers from a labour shortage in peak periods, such 
as cultivation, planting, weeding and harvesting. This shortage 
can be largely attributed to the male-female division of labour, 
the applied traditional cultivation practices, and the often 
sub-optimal nutritional status of the people who have to do the
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work.
In addition, the low levels of input cause yields also to be low, 
resulting in the area cultivated to be extended to a size 
adequate for subsistence for the farm family, thus adding to 
the already scarce labour supply. It would, therefore, seem 
reasonab le  to strongly  p rom ote  agricultural sm all-scale 
mechanization, however, the low level of schooling and the 
inadequate infrastructure hamper such development for the time 
being.
The continually declining food situation in Africa has caused 
the question to be posed as to how one could set up a well- 
coordinated programme focussing on reversing that trend. 
International organisations and donor countries alike were 
attempting to solve these issues in the mid-seventies. It did 
take some time, however, for the seriousness of the impending 
crisis to be realized by governments in the affected countries. 
Also the World Food Conference of 1974 had already discussed 
the question of how seriously food deficit countries could 
cooperate with donors to combat hunger. That question was 
posed, realizing that aid alone would not be the solution; it 
requires also a commitment from the respective governments.
The limitations, that cause small scale mechanization not to be 
a feasible alternative, must be thoroughly researched and if 
possible removed.
Grain Policies and Trade
Because of the serious problem s with respect to grain 
production in sub-Saharan Africa there appears to be a need 
for serious discussions on effective grain policies.
Three main issues for such a discussion are proposed:
- more freedom for cereal prices to adjust according to 
market conditions and to become more differentiated 
between regions and seasons;
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- restructuring rural marketing organizations to enhance 
their reliability and effectiveness;
- to provide a larger role for private sector activities.f 15]
One point of view is to allow cereal prices, to differ by 
regions within a country, reflecting different transportation 
costs. There can be no doubt that equal-price policies 
throughout a country have no economic justification, and lead 
to serious distortions and inefficiencies of resource use, and to 
large fiscal burdens with no economic return. Permitting 
regional price differentiation is therefore a sound proposal, but 
requires substantial adjustments. People living far away from 
main market centres and transportation hubs have benefitted 
for many years from nationwide uniform prices; supplies from 
outside the region are cheaper and surpluses sold fetch higher 
prices than would be the case in a free m arket. This 
advantageous change of their terms of trade is an incentive to 
go and inhabit areas from which they would have migrated 
under a differentiating system of regional prices.
Under these circumstances, transitional measures are required 
to permit these people to adjust to the worsening of their 
terms of trade. Taxing people, who live closer to such market 
centres, and who experience an improvement of their terms of 
trade as a consequence of the very same policy change, might 
be appropriate to finance the costs of the transition.
It is recommended to abolish floor (producer), and ceiling 
(consumer) prices, which have been governing many cereal price 
po lic ies u n til now; the m ain reason  being th a t th e ir  
implementation has been seriously flawed and that consequently 
the illegal character of private trade at other prices has been 
hampering the development of an efficient marketing system.
It is obvious that it constitutes a major step which will be 
considered too radical by most governments. In its place it 
would be preferable to draw a sketch of the process, divided 
into smaller steps, which leads to a more effective management 
of a more efficient marketing system. In that sketch it should
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be emphasized that it is not the purpose of this recommended 
reform to move to a system which is entirely outside the 
government’s control. Instead, it should focus on ways in 
w hich the  governm ent can lim it itse lf to m anageab le  
interventions, not exceeding the administrative capacity of the 
public sector, but clearly of sufficient strength to maintain a 
fair degree of stability in cereal markets.
It requires first of all a more detailed discussion of ways in 
which import quantities of cereals should be planned and 
managed in the medium and short run, as those are bound to 
remain a government responsibility, and will continue to be one 
of the strongest instruments of its cereal market policies. The 
relation between crop-monitoring, ordering of shipments and 
arrivals and the management of import availabilities should be 
stressed, as together they constitute one of the main ways to 
manage cereal markets in import-dependent countries. In 
countries which hover from year-to-year around in self- 
sufficiency in market terms, domestic procurement constitutes 
an additional element of policy which needs to be dovetailed in 
volume terms to import planning.
It should also be noted that developing countries do require to 
formulate price objectives for basic necessities and to use a 
limited range of instruments to achieve these objectives. Price 
objectives should bear a relationship to international prices 
ad justed  for dom estic  trad e  and tran spo rt costs. But 
international prices should not be followed too closely. For 
two reasons at least. First, government may want to avoid 
sharp short-term  fluctuations of international prices to be 
transm itted to their domestic markets and therefore adjust 
their own price objectives on the basis of moving averages 
rather than day-to-day changes. Secondly, the subsidization of 
cereal exports by a number of industrial countries depresses 
the international price of cereal below economically justified 
levels. It would therefore be short-sighted to take those low 
prices as the yardstick for setting domestic prices of cereals. 
Taxing cereal imports, to avoid the disincentive which they 
otherwise may provide to domestic procedures, is therefore 
economically justified.
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One should furthermore stress the fact that an import charge 
on cereals docs not necessarily constitute protection to one’s 
farmers. If the import tax simply captures, as tax revenues for 
the government, the amou it of subsidy which taxpayers in 
exporting countries have financed, there is no reason to 
consider this as protection. It amounts to a kind of additional 
developm ent assistance, from taxpayers in the exporting 
countries to the government of the importing country. In fact, 
if the import tax rate on cereals remains lower than the 
average tax rate on all other imports, one can still maintain 
that farmers in the importing country are receiving negative 
protection, as non-farmers are more protected than farmers.
Free-trade arguments suggest that import taxes should be 
reduced. But for the poorest developing countries, import 
taxes constitute a major part of fiscal revenues and their 
reduction runs therefore counter to the arguments for the 
strengthening of public services. Conversely, one can argue 
that import taxes on cereals should be at least as high as 
average tariffs on all other products in order to avoid negative 
protection. This would no doubt imply even higher import 
taxes on cereals than can be argued by way of the subsidy 
argument and the depressing effects which subsidies exert on 
international prices.
Whatever way governments decide to set import prices of 
cereals, their influence on domestic markets should be allowed 
to play their part by way of careful planning and phasing of 
import quantities and stock management. It should not be the 
purpose of cereal policies to set prices at a particular level but 
to supplement and strengthen the role of private trade. Prices 
should be permitted to fluctuate between boundaries around a 
central price, the latter being determined on the basis of 
(trends in) world market prices. One can think of boundaries 
of 10-15 percent above and below the central price, with 
release from stocks in public hands when the upper boundary is 
approached, and market purchases by the public sector when 
the actual price tends in the direction of the lower boundary. 
Both government sales and purchases take place with private 
traders, rather than directly from producers and to consumers,
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although the latter possibility should be kept open in order to 
be able to cope with failures and trade collision.
Presenting options for cereal market management in this way is 
probably more effective in moving governments towards more 
effective policies than stating that floor and ceiling prices are 
to be abolished. Also, a system of the kind as suggested here 
can be helpful in convincing the government that seasonal price 
variations should be permitted as long as these stay within the 
price boundaries and are made effective through a flexible 
import and domestic procurement policy. It can be dealt with 
through one and the same sets of instruments.
The larger role in cereal marketing for the private sector is 
the third major issue. Clearly, there is a potential here for a 
more efficient system and the issue is no doubt a valid one, 
particularly against the background of the failures to manage 
cereals markets by the public sector. But again in this case, a 
more detailed and carefully executed analysis ought to be made 
of the conditions which need to be met if the private sector is 
to be made the principal factor on these markets. At least the 
government should make sure that it has adequate means at 
th e ir  d isp o sa l to m a in ta in  m ark e t s ta b ili ty  be tw een  
predetermined boundaries and to circumvent the private trading 
sector if markets do not operate well or efficiently. Both for 
the public and the private sectors, it is essential that these 
conditions and rules are clearly specified, in order to avoid 
unexpected antagonistic situations or to harm producers or 
consumers of cereals.
Food Strategies
The Consultation Group on Food Production and Investments 
(CGFPI), founded in 1974 and abolished in 1977, made a first 
attempt to commit developing countries to the development of 
long-term plans for their food supply. The incentive was to 
receive an additional commitment of funds from donors to 
guarantee sufficient funds to execute the strategy. This 
approach has fortunately not died with the CGFPI, but has
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been further developed by WFC and taken to the international 
fora.
The strategy had been further worked out to give equal weight 
to production issues and to problems of consumption and 
d istribu tion . Furtherm ore the WFC stressed that such 
strategies required commitments from both sides; the developing 
country should attach high priority to food security, implement 
the necessary policies and execute a planned investment 
programme; while the donors were to commit themselves to 
guarantee the necessary funds for a number of years.
Although the value of food strategies has increasingly been 
recognized, the approach has not been wholly successful. Also 
commitments by developing countries and donor support have 
been lacking.
The strategy should only be developed for those countries that 
have not yet made an adequate planning effort; in such 
circumstances a food strategy can help to coordinate the work 
of the relevant ministries and organisation and to streamline 
and dovetail the respective programmes. Also the donor 
countries had not adequately anticipated the commitments that 
would be asked of them. Development of a food strategy is 
more than just sending two expatriates, submission of a plan 
for approval and obtaining funding:
- Food strateg ies require an in-depth analysis of the
national food and agriculture sector, often hampered by
inadequate information.
- Developing alternative futures is difficult in itself, but to
be successful it requires a solid commitment of the
government, concerning policy reforms.
- In most countries a serious problem towards achieving a 
better food supply is the lack of organizations that can 
adequate ly  im plem ent program m es and objectives. 
T h erefo re  a tho rough  analysis of the institu tional 
structure is necessary.
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There has not yet been an accepted procedure that has 
lead to donor commitments once food strategies have been 
finalized.
Food strategies are no different from other planning exercises. 
They will only be useful if they become a continuing process. 
In Africa that stage has not been reached.
Donor Coordination
In the last few years the issues of development management 
and donor coordination have been high on the agenda of many 
international organizations: UNCTAD, UNDP, the OECD/TAC
and the World Bank being the main ones. The national food 
s tra tegy  was m eant to become a new instrum ent for a 
well-coordinated aid effort for countries with serious food 
problems. So far, it has not lived up to its potential, yet it 
remains interesting to find out whether it still can. Such a 
coordinated aid effort is especially necessary in the least 
developed and smallest countries. A strategy may become a 
basis for fruitful discussions regarding food and agricultural 
policy and may provide the opportunity to coordinate the 
ensuing aid effort on a mutually acceptable basis. In such a 
case, special attention can be paid to the reinforcement of the 
policy execution capacity together with the core agencies for 
economic management. Discussing a food strategy in a donor 
meeting stimulates coordination and adds to the status of the 
paper. The document must therefore have some standing, 
obtained, for example, by peer judgement or by specialized 
agencies. Such donor coordination efforts may be organized 
under the umbrella of the WFC, but with the participation of 
the FAO and the IBRD.
Outlook
Aid to Africa with regard to food and agricultural development 
has increased rapidly over recent years. Rough estimates show 
that concessional aid to sub-Saharan Africa are equal or have
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surpassed aid levels to South Asia. On per capita basis this 
means much more aid to Africa, as the Asian population is four 
times larger in size. Unfortunately, this allocation of aid does 
not reflect the distribution of income. It appears that the 
’Africa aid’ effort has not generated additional funds but has 
caused a re-allocation away from Asia. But it has been made 
clear that aid measured in money terms is not necessarily the 
most relevant criterion.
The food security problem is not only a financial problem, but 
is to a large extent a problem of policy formulation and the 
av a ilab ility  of a d e q u a te  and capable  core staff. Or 
alternatively, if the funds would increase, the channels for 
such funds would become blocked. Already now the marginal 
efficiency of the additional aid flow has been seriously reduced, 
thereby adding to the criticism of some donors as well as of 
the South-Asian governments who contend that the size of the 
aid effort to sub-Saharan Africa is disproportional to the size 
of the needy population as compared to South Asia.
To adequately help Africa, well-documented plans concerning 
food policy and their execution must be made. Although it is 
accepted on paper, that Africa’s problem requires a long-term 
solution with a large-term commitment, carefully developed 
plans and activities, and building analytical capability, it is not 
well respected in practise. The time has come that African 
governments must realize the seriousness of the crisis. In 
doing so, the donors should stand ready to support any efforts 
to abolish hunger and poverty. Their willingness to commit 
themselves for a multi-annual period might positively influence 
the effort.
NOTES
1. This article draws upon an earlier published version in the 
International Spectator by W. Tims and D.C. Faber, 
39-9:536-546. 1985.
53
NOTES
(Continued)
2. Meadows et. al., The Limits o f Growth. University 
Books, New York. 1972.
3. World Bank President’s address to the Annual Meeting. 
Nairobi, Washington D.C. 1973.
4. W orld Food Council, The World Food and Hunger
Problem: Changing Perspectives and Possibilities. An
Independent Assessment. Rome. 1974-1984. 1984.
5. World Food Council, Progress Towards the Eradication of 
Hunger, a M ultila teral Decade For Food. R om e. 
1974-1984. 1984.
6. C.P. Timmer, W.P. Falcon and S.R. Pearson. Food Policy 
Analysis. Johns Hopkins University Press. 1983.
7. FAO - Committee on World Food Security, Director-
General Report on World Food Security: A Re-appraisal
o f Concepts and Approaches. Rome. 1983.
8. G.S. Tolley, V. Thomas and C.M. Wang. Agriculture 
Private Policy and the Developing Countries. Johns 
Hopkins University Press. 1982.
9. World Food Council. Toward the Eradication o f Hunger. 
Rome. 1980.
10. M. Rukuni, and C.K. Eicher. The Food Security Equation 
in Southern Africa. Mimeo. 1986.
11. World Food Council and the Government of Netherlands. 
Workshop held on Food Security Strategies for African 
Countries. The Hague. 1980.
54
NOTES
12. FAO - African Agriculture: The Next 25 Years. Rome.
1986.
13. In this respect it should be noted that an increasing part 
of Dutch (food) aid to the Sudan, Ethiopia and the 
Sahelian countries has been allocated to infrastructural 
Improvements, in order to be able to get the food to 
deficit areas.
14. M. Rukuni, and C.K. Eicher. Op cit. Mimeo. 1986.
15. Centre for World Food Studies. Cereals Policy Reform in 
the Sahel: A Critical Assessment o f the Berg Reports 
done fo r  the Netherlands. M inistry of Development 
Cooperation, Amsterdam - Wageningen. 1986.
55
THE FOOD SECURITY EQUATION 
IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
Mandivamba Rukuni and Car! IC Eicher
Introduction
Most scientists are surprised to learn that the continent of 
Africa occupies a land area larger than the combined area of 
the United States, Western Europe and the Peoples Republic of 
China. The immensity of Africa provides a sober note of 
reality and humility in discussing food security policy issues, 
and research priorities for Africa. Even if one moves from the 
50 states in Africa to 45 states in Sub-Saharan Africa, we are 
still dealing with an immense land area of six complex and 
diverse sub-regions, 45 states, 7 colonial histories, 1000 ethnic 
groups and countries at different stages and prospects for 
development.
The immensity of Africa should be juxtaposed against the 
desire of donor agencies to deal with African problems. 
Currently, almost every donor and international agency is 
working overtime to develop a response to the "African Crisis". 
But in the rush to develop general policies, programmes and 
models for Africa, a word of caution is in order. Gerald 
Helleiner, a Canadian Economist with 25 years of research 
experience on Africa reminds us that:
Beleaguered policy-makers in developing countries 
have become quite tired of generalised advice... Un-
56
happiness with global prescriptions has rarely been 
as vociferous as it has become in recent years in the 
context o f the ’conditionality’ attached to IMR, 
World Bank and other official lending (Agencies)?.
The IMF and the World Bank usually deny that they 
em ploy a single "model" fo r  all their mem ber 
c o u n tr ie s . W hether th ese  in s t i tu t io n s , qua  
institutions, do or do not, there can be little doubt 
tha t, w ith in  th em , g e n e ra lise d  p rescrip tio n s  
abound.[ \]
Helleiner’s wise words of experience are also instructive for 
researchers. The central question is: How can researchers
grapple with the immensity and complexity of Africa? This is 
an especially difficult problem because agricultural development 
is a highly location specific process. While African researchers 
natu rally  re jec t the idea of trying to develop a single 
institutional model (e.g. agriculture extension, research, credit 
marketing), for Africa, how does one advance a "manageable" 
agenda for studying common problems such as household, 
national and regional food security?
There are at least four options open to researchers in 
organizing social science research on a Sub-Saharan African 
basis. The first option is the generation of cross-country 
statistical data that examines almost all countries. This 
approach is routinely used by the United Nations Food and 
A gricultural O rganisation (FA O ), and the U nited States 
Development Aid (USDA), the two world sources of agricultural 
trade data. The second approach is to go to the other extreme 
and promote ad hoc, in-depth country studies, relying heavily 
on historical data. For example, two political scientists with 
several decades of experience in Zaire, Crawford Young and 
Thomas Turner, recently completed a definitive study entitled: 
The Rise and Decline o f the Zairian State, (1985).[2]
The third option is to focus on a common problem or sector in 
one of the six major ecosystems, such as the Sahel or Southern 
Africa. The FAO report SADCC Agriculture : Toward 2000,
(1984)[3] is an example of this approach.
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The fourth option is to organise an African-wide program of 
comparative studies of individual countries that are linked by a 
common analytical framework for the study of a particular 
policy question such as food security. W hile there are 
obviously advantages and disadvantages of each of the four 
approaches, Michigan State University (MSU) agricultural 
economists, in cooperation with agricultural economists in 
Africa, invested most of 1984 in developing a proposal to carry 
out a programme of comparative studies of food security policy 
options in Sub-Saharan Africa. The characteristics of the MSU 
Food Security Comparative Studies Programme are that:
1) a common analytical framework is used to examine the 
interplay of technology, institutions and incentives in each 
country and/or region;
2) the goal is to generate empirical information on how 
policy changes affect the achievement of household, 
national and, in some cases, regional (e.g. Southern 
Africa) food security objectives;
3) each  coun try  study includes an explicit, up -fron t 
commitment, to develop indigenous scientific capacity to 
design and carry out empirical studies, process data 
locally and assist in developing local institutional capacity 
for policy analysis;
4) the studies are designed to complement on-going food 
security studies such as the EEC-financed studies in 
Zambia, Mali and Rwanda and SADCC’s 12 food security 
studies and projects;
5) research results are synthesized through conference, 
seminars and working papers. All working papers are 
distributed free of charge within Africa.
MSU food security studies are underway in four countries - 
Senegal, Mali, Rwanda, Somalia, and one region - Southern 
Africa. In Southern Africa, the work is being carried out 
through a sub-contract with the Department of Agricultural
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Economics and Extension of the University of Zimbabwe. The 
University of Zimbabwe has placed initial emphasis on studies 
of Zimbabwe, but there are plans to broaden this coverage to 
several other countries where local researchers are interested 
in cooperative research on common themes.
The MSU research programme has been underway for about 18 
months in Mali and Southern Africa, 12 months in Rwanda and 
a few months in Senegal and Somalia. Naturally, there is a 
budget limit on every research project. If more funds were 
available, it would be desirable to undertake studies in a larger 
number of countries - perhaps 8 or 9 - to cope with the 
immensity of Sub-Saharan Africa. This is an important issue in 
light of the fact that 18 of the 45 countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa have a population of less than 3 million. MSU’s present 
research programme does not include any country with a 
population of less than 3 million.
We have chosen to organise our paper around four interrelated 
themes:
1) The Changing Food and Agriculture Situation in the World 
Economy, Africa and Southern Africa;
2) The Food Security Equation;
3) SA D C C ’s U p d a te d  Policy and S tra tegy  for Food 
Agriculture and Natural Resources: Implication for Food 
Security Researchers;
4) Six Food Security Research Challenges in Southern Africa.
The Changing Food and Agriculture Situation in the World 
Economy, Africa and Southern Africa
The University of Zimbabwe’s food security research programme 
in Southern Africa was conceptualised in 1984 during the 
prolonged drought in the region. Hence, it is important to 
reassess our research priorities in the context of a rapidly
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changing food and agriculture outlook in Southern Africa and 
in the world economy
Global Overview
The world food pendulum has swung widely every decade or so. 
India’s disastrous harvests of 1965/66 triggered the 1966 world 
food crisis that was followed by the Sahelian drought and 
world food crisis of the early 1970s. The doomsday prediction 
of the mid-1970s have been followed by a much more optimistic 
assessment of the world food outlook in the 1980s, punctuated 
by the Great African Famine of 1985 where a conservative 
estimate of 300,000 people died. In general, the code word of 
scarcity has been replaced by the appealing slogan that the 
world is now "awash with grain".
The current global food outlook can be summarised as follows:
* If food in the world were becoming more scarce, its real 
price would be tending upward. But the real price of 
wheat in world markets has been falling for well over a 
century. By the beginning of the 1980s, the real price of 
wheat in world markets was roughly half what it was 120 
years earlier in 1860. Moreover, the price has declined 
significantly since 1980.
* The real price of maize in world markets started to 
decline after World War II with the spread of hybrid 
maize. Global maize stocks in 1986/87 are 160 million 
metric tons (a 25 year high) compared with 40 million 
metric tons in 1983-84.
* The recent export quotation for No 2 yellow maize at US 
Gulf ports was US$ 70/ton in 1986 as compared with US$ 
100/ton in 1985 and US$ 160/ton in 1980.[4] Thus maize 
is at an all time low in real terms.
The production of rice is running ahead of demand in 
several large countries in Asia - e.g. India and Indonesia,
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requ iring  large adjustm ent program m es to shift to 
alternative crops.
* The production of sorghum is running ahead of domestic 
demand in China, India and Zimbabwe.
* Major adjustment programmes in Third World agriculture 
call for expanded agricultural policy research to guide the 
adjustment process and minimize the losses to various 
parties in the agricultural industry. However, only two 
percent of the operational research budgets of the 13 
International Agricultural Research Centres (the CGLAR 
System) is for agricultural policy research.
Despite this global assessment of food abundance, there are an 
estim ated  300 to 900 m illion people who suffer from 
malnutrition in the Third World[5]. The FAO estimated that
100 million or roughly one-fourth of the total population of
Africa were not receiving a calorie-adequate diet in 1985.
The central question that flows from this paradox of global 
food abundance and malnutrition is whether malnutrition is a 
food problem or a poverty problem? Over the part decade, 
pioneering research by a number of social scientists and
nutritionists has helped answer this question. There is now
overwhelming evidence that malnutrition is not caused by a 
shortage of food production but by a lack of purchasing power 
and poverty[6], or what Sen calls a lack of entitlements[7].
The empirical evidence that poverty is a central cause of 
famine, hunger and m alnutrition emphasises the need for 
stepped-up research on the relationships between poverty, 
hunger, famine and m alnutrition  because expanded food 
production cannot end hunger.
The Food Situation In Africa
In 1960 when 16 African states won their independence, Sub- 
Saharan Africa was a modest net exporter of food. But rapid
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population growth, declining food production and the Sahelian 
drought turned Africa into a net food importer in the mid to 
late 1960s. Food imports escalated during the Sahelian drought 
of the early 1970s, levelled off and then surged again starting 
in 1980. In 1985, Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 87 percent 
of grain imports: wheat, 50 percent; rice, 22 percent; and 
maize, 15 percent.
The most important change in Africa’s food import picture over 
the past two decades is the increasing importance of food aid. 
In the late 1960s, food aid accounted for 5% of the total grain 
imports, increasing to 18% in the mid-seventies and 40% in 
1983-85. From 1980 to 1985, food aid increased five-fold while 
commercial food imports were stagnant. In 1985, food aid 
accounted for 7 of the 12 million tons of Africa’s food imports.
Africa’s food crisis in the 15 year period from '1970-84 can be 
captured in a single statistic; food production grew at half the 
population growth rate during this period. But in 1985, food 
production made a dramatic recovery because of near normal 
rainfall throughout most of the sub-continent.
Crop production set records in Burkina Faso, Chad, Somalia, 
Sudan, Kenya and Zimbabwe.
Table 1 shows that indices of per capita food production 
increased in 1985. In 1986, the food situation has continued 
the 1985 pattern except in a few countries such as Botswana, 
now in the fifth year of a drought.
The central question that flows from this overview is the 
nature of the recovery in food production and availability; is 
the 1985/86 recover a temporary phenomenon or the beginning 
of an upward trend?
Food Situation in the SADCC Region
Today, there are 70 million people in the nine SADCC states, 
up 12 million from the 58 million when SADCC was established
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TABLE 1 : AFRICA: INDICES OF PER CAPITA FOOD PRODUCTION BY COUNTRY, 1976-1985 
(1976-78 = 100)
COUNTRY '76 •77 •78 ■79 •80 •81 •82 •83 •84 •85
ANGOLA 105 101 94 95 92 85 85 83 80 79
BENIN (DAHOCY) 96 101 100 102 90 87 83 77 93 102
BURUNDI 99 100 99 96 92 95 93 92 83 85
CNCROCN 103 103 93 96 93 92 86 82 86 89
ETHIOPIA 94 96 106 115 104 102 113 99 89 83
GHANA 106 98 95 012 100 95 89 74 87 88
GUINEA 101 99 96 95 95 91 96 92 93 96
IVORY COAST 95 101 102 112 118 120 110 103 120 120
KENYA 99 102 97 88 86 89 93 89 75 82
LIBERIA 101 102 97 96 100 100 96 100 101 99
MADAGASCAR 105 103 92 95 95 90 90 92 89 88
MALAWI 99 97 103 99 99 102 106 101 100 96
MALI 99 93 106 102 96 110 107 99 82 97
KEAHJIQUE 96 100 102 100 99 99 96 73 78 84
NIGER 97 96 103 106 111 102 99 96 61 88
NIGERIA 99 100 100 101 103 99 96 84 83 97
RUANDA 102 99 96 105 100 104 105 105 84 93
SENEGAL 110 78 110 83 73 97 96 69 72 80
SIERRA LECNE 99 103 97 96 92 88 86 89 80 79
SOUTH AFRICA 96 101 102 96 101 109 94 80 85 80
SUDAN 97 102 100 80 88 103 82 78 67 96
TANZANIA 100 99 100 100 96 96 93 94 90 95
TOGO 101 93 105 109 104 103 96 89 96 102
UGANDA 100 96 101 92 87 90 94 96 96 95
BURKINA FASO (UPPER VOLTA) 96 100 103 103 94 104 102 94 87 109
ZAIRE 102 101 96 97 97 100 101 100 95 96
ZAM3IA 109 101 90 84 84 93 84 91 87 92
ZIMBABWE 102 100 96 81 83 99 86 64 71 95
AFRICA, SUB-SAHARA 100 100 100 99 99 101 97 89 90 95
SUB-SAHARA LESS SOUTH AFRICA 101 100 99 99 99 99 96 90 90 96
ALGERIA 109 94 96 94 102 95 91 84 85 102
EGYPT 102 99 96 99 99 96 99 96 96 96
LIBYA 104 95 100 91 91 97 96 95 97 98
MOROCOO 109 85 105 99 99 78 96 90 91 93
TUNISIA 106 96 97 95 101 106 117 106 119 141
AFRICA NORTH 106 94 100 96 100 92 99 95 95 101
ALL AFRICA 101 99 100 96 99 99 96 90 91 97
AFRICA LESS SOUTH AFRICA 102 99 100 99 99 96 96 91 92 97
SOURCE: USDA, 1966
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in 1980. The population in the region is growing at about 2 
million per year and by the year 2000, there will likely be 100 
million people in the region. Even though the rate of 
population growth is projected to level off at 2.9 percent by 
the year 2000, the population in the SADCC region will likely 
double from 100 to 200 million sometime between 2020 and 
2030.
With 50 to 80 percent of the population in the region deriving 
th e ir  em ploym ent from  ag ricu ltu re  and rural non-farm  
employment, it follows that raising the productivity of the 
agricultural sector is essential for raising the average standard 
of living in the region.
Presently there is no definitive assessment of the changes that 
have taken place in the food economy of the SADCC region in 
1985 and 1986. The FAO report SADCC Agriculture : Toward
2000, (1984) is a hurried report that has been overtaken by 
events. Likewise, SADCC’s Macro-economic Survey, (1986), 
draws heavily on the FAO report and secondary data published 
through 1984.
The following overview highlights some of the important 
changes in the food situation in the SADCC region. The food 
economy in the nine SADCC states can be divided into a maize 
belt of three countries - Zimbabwe, Malawi and Zambia - and 
six food deficit countries. The maize belt has a backlog of 
farmer-tested maize varieties capable of producing significant 
surpluses for intra-regional trade. Since maize accounts for 
roughly 50 percent of the calories consumed in Zimbabwe and 
Zambia, and 70 percent in Malawi, it is important for food 
se cu rity  rese a rc h e rs  to identify  the sources of m aize 
productivity growth and to assess the relevances of the maize 
production model for other SADCC states and for other sub- 
regions in Africa.
We shall sketch some of the highlights of the SADCC Maize 
Model. Currently, Zimbabwe has around two million tons of 
maize in storage which is equivalent to about three years’ 
normal domestic sales by the Grain Marketing Board (GMB). In
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addition, Zimbabwe has the equivalent of four years’ domestic 
sales of red sorghum in storage.
The sources of productivity growth in maize, wheat, cotton and 
other commodities in Zimbabwe cannot be attributed to any 
single factor such as higher prices or favourable weather. For 
example, the sources of genetic material for maize, wheat and 
cotton are a function of several decades of pioneering research. 
For example, in 1960 Zimbabwe became the first country apart 
from the United States to introduce hybrid maize - SR-52 - to 
commercial farmers after 28 years of research on hybrids. 
Because Zimbabwe and Zambia were members of the Central 
African Federation when SR-52 was released, it was transferred 
to Zambia where it was quickly adopted by commercial farmers.
The maize revolution is unfolding in Zambia; new hybrids, and 
open pollinated maize varieties, higher producer prices, and the 
reorganisation of the seed parastatal along the lines of a 
public/private corporation, have propelled maize production to 
1.1 million tons in 1986, enough for domestic consumption until 
the 1987 harvest begins next June.
In Malawi, maize is the staple food and it has been exported 
for seven of the past ten years. Maize production is based on 
open po llina ted  varieties because hybrids acceptable to 
consumer tastes are not available. Malawi’s maize expansion 
appears to be a function of dramatically higher producer prices, 
shifting the price relatives of maize vis-a-vis other crops, large 
fertilizer subsidies and a vigorous extension programme.
In summary, the causes of the maize revolution in Zimbabwe, 
Zambia and Malawi should be closely examined by food security 
researchers. We are of the opinion that the surge in 
production in the maize belt is the cumulative outcome of past 
agricultural research,  a subtle  array of  institutional  
improvements and dramatic price increases beginning around 
1980. In short, a balanced package of technology and pricing 
policies is the hallmark of the maize revolution in the three 
countries. There are still a number of puzzles about the maize 
revolution that should be explored by researchers; ideally, in a
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programme of comparative studies involving researchers from 
the three countries.
Policy m akers are now faced with some important policy 
adjustments in the maize belt. The central policy issue is how 
to promote efficient diversification into oilseeds, higher valued 
export crops, import substitution crops for local industries (e.g. 
natural rubber), livestock and new food products. The rapid 
increase in maize supplies in the maize belt should be followed 
by government policies and institutional innovations to expand 
employment for low income people in rural areas (maize for 
work programmes) and diversification programmes.
But it takes a decade, on the average, to produce and farmer- 
test new varieties for crop diversification. SADCC should plan 
its agricultural research and human capital strategy to meet the 
needs of year 2000. For example, should SADCC develop a 
regional fruit and vegetable research programme? Should 
SADCC invest in research on jojoba, nitrogen-fixing trees and 
some of the thousands of d ifferent fruit species not in 
commercial production? Vietmeyer reports that about 3000 
different fruit species are found in Africa, Asia, Latin America, 
the Caribbean and the Pacific Islands but "only four - bananas, 
pineapple, papaya and mango - have been developed into major 
crops"[8]. SADCC’s regional agricultural programme should pose 
the question: What are the strategic long-run investments in
basic science, post-graduate training, applied research, and 
infrastructure to speed agriculture diversification and rural 
industrialization over the next 10 to 15 years?
The maize revolution in the centre of the SADCC region poses 
several questions for SADCC, when six SADCC countries are 
food importers:
1) Can the genetic backlog of maize varieties be transferred 
to some of the food deficit countries?
2) How long will it take the ICRISAT/SADCC Sorghum and
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Millet research programme, located at the Matopo’s station 
outside Bulawayo, to generate white sorghum production 
technology for low rainfall areas in the region where 
maize is a risky crop? In short, can white sorghum 
research achieve the same genetic potential of maize in 
the SADCC region?
3) Should SADCC’s food-dominated regional research portfolio
be expanded to include research on import substitution
with crops such as natural rubber export crops such as
jojoba, spices, cut flowers, etc.
We believe that SADCC agriculture has reached a turning point 
where the nine states can be divided into a maize belt of three 
surplus producing countries and six food deficit states. This 
dichotomy into surplus and deficit sub-regions has important 
implications for SADCC’s food and agriculture policy, for 
SADCC’s food security studies and projects and the University 
of Zimbabwe’s food security research programme. We shall 
discuss these issues in the section on Six Research Challenges.
The Food Situation in South Africa
The objective of maize policy in South Africa is to maintain 
self-sufficiency plus a surplus for export during the years of 
favourable weather. Whereas maize production in Zimbabwe 
normally ranges from 2 to 3 million tons, maize production in 
South Africa reached a peak of 14.6 million tons in 1981, with 
about 50 percent used in livestock feed. The 1981 production 
record was the culm ination of large price increases, and 
extremely favourable weather. In 1981 and 1982, maize and 
maize product exports made up nearly 30 percent of the total 
value of agricultural exports.
In 1982-85, because of the drought, South Africa imported 
maize and, in late 1983, it became a net food importer for the 
first time since World War II. Production returned to normal 
in 1986 (9 million tons).
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The Food Security Equation: Food Availability and Access
to Food
Ten years ago, the two economists, Reutlinger and Selowsky, 
published an influential monograph on Malnutrition and Poverty, 
(1976).
The authors challenged the assumption that higher rates of 
food production, economic growth and market forces would 
bring about an improvement in nutrition in Third World 
coun tries  w ithin an acceptable time fram e. They also 
contended that an understanding of the causes of malnutrition 
or policy solutions would have to address the distribution of 
food among different groups in the population.
In 1977, Oxford economist, A.K. Sen, published a paper on 
entitlements and famine and reinforced the view that poverty, 
or what Sen called the lack of entitlements (land, income, 
family support systems), is a major cause of famine and hunger. 
Sen also asserted that the prevailing view of the 1970s, that 
famine was caused primarily by a food production shortfall, was 
a simplistic and outmoded concept. Sen later expanded his 
entitlement thesis in his celebrated book Poverty and Famine, 
(1981).
The concept of food security came off age in the early 1980s. 
In a collection of essays edited by Alberto Valdes Food 
Security for Developing Countries, (1981), food security was 
defined as "the ability of food deficit countries, or regions 
within countries, to meet target consumption levels on a year- 
to-year basis", a definition that incorporates the effects of 
both supply and demand. In early 1986, the World Bank issued 
a food security policy paper Poverty and Hunger, in which food 
security was defined as "access by all people at all times to 
enough food for an active and healthy life." Two essential 
elements are "the availability of food and the ability to acquire 
it". We believe the Bank’s definition will gain international 
acceptance because it is simple but comprehensive and it 
rem inds one that there are two interacting parts of the 
equation.
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In summary, it has taken about a decade for the results of 
research on the link between poverty, hunger, famine and 
malnutrition to gain acceptance in policy circles. This time lag 
is about the same (a decade) as technical scientists require to 
develop improved plant varieties.
The two sides of the food security equation help provide a 
focus to the food security policy and research agendas in the 
SADCC region:
1) food availability through domestic production, storage 
and/or trade, and
2) access to food through hom e production, or food 
transfers.
To date, SADCC member states, SADCC’s regional programmes 
and donor agencies, have given priority to the food availability 
side of the food security equation. Food production research, 
food production campaigns, early warning systems and expanded 
grain storage capacity, have been emphasised in the First six 
years of SADCC’s history from 1980 to 1986.
On the food access side of the equation, Botswana has clearly 
taken the lead in the SADCC region, and probably in all of 
Africa, in developing a national food strategy, and implementing 
four innovative program m es, to cope with drought and 
household and national food insecurity[9]. Botswana made a 
strategic decision during the 1979 drought to develop a 
permanent institutional capacity to cope with drought and to 
ensure that all members of society have access to a calorie- 
adequate diet. When the present drought initially took hold in 
1982, Botsw ana fu rth e r s tren g th en ed  its food secu rity  
programmes such as Pula for Work, supplementary feeding for 
underw eight ch ild ren , school feeding program m es, food 
production input packages and a project to reduce the 
dependency on rainfall by bringing more land under irrigation. 
About 600,000 or 60 percent of Botswana’s population were 
receiving some type of assistance from these food security 
programmes at some time during 1986. We are of the opinion
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that a SADCC conference should be convened to study what 
can be learned from Botswana’s pioneering food security 
experiments.
The food access or demand side of the food security equation 
is an unch arted  area  in term s of research  and policy 
experimentation (with the exception of Botswana). There is a 
need for food surplus SADCC member states to expand their 
policy analysis capability to determine how to achieve adequate 
food consum ption for groups of the population who are 
inadequately nourished in years when aggregate supplies are 
adequate or in surplus.
In food deficit countries, the key policy issue is, what can be 
done to assure adequate levels of food consumption for the 
entire population at all times at the least possible cost. In 
food deficit countries, a key research topic is how to develop 
an efficient food production system, including cost-effective 
ways to increase the index of food self-sufficiency of key 
staple foods while reducing the risk of importing food from 
South Africa under present emergency conditions in the region.
It is not time to discard several appealing concepts such as 
food firs t, food se lf-re lian ce  and food self-sufficiency. 
Although these concepts have a powerful emotional and 
political appeal, they have a built-in food production bias. 
Moreover, they cannot help answer the key political question: 
W hat is the m ost cost effective m ix o f  dom estic  fo o d  
production and storage, food trade and/or food aid to meet 
national food security needs?
But food self-sufficiency can be a useful operational concept if 
it is supported with underlying economic analysis. For 
example, if Botswana wants to increase its self-sufficiency 
index of sorghum from 30 to 80 percent through subsidised 
credit, mechanisation and irrigation projects, what will it cost 
in real terms to increase the self-sufficiency ratio? How much 
additional employment can be generated? What is the political 
value of reducing the ratio of staple food dependency? These 
are hard political economy type questions that can only be
70
answered by in-depth research. We are of the opinion that the 
concept of food security should replace food first, food self- 
reliance and food sufficiency.
SADCC’s Updated Policy and Strategy for Food, Agriculture and 
Natural Resources : Implications for Food Security Researchers
When the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference 
(SADCC) was established in Lusaka in 1980, the overarching 
aim was to accelerate regional cooperation of the nine member 
states to further social and economic development and reduce 
their dependence on South Africa. Seven regional food and 
agriculture sector programmes were established by SADCC, and 
Zimbabwe was requested to provide leadership in carrying out 
one of the seven sub-sector programmes - regional food 
security. We shall now examine the evolution of SADCC’s food 
security programme from 1980-86.
The Evolution of SADCC’s Regional Food Security Programme
The initial SADCC meeting in Lusaka in April of 1980 did not 
provide Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Agriculture with a definition of 
regional food security. Following the Lusaka meeting, the 
Economics and Markets Branch of Zimbabwe’s Agricultural 
M inistry was charged with developing a food security  
programme of work in the short space of six weeks.
One of the first steps taken by Zimbabwe’s Economics and 
Markets Branch was to set up an Inter-Ministerial Committee. 
Subsequently, two technical level meetings were held, which 
comprised of officials from Agriculture Ministries of all nine 
SADCC countries. These meetings, in mid-1980, laid the 
groundwork for a portfolio of nine regional food security 
projects. Over a period of several months in mid-1980, the 
various committees reached the following conclusions about the 
nature of food insecurity problems in the SADCC region and
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steps to meet these problems:
1) regional food security was interpreted to mean that the 
countries of the SADCC region should be assured of food 
supplies adequate in both quantitative and qualitative 
terms to feed their populations;
2) food production in the region was considered about ten 
percent below food needs in the region;
3) since less than 5 percent of the arable land in the region 
was used for farming in any one year, it was concluded 
that the region had the potential to attain food security 
by increasing its own food production, and that this 
should be the strategic principle on which to base its 
future foods security policy;
4) to attain an overall aim of the policy it was considered
that a number of measures are necessary which, taken 
together, would have the effect of reducing constraints 
to, and encourag ing  increase  in, food p roduction  
throughout the SADCC countries;
5) nine regional food security proposals were approved by
the Council of Ministers at Maputo in November 1980.
These proposals were later developed into projects and
they becam e the reg ion ’s food security policy and 
programme of action.
In December 1982, Zimbabwe established a Food Security 
A dm in is tra tion  U nit in the M inistry  of A griculture to 
administer the regional food security programme.
Agricultural Policy Reforms Underway in Member States
Since agricultural, nutrition and economic policies may be more 
important than national and regional food security projects per 
se (e.g. grain storage, early warning systems) in influencing the 
achievement of national and regional food security objectives,
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it is important to review some of the significant policy shifts 
by SADCC member states over the past few years. A careful 
review of the recen tly  com pleted  food and agriculture 
background policy statements, and other sources reveal that a 
number of significant policy reforms are underway, including 
the following:
* Significant experimentation is underway in pricing policy 
reform. For example, Zambia recently introduced floor 
prices to replace official guaranteed producer prices for 
maize for the 1986/87 crop year. The policy is designed 
to reduce the cost of storing unexpected large crops. But 
farmers are permitted to take advantage of market price 
movements and sell their maize at above floor prices.
* All nine member states are pursuing policies to increase 
local food production and reduce food imports but, there 
is little supporting economic analysis of the real costs of 
increasing the self-sufficiency ratios of staple foods in 
member states.
* No member state is pursuing a policy of increasing food 
imports from neighbouring states, thus raising fundamental 
questions about a possible conflict between national food 
self-sufficiency policies and SADCC’s objective to expand 
intra-regional trade.
SADCC’s Updated Policy and Strategy for Food, Agriculture and 
Natural Resources
In May, 1986, SADCC’s Council of Ministers met in Maputo and 
requested the Agriculture Ministries in the Region to review 
the e n t i r e  r e g io n a l  food  and a g r ic u ltu re  p o r tfo lio , 
Subsequently, a working party was appointed and, over the 
course of three months, an updated policy and strategy was 
developed for food, agriculture and natural resources. The 
updated strategy was approved by the nine SADCC Ministries of 
Agriculture in Mbabane on October 9, 1986.
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SADCC’s Updated Policy and Strategy for Food, Agriculture and 
Natural Resources is designed to achieve the following basic 
objectives:
- Provide a framework to integrate SADCC’s regional and 
national policies and projects, and harmonize investments 
that cut across sectors such as agro-industry and human 
capital improvements;
- Reinforce and facilitate the efficient growth of food and 
agricultural production in member states;
- Increase  ru ra l incom es and fac ilita te  em ploym ent 
generation in member states in order to help translate the 
food needs of rural people into effective demand to 
purchase food in the market;
- Assist member states in designing policies, programmes 
and projects to increase household food security and to 
ensure an adequate diet for all members of society;
- Increase national and regional food security to ensure 
against bad harvests, natural disaster and reduce food 
dependence on South Africa and the world economy;
- F o s te r  the  e ff ic ie n t developm en t, u tilisa tio n  and 
conservation of natural resources and protection of the 
environment;
- Generation of domestic savings and foreign exchange to 
finance a gradual structural transformation of agriculture- 
dom inated  econom ies to those  producing a larger 
percentage of industrial goods and services.
The highlights of SADCC’s Updated Policy and Strategy for
Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources are as follows:
* The primary goal of the sector is to increase household,
national and regional food security.
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* Food security is defined as ensuring that all members of a 
household, nation or region have access to an adequate 
diet to lead an active and normal life. Its two essential 
e le m en ts  a re  food av a ilab ility  th rough  expanded 
production, storage and trade and the ability of all people 
to acquire an adequate diet.
* The mandate of SADCC’s regional food security programme 
has been broadened to include both sides of the food 
security equation - food availability and access to food.
* Since poverty is a key cause of household food insecurity, 
expanding food production and the achievement of national 
food self-sufficiency will not automatically end food 
insecurity. Therefore, income and employment generating 
projects in rural areas (e.g. crops, raw m aterials for 
processing, small ruminants, fishing, small scale industry, 
etc.), are essential components of increasing national food 
security.
* The updated  s tra tegy  re ite ra te s  the im portance of 
increasing food production; particularly in food deficit 
member states.
* Agro-industries and rural small scale industries are an 
integral part of the updated agriculture strategy.
* The food orientation of the regional agricultural research 
strategy has been broadened to include cash crops, 
industrial crops and export crops in order to generate 
production technology to expand rural incomes, foreign 
exchange earnings and help rural families purchase a 
better diet.
* Because of the need to anticipate rather than respond to 
changes in the world food economy, policy analysis 
capability should be strengthenend in the region.
* The strategy expands the mandate of the Southern Africa 
Centre for Cooperation in Agricultural Research (SACCAR)
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to include postgraduate training in agriculture and natural 
resources and charges SACCAR with developing a regional 
b lu e p r in t to  s tren g th en  p o st-g rad u a te  tra in in g  in 
agriculture on a long term basis. SADCC invites its 
cooperating partners - bilateral and regional - to work 
closely with SACCAR in planning and helping implement 
this important activity.
* P rogram m es in na tu ra l resources - soil and water 
conservation, fisheries, forestry and wildlife - will be 
developed and intensified for their direct contribution to 
developing, utilising and sustaining the natural resource 
base and th e ir d irec t and indirect contribution to 
increasing food, agriculture and livestock production.
* The strategy requires close liaison between the food, 
agriculture and natural resources sectors and the industry 
and trade sectors in order to increase regional cooperation 
in the planning, production and trade in seed, fertilizer, 
pesticides, farm machinery, food processing and other 
agro-industries.
SIX FOOD SECURITY RESEARCH CHALLENGES IN  
SOUTHERN AFRICA
We now turn our attention to the research challenges that flow 
from SADCC’s updated policy and strategy for food, agriculture 
and natural resources that was approved on October 9, 1986. 
Before proceeding, we believe it is important to clear up the 
following issues:
(a) the definition of food security;
(b) the need for a balanced approach to address both sides of
the food security research equation;
(c) the need for a multi-disciplinary approach; and
(d) an appropriate time frame.
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We define food security as ensuring that all members of society 
have access to enough food throughout the year to lead an 
active and healthy life. The two key components of food 
security are food  availability (through domestic production, 
storage a n d /o r  trad e ) and fo o d  access (through home 
production, purchase in the market or food transfers).
It is important to ensure that food security is not defined as 
being synonymous with food self-sufficiency or agricultural 
development. Food self-sufficiency, is a narrower concept than 
food security. Food self-sufficiency can be narrowly defined as 
achieving 100 percent of the staple food needs of a nation 
from dom estic production and storage under all weather 
probabilities. Increasing the food self-sufficiency index (e.g. 
Lesotho’s drive to raise its self-sufficiency index of wheat from 
30 percent to 60, 80 or 90 percent) is a valid policy objective. 
The challenge for food security researchers is to compute the 
real cost (and risk reduction) of increasing the self-sufficiency 
index of a particular commodity. But we observe that few 
countries in SADCC currently have the data, analytical skills 
and time to carry out such exercises. The University of 
Zimbabwe study of the wheat industry is an example of the 
type of research that is needed to add more "substance" to 
debate on food self-sufficiency.
Food security  is a narrow er concept than  ag ricu ltu ra l 
development. Agricultural development is defined as the 
process of increasing agricultural output while remaining silent 
on distributional issues (e.g. access to food). If food security 
resea rchers  define their research agenda as broadly as 
agricultural development, they will become bogged down with 
research on credit, land tenure, processing, etc. In sum, food 
security is a much broader concept than food self-sufficiency 
and a much narrower concept than agricultural development.
The second background issue is the balance between research 
on food availability (supply issues) and food access (demand 
issues). While the issue of the proper balance between 
research on food availability and food access must be sorted 
out in a country specific context, we estimate that at least
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two-thirds o f on-going food security studies in Southern Africa 
are focussed on food  availability issues, i.e. food production 
and storage issues. There is now an urgent need to shift the 
ratio to at least 50 percent on food availability and 50 percent 
on food access research in the near future.
The third background issue is the need for a multi-disciplinary 
team to pursue research on both sides of the equation. While 
it is easy to achieve multi-disciplinary cooperation in an 
international conference centre, it is difficult to bring together 
researchers from the appropriate mix of disciplines to carry out 
food security research in practice. We are well aware that the 
discipline of economics does not have the corner on the food 
security research agenda. There is a need for at least three or 
four disciplines to cooperate in carrying out each of the 
studies.
The final background agenda is the time-frame. We take the 
position that 40 to 50 scientists from numerous disciplines 
should come together to develop a food security research 
network for Southern Africa and carry out a programme of 
comparative food security studies within a ten year time-frame. 
Plant breeders openly admit that it will take around a decade, 
on average, to develop a new plant variety and test it before 
it is ready for release to extension agents. Why should a food 
security team working on malnutrition, food consumption 
studies, etc., promise results in two to three years when they 
know it will take five to ten years to do respectable research?
We have chosen to organise our remarks on food security 
research priorities in Southern Africa around six challenges:
1) the food and agriculture production challenge;
2) m arketing , ru ra l in fra s tru c tu re  and s to rage  policy 
challenge;
3) the challenge of raising rural per capita incomes and 
generating employment in rural areas;
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4) the nutrition challenge;
5) national food security policy analyses; and
6) regional food security policy analyses.
/. The Food and Agriculture Production Challenge
Today, some donors are raising questions about the need to 
continue investments in agricultural research in the light of 
good harvests in 1985 and 1986 throughout Africa. However, 
we believe that expanded research is needed on the design of 
efficient food and ag ricu ltu ra l production systems, the 
cornerstone of national and regional food security strategies. 
Research is needed on three production issues:
(1) increasing food and agricultural production;
(2) reducing crop production instability; and
(3) diversification away from grain, especially in the maize 
belt.
Technical scientists and food security researchers need to 
pursue research on food and agriculture production in SADCC 
countries because: (a) six of the nine SADCC states are food 
deficit; (b) SADCC’s population will increase by 30 million 
(e.g. 70 to 100 million) by the year 2000; (c) the population
growth rate in the SADCC region (about 3.2%) is roughly triple 
the annual rate of growth of some industrial countries (e.g. 
Netherlands and Norway 1850 to 1900 and Japan from 1878 to 
1912) at a comparable stage in their economic history; (d) 
population growth of 3% and income growth of 1 to 2% 
translate into an annual increase in the demand for food of 3 
to 5% per year - rates that few countries have sustained for a 
decade or more; (e) there are virtually no proven technical 
packages for low rainfall and resource poor regions where 
household food insecurity is a major problem; and (f) the 
expansion of agricultural exports is central to foreign exchange
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First, let us examine the food and agriculture production 
challenge. If SADCC states want to pursue an agricultural-led 
development strategy, they will have to make large investments 
in agricultural research, human capital, infrastructure and 
favourable economic incentives. Few countries in the Third 
World have been able to achieve and sustain annual rates of 
growth of agricultural output of four percent for a period of 
one or more decades. Reynolds has recently compared the 
agricultural performance of forty-one countries for the thirty 
year period, 1952-1981. He found that five of the 41 countries 
could be classified as high perform ance countries - i.e. 
achievement of annual growth rates of agricultural output of 4 
percent or above for the entire period.[10] But Reynolds found 
that only one of these five - Thailand - achieved a growth 
rate above 4 percent in all three periods as shown in Table 2.
and rural employment generation in SADCC states.
TABLE 2
Annual Growth Rates of Agricultural Production 
in Five Countries: 1952/54 - 1979/81
1952/54- 1959/61- 1969/71- 1952/54-
1959/61 1969/71 1979/81 1979/81
South Korea 5.4 4.2 4.2 4.4
Thai land 4.5 5.1 5.1 4.8
MaI ays i a 3.0 5.6 4.8 4.4
Mexico 5.0 4.5 3.5 4.1
Venezuela 4.5 5.3 3.8 4.4
(Source: Reynolds 1986, pp.96-97)
In sum m ary, achieving and sustaining annual food and 
agricultural production growth rates of 3 percent or more for 
one or more decades is a major challenge. There is a major 
food and agricultural production challenge in the SADCC 
region. Food security researchers should cooperate with
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farming systems researchers in generating information on 
constraints on expanding food and agricultural production.
Farming systems researchers can design their research to throw 
more light on how to help achieve household and national food 
security objectives. Why can’t agricultural econom ists, 
geographers, sociologists and agronomists at the University of 
Zimbabwe pool their resources to pursue joint research on food 
and agriculture production in low rainfall areas?
The second aspect of the food and agricultural production 
challenge is reducing crop instability. Since cereal production 
is volatile in the SADCC region there is a need for research 
on sorghum and millet, and irrigation to reduce the dependency 
on rainfall.
The third aspect of food and agriculture development is 
research to produce new production technology to diversify 
away from grain. This will require stepped-up research on new 
industrial crops (e.g. natural rubber), export crops (horticultural 
products, cut flowers) and high value crops such as spices.
Food security researchers should interpret the production 
challenge broadly to include research on efficient food and 
agricultural production streams. Why should a nation that is 
self-sufficient in grain restrict its food security researchers to 
research on food? It is obvious that Botswana’s comparative 
advance is selling diamonds on world markets, beef to Europe 
and importing sorghum and maize from Zimbabwe and Zambia.
2 Marketing Rural Infrastructure and Storage Policy
The emergence of the maize surplus in Zimbabwe and Malawi 
and the red sorghum surplus in Zimbabwe throws the spotlight 
on the need for marketing research, a neglected topic by 
agricultural economists relative to research on farming systems. 
R esearchers have presented data that farmers in Nigeria, 
Malawi, Tanzania, Kenya and the Sudan received a substantially 
lower percentage (40 to 50%) of the final consumer price of 
grain from 1975 to 80 than farmers received in four Asian
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countries (71 to 87%).[11] The reasons for lower returns to 
African farmers were the higher marketing board charges and 
ru ra l tra n sp o rt costs that are "typically double that of 
Asia"[12]. We believe that an integrated research programme 
on marketing infrastructure, transportation and grain storage is 
needed in SADCC states.
The magnitude of on-farm storage losses in the SADCC region 
is an open question and an issue that should be explored 
through in-depth research.
The FAO report (1984) on SADCC agriculture asserts that pre- 
and post harvest losses from pests and diseases currently 
reduce food availability by 30 to 40 percent or more. But 
Greeley recently reviewed the literature on post harvest losses 
in developing countries; he notes a big gap between estimates 
produced by short term missions and actual losses recorded by 
careful research studies. Greeley reported:
Eleven ”expert” estimates on post-harvest losses o f 
rice at farm  level in Bangladesh were published  
between 1975 and 1980; their average was 26.8 
percent. By contrast, a three year research project 
which physically measured losses in all post-harvest 
operatives from cutting to cooking showed that total 
post-harvest rice losses at farm level were below 7 
percent. [13]
3. Challenge o f Raising Per Capita Incomes and Generating 
Employment in Rural Areas
Typically average per capita incomes in urban areas are several 
times higher than in rural areas in the Third World. Since 
research has shown that hunger and malnutrition in many 
countries is an income problem, the challenge for food security 
researchers is to help develop policies, programmes and projects 
to raise rural per capita incomes in farmer and rural non-farm 
activities such as rural small scale industries, trading, etc.
82
One of the most direct ways of raising per capita incomes in 
food deficit countries is to increase food and agricultural 
production. In the six food deficit SADCC states expanded 
food production can increase the real incomes of farm labourers 
and generate a demand for more hired labour. Much of the 
increase in incomes that farmers will receive will be spent on 
locally produced foods and services. In food surplus countries, 
expanded food production can benefit the poor - especially net 
food purchasers - by driving down the cost of food so that 
families spend 20 to 30 percent of their disposable income on 
food rather than 40 to 60 percent, a common range in Third 
World countries.
SADCC’s updated food and agriculture strategy explicitly 
recognises that a direct attack on rural poverty must be 
broadly conceptualised and it must go beyond stepping up food 
production. SADCC’s present regional research programmes on 
sorghum, millet and grain legumes will be supplemented with 
research on export crops, industrial crops, etc., in order to 
generate new production technology capable of producing new 
income streams for rural people. In sum, SADCC’s food 
centered regional research strategy has been replaced with a 
strategy to strengthen SADCC’s long term dynamic comparative 
advantage in food and agriculture.
Closely related to research on raising rural incomes is research 
on employment generation. In the 1950s and 1960s, it was 
assumed that rural-urban  m igration was a desirable and 
inevitable feature of the development process. Today, there 
are few economists who argue for government policies to 
stimulate rural to urban migration. For example, in Botswana, 
around 20,000 school leavers are coming on the market each 
year while 7,600 new jobs are forecast in the industrial urban 
sectors over the 1985-91 Development Plan. In Zimbabwe’s new 
Five Year Development Plant (1986-1990), high priority is given 
to rural employment generation because roughly 85,000 school 
leavers have been added to the labour force for each of the 
past three years and only 6,000 or less than 10 percent are 
estimated to have found jobs in the industrial-urban sector. 
The challenge is how to find productive employment for the
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remaining 90 percent in the rural economy until there is an 
expansion in industrial urban jobs.
4. The Nutrition Research Challenge
The FAO estimates that roughly one fourth of the people in 
Africa or 100 million is Sub-Saharan Africa were malnourished 
in 1985. Data are scarce on the incidence of malnutrition by 
age, sex, income group and within households. Moreover, since 
many nutrition surveys are classified in the SADCC region, it is 
difficult to encourage food security researchers to move into 
this important area of study.
Nutrition improvement programmes are running far ahead of the 
conceptual understanding of the determinants of nutrition. For 
example, although economists such as Reutlinger, Sen and 
others have emphasised the malnutrition-poverty connection, we 
believe that posing the m alnutrition  problem  as a food 
production (i.e. lack of available food) or a poverty problem is 
a vast oversimplification of the issues involved.
Nutrition research is complex and fraught with conceptual 
difficulties. For example, Field describes the state of the art 
of nutrition as the "soft underbelly of applied knowledge in 
nutrition planning".[14] It is arguable that improving income is 
indeed a strategic factor in improving household nutrition at 
low level of income. But as income levels increase, the income 
impact on nutrient demand may fade and other factors such as 
womens’ schooling and non-nutritive characteristics of food 
such as taste, convenience, status conferral and time intensity 
may influence household nutrition. Finally, surveys of seasonal 
food availability are fraught with conceptual difficulties in 
disentangling the effects of disease, low food intake and 
weight.
We observe that some donors are pulling back from nutrition 
improvement projects because they have found that nutrition 
interventions are dependent on other factors, such as improved 
health and water supply for successful execution. This is
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especially the case in Africa, where the capacity to plan and 
implement nutrition projects is in short supply. One major 
multi-lateral donor now privately admits that it made a mistake 
in "projectizing" nutrition a decade ago. Most donors are in a 
quandary on how to proceed with nutrition interventions. Some 
donors are trying to figure out how to incorporate nutrition 
into food security policy analysis.
What is the nutrition research agenda? In order to design 
effective food security programmes to combat malnutrition, one 
must first know who the malnourished are, what they eat, and 
why they are hungry. In much of Africa basic information is 
sparse on the incidence and causes of chronic malnutrition and 
on the socio-economic characteristics of the malnourished. 
Methodological advances are needed to design more cost- 
effective means of gathering such information; traditional 
nutrition studies usually fail to elicit information on the 
relationship between income and consumption. Conventional 
income-expenditure studies, especially when conducted in rural 
areas, are extremely costly. Yet without such information it is 
im possible to determ ine the most cost-effective way of 
increasing caloric intake in a given rural area: Is it through
improving home food production, reducing post-harvest losses, 
or expanding non-farm employment, coupled with improvements 
in the food marketing system? In urban areas, knowledge of 
the consumption patterns of the poor is needed to design 
programmes that protect the poor from bearing an undue 
burden of the painful structural adjustments that many African 
countries are undergoing. [15]
5. National Food Security Policy Analysis
National food security policy analysis is the crucial link 
between household and regional analysis. Because of the vast 
differences in ideology, institutions and opportunities for 
development, each SADCC state should develop a small food 
security policy analysis capability in government and/or local 
universities. A critical question is the location of a food 
security planning/research unit - the Ministry of Agriculture,
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M inistry of Econom ic Planning or in the Office of the 
President? There is no institutional guideline on this issue 
except to point out that the Botswana model is appealing, in 
that other inter-m inisterial committees feed information on 
food security into the Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Planning. But Botswana’s (1985) national food strategy is not 
su ppo rted  with basic econom ic analysis of the cost of 
increasing food production. There is substantial economic 
capacity in planning units in Ministries of Agriculture that 
should be m obilised for research on food security policy 
analysis. Currently most planning units are smothered with 
project aid with its attendant report requirements.
Because of intra-regional trade linkages, it follows that the 
national and regional research programmes should be developed 
as a unified package and undertaken in a regional framework. 
Moreover, since African economies are integrated into the 
world economy through trade and exchange rate linkages, a 
logical question is what type of economic model is needed to 
capture these linkages? Computable general equilibrium models
(CGE) were used for this purpose in Egypt, India and South
Korea.
The num ber of trained analysts in Sub-Saharan African 
countries is small relative to the number available in countries 
such as India and Egypt to carry out general equilibrium 
studies. Moreover, the data base is extremely inadequate for 
CGE modeling in Africa.
We believe th a t researchers in Southern Africa should 
concentrate on partial equilibrium and sub-sector studies with 
an initial emphasis on the one or two most important staple 
foods in the national economy. For example, because maize 
accounts for roughly half of the calories consumed by the
average Zimbabwean, the University of Zimbabwe food security
research team is carrying out a comprehensive study of the 
maize and wheat sub-sectors and plans to undertake studies of 
the sorghum and oilseeds sub-sectors. The latter two are of 
crucial importance in understanding how to increase household 
food security among communal farmers, especially in low
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rainfall and resource poor areas.
Presently there are no SADCC states that have an adequate 
data base and local policy expertise to carry out comprehensive 
national food security studies. Most of the 30 national food 
strategies that were prepared in Africa since 1979 on the 
recommendation of the World Food Council have been "flash in 
the pan" exercises.[16]
Most of these strategies have concentrated  on the food 
availability side of the equation (e.g. how to step up food 
production and build more grain storage), have relied on 
secondary data and have paid lip-service to build local policy 
analysis capability. Finally, there is practically no agricultural 
economist in the region who is working on trade problems. 
Since trade and exchange rate policies may be more important 
than domestic agriculture policies (e.g. agricultural credit) in 
influencing the performance of the food and agriculture sector, 
a logical question is: What can be done to train a new
generation of agricultural economists and economists to devote 
their career to teaching and research on the macro economics 
of food and agriculture?
Because numerous Asian countries have decades of experience 
in d ea lin g  with food security  policy issues, including 
experimentation with institutional innovations to increase the 
access to food, it is important for researchers in the SADCC 
region to examine the international literature.
Reffonal Food Security Studies
The co-existence of malnutrition and food surpluses requires 
the University of Zimbabwe to step up research on regional 
marketing, trade, nutrition and access to food. Moreover, since 
food in secu rity  in the SADCC region can orig inate in 
international price movements, it is important that the regional 
trade agency includes research on both intra-regional and 
international trade. It is important to integrate research on 
managing foreign exchange, food aid and trade.
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Summary
In the long run, economic growth is a powerful instrument for 
raising per capita incomes and helping the poor purchase a 
better diet. But there is substantial evidence that it may take 
a long time before growth will cure poverty. Therefore, 
African governments, like governments in industrial countries, 
are slowly beginning to realise that they have an obligation to 
intervene to ensure that all people have access to a calorie- 
adequate diet throughout the year.
In the SADCC region, the challenge is to increase food 
production in food deficit states and develop cost-effective, 
administratively and politically feasible interventions to ensure 
that all people have access to a calorie-adequate diet in both 
food deficit and food surplus countries. Presently there are no 
rules, no models and no guidelines on cost-effective food 
security policies that can be applied in the SADCC region 
because our present knowledge base is woefully inadequate. 
For example, there is little research on alternative institutions 
to increase access to food because, as Myrdal notes, the 
"ordinary economist" assumes away institutional problems.[17]
The imm ensity of Africa, the complexity and diversity of 
A fric a n  a g ric u ltu re  and the weak da ta  base on food 
consumption, nutrition and marketing should be taken into 
consideration in laying out a comparative research programme 
on food security. Short term (6 to 18 month) national food 
strategy exercises simply massage secondary data, raise false 
hopes and avoid the difficult task of building African research 
capacity for policy analysis on African problems.
We have highlighted the importance of defining the food 
security research agenda to include both food availability and 
food access issues. We estimate that two thirds or more of the 
food security studies in the SADCC region are currently 
focussed on one half of the equation, i.e. food availability 
issues. We believe that a more balanced research programme is 
called for, i.e. one that devotes at least one half of the 
research resources to each side of the equation.
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Food security  researchers should argue for parity with 
technical scientists in length of funding. At the end of the 
day, we believe that the major challenge for food security 
researchers in the region is to develop a manageable research 
agenda to guide policy makers on how to assure adequate levels 
of food consumption for the entire population of SADCC states, 
at all times and at minimum cost.
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THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 
AND FOOD PRODUCTION 
IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
Archie Mafeje
The General Background in Black Africa
In undertaking any studies in Africa, two perspectives need to 
be kept firmly in mind, namely, the broad and the local
perspective. In the past there has been two tendencies, the
liberal empiricist tradition maintained largely by the British and
later by Americans; and the Marxist tradition pursued almost
single-handedly by a few French historians and sociologists. 
For the empiricists, "Africa" was primarily that part of the 
continent in which they happen to have done their field-work. 
This was particularly true of social anthropologists who became 
identified with specific "tribes", whom they referred  to, 
patronisingly, as "my people". Agricultural economists, though 
less affec ted  by particularism  than the anthropologists, 
espoused a certain regionalism. Their agricultural studies were 
e ith e r  on W est, E ast or C en tra l Africa but passed as 
agriculture in Africa in general. The practitioners concerned 
were, thus, guilty of generalisation by extrapolation. The 
surprising thing though is that they all believed, implicitly or 
explicitly, in the comparative method, which was supposed to 
be an antidote to personal or individual bias.
As we know now, the comparative method may guard against 
over generalisation, but it does not necessarily lead to 
theoretical generalisations in the sense of nomothetic pro­
positions. Instead, it gives rise to taxonomic categorisations.
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The tighter these are, the more static and incapable of dealing 
with dynamic processes they become. Two examples will 
suffice. In anthropological literature the "tribes" maintained 
their pristine state, despite the pervasive impact of colonial 
capitalism . Likewise, liberal agricultural economists got 
obsessed with "communal" land tenure systems in Africa, which 
were supposed to be a barrier to development, without noticing 
the dynamic changes these systems were undergoing as a result 
of the impact of colonial capitalism. The classification itself 
was an outcome of an implicit comparison with the European 
model of individual land tenure. The two examples are 
significant and will receive fuller treatment in the appropriate 
section.
On their part, the few Marxists who were on the ground, 
notably, Suret-Canale and Georges Balandier, in their desire to 
discover thematic issues which were amenable to theorisation, 
were inclined to use the history of essentially French-speaking 
W est A frica  and the Congo to explain the h isto rica l 
development of the whole of "Black Africa". One example is 
the determinant relationship they sought to establish between 
long-distance trade and the rise of kingdoms in Africa. 
Although this trad ition  has been faithfully maintained by 
contemporary French writers such as Samir Amin and Coquery- 
Vidrovitch, there is hardly any evidence that the rise of, say, 
the interlacustrine and the southern African kingdoms was 
attributable to long-distance trade. However, in mitigation it 
must be noted that these writers, unlike their predecessors, are 
beginning to hold a more differentiated view of black Africa. 
As an illustration, reference could be made to Samir Amin’s 
division of black Africa into four socio-historical zones - 
Africa of "colonial economy", of "concessionaries", of "labour 
reserves", and of "pseudo-feudal systems".
On her part, while still committed to the long-distance thesis, 
Coquery-Vidrovitch recognises the critical importance of lineage 
organisation even in tributary formations in Africa - a point 
which is lost sight of in Samir Amin’s analysis and which is, 
probably, the greatest contribution to African Marxist studies
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by the French anthropologist, C laude M eillassoux. The 
significance of this lies in the fact that a great deal of 
Marxist writing on Africa is still derivative, relying largely on 
unstud ied  and undigested textbook knowledge. This is 
especially true of agrarian studies where classical concepts such 
as "feudalism ", "tribalism", "capitalism", "Prussian path", 
"peasants", "com m unal land tenure", etc., etc. are used 
uncritically. It is the intention in this essay to subject some 
of these concepts to critical examination so as to throw into 
re lief some of the peculiarities of the African agrarian 
formations. This is done with the conviction that it is in this 
area that African social scientists are likely to make a distinct 
contribution. The underlying reason is that their societies are 
predominantly agrarian and, contrary to all logic, the agrarian 
question in them is the least studied.
Since independence, thanks to modernisation and economic 
growth theories, there had been a preoccupation among African 
scholars and policy-makers with the "modern sector". Now that 
a major dislocation has occurred and governments and their 
advisers are faced with the once neglected problem of food 
production and security, attention has turned away from the 
so-called modern sector to the "small producers" who are the 
foundation of African agrarian social formations. Alienated 
African intellectuals, both left and right, are under pressure to 
justify themselves. This, they will not be able to do, without 
going back to the roots as against received classical texts. 
For their enterprise to succeed, the African scholars will have 
to evolve a general perspective which is informed by the 
specific ity  of A frican  local h istory . A rgum ents about 
universalism versus particularism are of little relevance here. 
What is at issue is authenticity or self-knowledge. "Local" 
need not be equated with parochialism. Boundaries between 
societies are a m atter of history and cultural evolution. 
Nowhere in modern Africa do they coincide with political 
entities, called states. Therefore, the mapping out of certain 
groups bound together by a common history and culture will be 
part of the exercise. For instance, it is not yet clear what we 
mean by "Southern Africa", apart from the geographical 
specification. Need this be the case?
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For the time being, suffice it to say, super-imposed on sub - 
regional or regional socio-cultural formations in Africa, as 
elsewhere in the Third W orld, was a common heritage, 
colonialism. According to some African revolutionary thinkers 
such as Amilcar Cabral, owing to colonialism, African peoples 
were forced to take leave of universal history. Consequently, 
liberation will not be attained until Africans rejoin human 
history. It is theoretically sounder to accept the fact that 
colonialism is an important, if negative, part of African history 
and that Africans will not achieve genuine liberation until they 
are able to live it down i.e. until they are able to abandon 
colonial modes of thinking and doing. This is the essence of 
their struggle and the fundamental contradiction between 
decolonisation and neocolonialism.
In agriculture the colonial imposition expressed itself as a 
division between export crops and subsistence crops. The two 
long-term implications of this were: (a) African economies 
were being re -s tru c tu re d  to serve the in terests of the 
industrialised countries as suppliers of primary agricultural 
commodities; (b) the subsistence needs of the indigenous 
population were being relegated to the background. Although 
this was construed in monetary terms such as cash versus 
subsistence crops, the distinction was inconsequential because 
all crops in a monetized economy are potentially cash crops. 
Functionally and structurally, the important differences lie 
between export and staple crops or between the so-called 
modern and traditional sector. As has been forcefully argued 
by the "dependency" theorists against the "dual" theorists, 
these were not things apart but rather dialectical processes of 
appropriation and subversion or underdevelopment. The modern 
sector appropriated the best soils, the best labour and received 
the best technical inputs, services and scientific support from 
the colonial governments at the expense of the traditional 
sector.
Of course, this was not done for its own sake but for the sake 
of the metropolitan centres. In other words, while the modern 
sector benefitted by the under-development of the subsistence 
sector, it was also being mined by colonial capitalism. The
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entailed  systematic loss of value meant that it could not 
rep roduce  itse lf  p rogressively  and, thus, transform  the 
agricultural economy into its own image. It is most telling 
that in African countries the farmers who are enumerated as 
"commercial", "progressive" or "big" have since the 1960s 
remained at around 5 percent (or less) of the agricultural 
producers. Consequently, their share in the total volume of 
agricultural production rarely exceeds 30 percent. Here, we are 
not referring to their share in the GNP, which is usually much 
higher. Even this cannot be clarified in all cases, as it had 
been policy since colonial times to undervalue peasant produce.
W hat em erges from this b rief analysis is an extraverted 
agricultural economy which is disabled in two fundamental 
ways. First, owing to loss of value to metropolitan centres, it 
is incapable of contributing effectively to the national fund for 
industrialisation. Second, it is totally indifferent to the food 
requirements of the nation as a whole. Given the fact that the 
subsistence producers were being progressively underdeveloped, 
partly to force them into the labour market and partly out of 
increasing social and economic deprivation, national food 
production and security had been endangered beyond repair. In 
other words, there was no arrangement for augmenting the 
national subsistence fund over time. This, undoubtedly created 
a predisposition towards the present food crisis in Africa which 
is often treated as a sudden and unexpected development.
While colonialism is responsible for these distortions, African 
governm ents stand indicted for having pursued the same 
policies after independence and for having, thus, instituted 
neo-colonialism in their countries. During their tenure things 
got worse because, unlike the colonial administrators, they 
lacked self-discipline and a sense of organisation. Above all, 
they were too eager to accumulate material wealth before they 
had learnt how to produce it. Their petit-bourgeois greed or 
crass materialism meant not only wanton waste of resources but 
also super-exploitation of the direct producers. This had to be 
the case because, unlike the bourgeoisie in Europe, they had 
neither alternative sources of wealth nor a viable economic and 
political project. Theirs became a pathetic example of fishing
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by emptying the pond.
After the initial flush of enthusiasm at independence in the 
1960s, the peasants got thoroughly disillusioned and withdrew 
to themselves. This was made even worse by the collapse of 
international markets for agricultural commodities from the 
1970s onwards. The ensuing incessant struggles among the 
petit-bourgeois elites, culminating in a series of coups and 
mounting repression, signalled both the political and the 
economic bankruptcy of the African petit-bourgeois elite. From 
this point of view, it is yet to be proved that the reasons for 
the collapse were both technical and physical and that this was 
the major difference between the 1960s and the 1970s or 1980s.
The Background to the Agrarian Question in Southern Africa
While it is true that the underlying reasons for the agricultural 
and food crisis in Africa are universal, namely, distorted 
colonial structures and neo-colonial policies, the actual 
instances of this impoverishing dialectic vary from region to 
region and from country to country. For instance, West Africa 
never had the white settler problem, whereas Southern Africa 
is the epitome of precisely that. The fact notwithstanding that 
areas like West Africa were plagued by the same contradiction 
between the modern and the traditional/subsistence sector, the 
major difference between them and Southern Africa is that in 
their case the indigenous population was always in effective 
occupation of the land. The rest was a problem, not of race, 
but of class, mediated by clan and lineage affiliations. For 
instance, in countries such as Ghana, Nigeria and Burkina Fasso 
chiefs are said to have sold land to the colonisers for their 
personal benefit. This might be so, but there is no evidence of 
permanent alienation of land in this area to foreigners. Even 
in the case of migrant cocoa farmers in Ashanti or cola 
farm ers in Katsina in Nigeria, who were supposed to be 
"capitalist", they never acquired permanent individual rights in 
the land they cultivated. The natives m aintained their 
reversionary rights in land. Therefore, the transactions that 
took place could be regarded as renting or leasing land.
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The inalienability of land in this region goes as far back as the 
days of slavery. In Northern Nigeria, where feudalism is 
supposed to have obtained, it transpires that there was no 
outright allocation of land to individual lords but rather 
allocation of whole slave villages or villages of the subordinate 
clans to favoured officials who did not hold such villages in 
perpetuity. For instance, in the Emirates of Zaria officials 
were allowed to pass down to their heirs neither their official 
domains nor their full patrimony. These reverted to the state 
for redistribution. In other words, at the local level the 
principle of clans and lineages was not interfered with. This 
renders it impossible to subsume the system even under what 
Marx called the "Asiatic mode of production". Our immediate 
interest is to elucidate the essential difference between settler 
economies and the general colonial mode of production in 
Africa.
For the purposes of the distinction we seek to make, it will 
not do to refer to Southern Africa in purely geographical or 
political terms, as might have been the consideration in the 
case of SADCC. Some socio-historical indices which are
d iagnostic  of the societies in question will have to be
employed. During the expansive phase of colonialism in the
south, the 11th parallel or latitude 11 degrees S used to be 
regarded as the northern borders of the South African area of 
labour encatchment. This coincides with Samir Amin’s Africa 
of "labour reserves". It was also an area of greatest white 
settlem ent in the region. This m eant two things: (a)
alienation of land to white settlers on a scale unknown to the 
rest of black Africa, except for Kenya; and (b) creation of a 
more than average demand for black labour in colonial Africa. 
Naturally, the whites, who had the sponsorship of the colonial 
state, chose the best lands and on a grand scale which was 
justified by neither their numbers nor their needs e.g. 87 
percent of the land in South Africa, 47 percent in Swaziland 
and 45 percent in former Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). Judged by 
capitalist standards, this was irrational. But when it is 
remembered that divesting the indigenous population of their 
only means of production, land, was the surest way of making 
them available to capital as labour, then the move was quite
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logical.
Despite the logicality of the colonial/settler strategy, the 
countries affected ended up with a schizophrenic situation. In 
the white areas, capital organised land distribution according to 
its own laws, viz., individual land tenure. On the other hand, 
the African migrant workers, in an effort to secure their rear, 
maintained what they knew best, customary tenure under the 
tutelage of lineages and the guardianship of chiefs. The social 
schizophrenia did not stop here. It penetrated the labour 
process as well. The white landowners, whose estates were 
measured in 1000s, or at least 100s of acres, behaved more as 
feudal lords than as capitalists and treated their African labour 
as bonded labour which was often paid in kind. This took the 
form of rations and squatting rights in exchange for labour 
which in principle was available for 24 hours a day and 
extended to the members of the worker’s family.
Furthermore, as examplified by the South African Masters and 
Servants Act (1845) and the Tangatha system in Malawi, the 
bonded workers had no right to withdraw from the contract. 
The availability of cheap, captive labour considerably slowed 
down technological progress in agriculture in southern Africa. 
In South Africa and its environs white agriculture remained 
extrem ely backward until the 1930s when it had to be 
reorganised as a result of the policies of the then government 
which favoured Afrikaaner farmers, and as a reaction to the 
devastating effects of the Great Depression on the poorer and 
more inefficient white farm ers who in desperation, were 
swarming to the cities only to swell the ranks of the 
unemployed and to accentuate the so-called "problem of poor 
whites". In Malawi the white estate farmers stayed backward 
until independence in 1960s when President Banda’s Government 
threatened them with eviction, if they did not pull up their 
socks. In Rhodesia, like in the Western Cape and some parts 
of Natal, there had been a fair number of farmers who were 
imbued with the capitalist spirit and used resources more 
productively. This is notwithstanding the fact that, like in 
Swaziland, up to 70 percent of white estates remained idle, 
while Africans went begging for land for cultivation.
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The conventional view in Southern Africa is that Africans have 
always practised primitive agriculture for subsistence. This is a 
racially-inspired stereotype. From the middle of the 19th 
century onwards Africans all over Southern Africa showed 
them selves to be as responsive to innovation in arable 
agriculture as the white farmers.[l] By 1840 they had adopted 
th e  E u ro p e a n  p lough , and m aize as a s ta p le  c rop . 
Subsequently, the better off among them had added to the list 
such implements as the iron planter, the mechanical weeder and 
the harrow. They had some knowledge of fertilisers but, at 
best, could afford only the cheaper varieties e.g. phosphates in 
limited amounts. Manuring the land was universal among them. 
This is what made them attractive to white landlords as 
labour-tenants or sharecroppers, especially in the Orange Free 
State, the Transvaal and Northern Natal. In all cases the 
A frican  sh a re -cro p p e r was expected to b ring  his own 
implements, oxen and seeds. This was called "farming on the 
halF or "kaffir farming" by those who wanted all Africans 
reduced to farm labour, pure and simple, and the whites to 
take "their rightful place" as labour-employing capitalists. 
Nevertheless, it took the 1913 Land Act to stifle any further 
developm ent of the share-cropp ing  system and labour- 
tenancies. Otherwise, both land-hungry blacks and work-shy 
whites found it convenient.
The point to grasp is that between 1860 and 1900, the 
Africans, barring the Western Cape sheep and fruit farmers and 
the sugar p lantations in Natal, were the most dynamic 
ag ricu ltu ra l p roducers in South A frica . As has been 
documented variously by Bundy, Trapido and Denoon, at this 
point in time in all the provinces the volume of production of 
food by Africans exceeded that by white farmers by far. This 
was revealed by market returns from Grahamstown and Port 
E lizabe th  in the E as te rn  C ap e ,[2] V ereenigen in the 
Transvaal[3] and the traders’ and missionaries’ recorded reports 
from the Orange Free State and Natal.[4] In the case of Natal 
it was reported outrightly that white farmers in the province 
depended  on the natives for their food.[5] It was in 
recognition of this fact that Bundy entitled his book, The Rise 
and the Fall of the African Peasantry. The fall occurred after
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1913 when Africans were forbidden by law to buy and own 
land, to indulge in share-cropping with white landowners or to 
take out la b o u r- te n a n c ie s  from  them . T his was an 
extra-economic measure, designed to protect uncompetitive 
white farmers and to cheapen black labour for the benefit of 
white employers in general. White farmers in the Boer 
Republics and Northern Natal had complained that they could 
not compete with the "kaffirs" who relied on their extended 
families rather than employed labour. This experience is not 
limited only to South Africa. In the African Purchase Areas in 
Zimbabwe African farmers proved to be just as competitive; so 
did the African farmers in Malawi after independence. In fact, 
in the latter they accounted for what is considered to be one 
of the four success stories in Africa (the other three being 
Kenya, Ivory Coast and Cameroun).
It would seem, therefore , that the success or failure of 
Africans in agriculture and in food production, especially, must 
be judged, like any other case, according to the objective 
conditions governing their lives. In the over-crowded "Native 
Reserves" or "Tribal Lands" in South Africa, Swaziland and 
Zimbabwe, African production has deteriorated to an alarming 
degree (in 1985 it was announced in Zimbabwe but not 
explained that the African producers in the Tribal Trust Lands 
had produced a surplus under the same crowded conditions). 
Sub-economic units under increased demographic pressure, 
absolute poverty and general neglect by the state , and 
unchanging  p ro d u c tio n  tec h n iq u es  u n d e rc h a n g e d  and 
unfavourable physical and ecological conditions are obvious 
constraints. What is not so obvious but critical is the cost of 
labour and its social reproduction. Extensive labour migration 
is an index of poverty among rural Africans. It is also a 
reflection  of d im inishing re tu rn s  on effo rt in A frican  
agriculture. This is what it was meant to be by the various 
disabling laws passed by the colonial state and by the 
substantive demand for labour by capital.
However, the intractable problem is that colonial capital was 
not willing to pay the cost for the social reproduction of the 
African labour that had been delivered to it as virtually forced
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labour with no job security. The consequences or advantages 
of th is to capital had been anticipated , and hence the 
insistence on the system of "Native Reserves". These were 
dumping grounds for unserviceable African labour which had to 
bear the cost of the social reproduction of such labour. In 
other words, the reserves were not meant to, and could not 
have been meant to, guarantee the subsistence of the African 
labour whose services were needed elsewhere. They were only 
meant to supplement at a very low level the starving wages 
that the Africans were receiving from their exploitative 
employers. It is, therefore, logical nonsense to have expected 
Africans to develop or even sustain subsistence agriculture in 
the Reserves. This would have been a contradiction in terms. 
C on tended  natives in the countryside would have been 
unavailable to capital, which was the case originally. It is, 
therefore, incongruous that after independence countries such 
as Swaziland, Botswana and Zimbabwe have retained the system.
The "Reserves" and the Problem of Food Self-sufficiency
The "Reserves" are a colonial remnant which was aimed at 
undermining the economic self-sufficiency of the Africans. As 
such, they cannot, even under the most benevolent African 
governm en t, g u a ran tee  the subsistence  needs of their 
inhabitants. It is not a question of rehabilitating or improving 
them but of dismantling them altogether, as part of a radical 
transformation of the agrarian structures in southern Africa. 
This entails a number of major changes, among which may be 
mentioned: (a) redistribution of the land according to the
needs of the rural producers; (b) land reform in accordance 
with the requirem ents of the national economy, including 
self-sufficiency in food production; and (c) revision of existing 
systems of land tenure with special regard to racial, class and 
sexual discrimination. In their totality these constitute what 
might be referred to as the agrarian question in southern 
Africa.
On the question of "Reserves", even the South African rulers, 
the originators of the system in Africa, have come to realise
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that it is unsustainable, politically. They are, therefore, 
committed in principle to the "lifting of the pass laws" and the 
dissolution of the Bantustans. This is the least price they can 
expect to pay in any negotiations with the national liberation 
m ovem ents. W hile we m ight yet see a great deal of 
procrastination and dilly-dallying, the result is inevitable. In 
Zimbabwe the decision had already been made as far back as 
1976 in a policy docum ent by the ZA N U -PF Executive 
Committee. But the mechanics of implementing it are proving 
very d ifficu lt m ainly because of the L ancaste r H ouse 
compromise. Nonetheless and despite the zig-zags, the ZANU 
Government cannot afford the policy of Tribal Trust Lands.
This is in contrast to Swaziland and Botswana where the 
African governments feel under no compulsion to abolish the 
system of reservations but, instead, perceive it as the best way 
of protecting their "tribesmen" from rapacious capitalists. In 
Swaziland the Government has since independence been hoping 
to buy back more land from white landowners to augment its 
overcrowded National (tribal) Lands. But this has proved 
difficult, financially and politically. Consequently, the status 
quo prevails and the prospects for any serious land reform and 
rehabilitation of the African producers for self-sufficiency, at 
least, in food production appear more and more remote. 
Policymakers in Swaziland could report that the question we 
are trying to broach is irrelevant since their country is one of 
the few in Africa which are self-sufficient in food production, 
thanks to the white capitalist farmers who own nearly half of 
the Swazi territory and whose production is not necessarily 
geared to domestic needs.
This would be too difficult to reconcile with any notion of 
"independence" and equity for the people. For Botswana, the 
principle of independence is not at issue, since all land belongs 
to the national patrimony. If it were not for the question of 
white dominance and the role played by small producers, 
Swaziland could be compared to Malawi. But the white estates 
in Malawi constitute only 17 percent of arable land, while the 
small producers account for about 70 percent of the food 
production.
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What is disturbing about Malawi is the fact that the estate 
farms, white or black, are allowed to grow at the expense of 
the small producers, especially in the central provinces which 
show the highest rate of labour migration to South Africa. We 
are, thus, faced with a choice between benevolent reservation 
policies and laissez faire policies that lead to the expropriation 
of the poor. This brings us to our second consideration, the 
question of class differentiation. Under classical capitalism 
w hich  w as a c c o m p a n ie d  by ra p id  in d u s t r ia l i s a t io n , 
commercialisation of land, and an exodus of the population to 
the cities, agricultural production became the business of a few 
specialised farmers. In response to the expanding market for 
food  in the  u rb an  a re a s , food p ro d u c tio n  increased  
phenomenally - more than industrial raw materials which had to 
be supplemented by plundering the colonies. As has already 
been mentioned, in underdeveloped countries under the impact 
of co lonial cap italism  n e ith e r in d u str ia lisa tio n  nor an 
agricultural revolution occurred. Whereas by 1860 (i.e. 100 
years after the industrial revolution) only 10 percent of the 
population in Europe was still in the rural areas, in Africa 
after about 100 years since the in troduction of colonial 
capitalism, around 85 percent of the population is still in the 
rural areas. Secondly, instead of growing, food production has 
declined steadily since the turn of the century. The so-called 
African capitalist farmers who emerged around the same time 
made no difference, as they were specialised in plantation crops 
for export.
This does not apply to Southern Africa, where the Africans 
were quickly confined to the "reserves". Here, agricultural 
production on any significant scale became the privilege of 
white settlers. Indeed, the latter became the agents of any 
capitalist transformation in the region, with the exception of 
Lesotho and Botswana where climatic conditions were not so 
favourable. Generally-speaking, food production by white 
farmers kept up with the demand (this does not apply to 
M alawi w here A fricans have been responsible for food 
production). They were also responsible for virtually all export 
crops. The latter is not to be exaggerated. The Southern 
African countries are by international standards small exporters
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of non-food crops. Given their racial division of labour and 
palpable income differentials, what would be expected of them 
is the problem of access among the majority of the population 
even under conditions of adequate supply of food. In other 
words, the white farmers are not obliged to adjust their prices 
to a weak domestic market when they can fetch better prices 
for their produce abroad. It would take a special food policy 
and subsidies to circumvent such a problem. Given the general 
indifference of white governments to the needs of the black 
majority and the usually strong political lobby white farmers 
have always had in the region, there had been no question of 
such an intervention, except in Zimbabwe immediately after 
independence. Even then it was an emergency situation caused 
by the drought and the general disruption of agricultural 
production.
As would be appreciated, the racial question overlays a number 
of basic issues which otherwise centre on class relations. The 
white farmers in Southern Africa exploited and dominated 
Africans as a capitalist class, supported by a capitalist state. 
As was shown earlier, in South Africa, especially, the whites 
sought to thwart any development of a capitalist class among 
African agricultural producers by legislation. The 19th century 
African peasantry, which was composed of largely Christian 
converts around mission stations, school teachers, ministers of 
religion, and labour-tenants and share-croppers, who generally 
had no form al education or C hristian background, was 
mercilessly crushed. They were condemned to a lowly living in 
the reserves on plots of no more than 4 acres and for which 
they had to pay quit-rent to the colonial state. Practically, 
the same policies were extended to the neighbouring British 
Protectorates, which were also looked upon as labour reserves. 
However, in L esotho  and Botswana there  was no land 
alienation, as was already noted. Instead, there was general 
neglect which left their agricultural economies as depressed as 
the South African Reserves, if not worse, given the fact that 
the climate in both countries was less favourable for arable 
agriculture. Therefore, the prospects for the emergence of an 
African capitalist class in agriculture were nil. In Rhodesia, as 
in South Africa, such a developm ent was forestalled  by
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legislation. In Malawi and Zambia the same result was 
achieved through nonstatu tory  racial discrim ination and 
manipulation of credit and marketing facilities. So, Southern 
A frica boasted  of no A frican cap ita lis t class p rio r to 
independence but rather a dispossessed or depressed peasantry, 
which could hardly feed itself.
After independence and even in the Bantustans, we witness the 
emergence of a grasping African petit-bourgeois elite which, 
relying on state revenues, tries to project itself as a capitalist 
class. Buying farms is a popular pastime among this class, but 
none of its members actually farm or live in the countryside. 
Instead of looking upon their farms as objects for investment, 
they look upon them as resorts for week-ends and holidays or 
as an insurance against old age. Malawi, where President 
Banda was prepared to sack a minister or higher civil servant 
for being a bad capitalist, might be the only exception. In 
Botswana the governing elite seem to be doing well in cattle- 
ranching either because, one suspects, it needs less . supervision 
than arable agriculture or because the Batswana herdsmen have 
a long tradition from which to draw. This could have been the 
case in Lesotho and Swaziland, if it were not for land scarcity 
and the already acute problem of over-stocking.
In Zimbabwe and Zam bia there had already been a few 
"progressive farmers" in the African Purchase Areas and in the 
Mazabuke District, respectively. It does not seem that they 
develop further than what is referred to as "kulaks" elsewhere. 
W hether or not the new entry by the m em bers of the 
governing elite will bring about a transformational effect is an 
open question. Suffice it to say, for the time being, there is 
no African class in Southern Africa which has come forward to 
take over agricultural production from the peasants on a 
national scale. But, as has been explained, peasant production 
everywhere in Southern Africa has been seriously undermined. 
This has, in turn, jeopardised chances for increased food 
p roduction  at the popular level. In countries such as 
Swaziland, South Africa and Zimbabwe where white farmers are 
the main producers, they have proved to be unconcerned with 
the problem of food security for the mass of the people. Yet,
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they have a huge monopoly of the best lands in all three 
countries. But then the ultimate question is: if such land
were equitably distributed, as it must, would the African 
"peasantry" in the region, which has been undermined over the 
last 50 years, be able to reproduce itself progressively; or 
should the decomposition of its mode of production be taken 
for granted?
The Question o f the Peasantry and Agrarian Revolution in 
Southern Africa:
Under the term, "agrarian revolution", must be included not 
only changes in class structure, production relations and social 
institutions in the countryside but also a veritable technological 
or scientific revolution. Liberal scholars have tended to reduce 
this to a techn ica l question , requ iring  a change from 
"communal" to "individual" land tenure in the case of Africa. 
On the other hand, M arxists have emphasized class and 
production relations at the expense of technical questions, 
which are usually lost in grand formulations about "material 
forces". Methodologically, such impartiality is not justified, as 
the process of social transformation involves both dimensions. 
For the social and historical reasons elucidated above, the 
African peasantry in Southern Africa has fallen far behind, 
technologically. In the meantime, the environmental conditions 
in the region have become less conducive to increased 
productivity, especially in food crops. This is in addition to 
other agronomic factors which have always been a problem in 
the region and which the peasant producers have never quite 
mastered or could not hope to master under the present state 
of their technological knowledge and financial possibilities. 
These m ight be w orth highlighting so as to avoid any 
revolutionary romanticism about the capabilities of the peasants 
on the eve of the revolution.
Scientifically, it is known that the soils in Southern Africa are 
predominantly low in plant nutrients, too acidic and abound in 
specific toxicities. It has also been reported by agronomists 
that the effectiveness of inorganic fertilisers and organic 
manures is reduced by the rapid leaching of nitrogen from high
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rainfall, the rapid breakdown of organic material, and the 
strong binding of phosphate and other nu trien ts to soil 
particles. This is believed to create specific problems of soil 
m anagem ent which have a bearing on traditional farming 
systems. Left on their own such textural and structural soil 
characteristics, naturally, constrain crop production and favour 
both compaction and soil erosion. As is well-known, soil 
erosion is most serious in Southern Africa and has been 
exacerbated by lack of soil preservation methods, frequent 
cropping of the soil with maize and over-stocking in the 
tsetse-free zones. This has greatly reduced the production 
potential of large areas in the region.
Secondly, although the average rainfall over much of the region 
is high or sufficient to grow a wide range of crops, the 
rainfall varies widely within growing seasons and from year to 
year. This resu lts  in frequen t dry spells during crop 
development and not so infrequently in years of drought or 
near-drought. The problem of unreliable rainfall is compounded 
by the poor water retention capacity of most soils in the 
region and high tem peratures that cause rapid evaporation. 
Consequently, water stress is reported to be the most serious 
constraint on crop production in most of the region. It is also 
believed to be the primary cause for average yields to diverge 
by as much as 25-50 percent between low and good rainfall 
areas and between bad and good years. The high probability of 
crop failure is seen as one of the factors which would 
predispose peasants to cut back on effort. All this would 
indicate the desperate need for irrigation in the region.
Fortunately, with the exception of Lesotho and Swaziland, the 
Southern African countries have substantial surface-water 
resources that could be developed for irrigation. Depending on 
the approach adopted, construction and maintenance costs for 
irrigation could be prohibitive. For large-scale irrigation, it is 
estim ated  that the foreign exchange costs could exceed 
US 10 000/ha and would be generally uneconomical for the 
production of staple food crops. Added to the cost would be 
the problem of trained irrigation engineers, water management 
personnel, and absence of appropriate institutions and irrigation
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experience among the African peasants in the region. This, 
combined with the huge gap in research capacity among 
A fricans to determ ine suitability of particu lar soils for 
irriga tion , the ap p ro p ria te  cu ltivars and m easures for 
controlling new crop diseases and pests, make large-scale 
irrigation in the region look more like a result of development 
than a problem of development. Luckily, on the other hand, 
there seem to be plenty of opportunities for small-scale 
irrigation projects throughout the region which are well suited 
to the needs of small producers. The estimated cost for these 
ranges between US 500 and US 1000/ha. They are believed to 
be cost-effective even for staple crops. They can, thus, make 
a rapid contribution to food self-sufficiency where small 
producers are subjects of development. FAO estimated the 
potential for small- to medium- scale irrigation for the SADCC 
countries as follows:-
Table 1 : Potential for Saall- to Nediua-Scale Irrigation*
Country •000 ha X of country
Angola 3 800 3.0
Botswana 1 -
Lesotho 30 1.0
Malawi 500 5.6
Mozambique 3 350 4.3
Swazi land 10 0.6
Tanzania 2 500 2.2
Zambia 1 300 1.1
Zimbabwe 300 (nonalluvial soils)
TOTAL 11 791
‘Estimated on the basis of the surplus from average annual 
rainfall within the country.[6]
Pre-and post-harvest losses from pests and diseases is often 
mentioned in relation to food production in Africa. In the 
SADCC region it is estimated that food availability is reduced
109
by 30-40 percent by such disasters. Grain losses alone are put 
at more than 2 million tonnes per year, which more than 
matches the volume of grain imports. Thus, improvements in 
pest and disease control in the field and during storage could 
g rea tly  augm ent the food supply and might contribute 
significantly to food self-sufficiency in the region. According 
to reports, each of the main cereal crops in the SADCC
countries is subject to about six major diseases and to an equal
number of field and storage pests. It is believed that, at any 
given time, almost any of these diseases or pests could cause 
complete crop losses in various parts of the region. Yet, there 
is no im m ediate  or apparen t reason why the peasants 
them selves have not reduced the risk within their own 
technical possibilities.
A nother area where existing opportunities have not been 
exploited by the African peasants in Southern Africa is 
pastoralism. From the physical point of view, it is noticeable 
that the grasslands in the SADCC countries can support only 
low animal population densities. The average carrying capacity
is thought to vary from about 2 ha/an im al unit in the
better-watered areas in Malawi and Zambia to 20 ha/animal 
unit in the arid areas of Botswana, Lesotho and Tanzania. Yet, 
th e re  is a persisten t drive among the peasants to own 
ever-increasing herds, without taking steps to improve the 
pastures. The combined effect of large herds, low carrying 
cap ac ity  of the na tu ra l pastu res  and genera l lack of 
supplem entary feeds is, of course, over-grazing and land 
degradation. Under the present conditions, it is estimated that 
herds exceed the carrying capacity in the SADCC region by 
anything between 50 and 100 percent. It could not be that the 
peasants are unaware of the destruction their herds are causing 
and of the losses in yields that they, as producers, are 
suffering. What are the underlying causes for their apparent 
irrationality? Are the peasants in fact their own worse 
enemies, as Marx believed?
The issues raised in the preceding section are a complex nexus 
between subjective and objective factors, whose determinations 
are difficult to decipher. Without going deep into the question
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of the ambiguous status of the peasantry, as a class which 
partakes of the attributes of both the labouring and the 
property owing classes, it is important to note that African 
"peasants" are not affected by this particu lar ambiguity 
because, h isto rica lly , they have never known individual 
property. What they are customed to is corporate rights in 
land and cattle, realised through lineages and extended families. 
Heads of these units held such property in trust and presided 
over its d istr ib u tio n . The fact that they m ight have 
manipulated the distribution in their favour e.g. allocating 
cattle to acquire more wives for themselves while juniors are 
expected to cool their heels or passions, does not invalidate 
our proposition. The same manipulation might have been 
practised by lineage elders in allocating land to different 
families. As these were nothing more than privileges, they 
were subject to questioning by corporate members who were 
entitled to inalienable use-rights.
Even so, Meillassoux saw this as a particular mode not only of 
allocating value but also of appropriating value.[7] He referred 
to it as the "lineage mode of production" and argued, 
erroneously in our view, that within it the elders exploited 
juniors and women and that, in fact, constituted an exploiting 
class. Despite the hierarchy, based on gender and seniority, in 
the lineage mode of production, it is still im portant to 
distinguish between relations of domination and relations of 
exploitation. In the course of the cyclical development of 
domestic groups, African lineage elders could only reproduce 
themselves through juniors. Whereas women were, no doubt, 
dominated and exploited by men in general, senior women did 
likewise to ju n io r women. Think of those dom inating 
matriarchs and insufferable mothers-in-law! Wherein lies class 
in this?
Nevertheless, any hierarchies and inequalities in a society 
create a predisposition towards class-formation. The principle 
of non-antagonistic relations in property-less societies not 
withstanding, it must be acknowledged that under certain 
conditions use-rights could get entrenched. Among these may 
be mentioned demographic pressure and colonial capitalism. In
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the former case there might be simply not enough land to go 
round e.g. in Lesotho and the National Lands in Swaziland. 
U nder colonial capitalism individual families might try to 
maximise their advantage by growing permanent crops or by 
developing their plots for commercial production. This is what 
the Christian families did around the mission stations during 
the 19th century in South Africa. Their capitalist enterprise 
was only aborted by the white capitalist state in anticipation 
of the labour needs of white capital. This did not happen 
elsewhere in Black Africa, Kenya excluded. Another difference 
is that while chiefs in other parts of Africa, especially in West 
Africa, were able to take advantage of their positions and 
engaged in illicit deals over land with foreigners for their 
personal benefit, in South Africa their power had been usurped 
by white magistrates and they, as junior civil servants, were 
forbidden to exercise their traditional prerogatives in lieu of 
m onthly stipends and o ther allowances from the white 
adm inistration. The accumulation we witness now in the 
Bantustans by collaborationist chiefs is a new deal, which has 
its own reasons.
It had been suggested by Meillassoux on the basis of his work 
in the Ivory Coast that the elders and the chiefs stood to gain 
by maintaining the traditional system and the lineage mode of 
production while reserving the right to make deals with 
im peria lism  or co lonial cap italism  on beha lf of their 
communities. This gave them an opportunity to control the 
flow of prestige goods from both ends. Insofar as this is true, 
Meillassoux argued, it was not individuals which imperialism or 
colonial capitalism exploited but whole communities. This 
included even the release of junior men as migrant workers. 
Meillassoux’s thesis fitted in very well with a broader theory 
that had been advanced by the French Marxists about the 
"dissolution and preservation" of pre-capitalist modes of 
production in Africa.
The idea was that colonial capitalism undermined African modes 
of production sufficiently to create reservoirs of cheap labour 
but not enough to dissolve them, lest it was forced to pay for 
the social reproduction of the labour it was exploiting. Later,
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in the hands of writers such as Rey and Samir Amin, this 
developed into the so-called theory of "articulation of modes of 
production", which was specifically extended to South Africa by 
Wolpe.[8] What this boils down to is that the migrant workers 
are a dynamic link between the capitalist mode of production 
and the African subsistence or "re-distributive" mode of 
production. It is the redistributive function of the latter that 
is exploited by capital for the social reproduction of its labour. 
In Meillassoux’s terms, it is the community that is exploited by 
virtue of releasing individual workers to capital. For Southern 
Africa both these are extremely suggestive. We might benefit 
by going through them, even if in the end we discard them. 
We have already referred to the suppression of capitalist 
growth among Africans in Southern Africa, the deliberate 
attempt to reduce all Africans to potential labour, and the 
institution of the system of "reserves" so as to maintain black 
labour migrancy over a period of more than 100 years. What 
we need to do now is to consider the implications of these 
factors against the background of the theories mentioned 
above.
Meillassoux’s thesis was based on the explicit assumption that 
the societies he studied were "self-sustaining agricultural 
communities". Therefore, the first question that has to be 
addressed is whether or not the Southern African agricultural 
communities are "self-sustaining". The second question is 
whether the processes of social production and reproduction in 
African agricultural communities should be located at the level 
of the "community" at all. Technically, the two questions could 
be form ulated even more sharply by asking whether such 
processes occurred at the level of the "social formation" or of 
the "mode of production". This also has a direct bearing on 
the theory of "articulation" of modes of production. As will be 
recalled, in these theories the "articulation" was between the 
capitalist mode of production and an unidentified category of 
"pre-capitalist" modes of production in Africa. If the idea of 
articulation of modes of production were granted, could it be 
assumed that all pre-capitalist modes of production articulate in 
an identical way with the capitalist mode of production? 
Implicit in this question is a num ber of theoretical and
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However, in passing it could be pointed out that not only did 
various African modes of production respond differently to 
colonial capitalism e.g. the pastoralists in the Sudan belt and 
the mercantile societies of West Africa, but also colonial 
capitalism took various forms e.g. concessionary capitalism 
along the banks of the Congo and Niger rivers and white 
s e tt le r  c a p ita lism  in sou thern  A frica . But all these 
arrangements, through systematic extraction of surplus value 
from the African societies,[9] undermined the capacity of 
African modes of production to reproduce themselves. Southern 
Africa, where up to 85 percent of the income of the rural 
population is accounted for by remittances from the cities, 
might be a extreme example, but is reflective of a general 
phenomenon in Africa. Otherwise, how else do we explain the 
current crisis in Africa, culminating in near-starvation or 
actual famines? It might be what we are dealing with is not 
"articulation of modes of production" in Africa but a particular 
variant of capitalism, colonial capitalism, which is parasitic and, 
therefore , unprogressive. It exploits labour, without any 
transform ational benefits. In other words, what we are 
experiencing here is not "dissolution and preservation" but 
rather "dissolution without resolution". Colonial capitalism is 
not able to resolve the problem of production and social 
reproduction in Africa. What it seems to be heading for now 
is general genocide, as is shown by the dumping of unwanted 
surplus labour since the 1970s. In South Africa this had 
already been anticipated by the mass removals of 1969-1972 and 
by the constant threat to repatriate all the labour from the 
neighbouring countries.
It would be premature to conclude from the foregoing remarks 
that African modes of production have ipso facto decomposed. 
It is im portant to bear in mind that colonial capitalism, 
powerful and intrusive as it was, did not have monopoly of 
initiative. After their resistance had been broken, Africans 
adopted strategies for survival. These included clinging to 
some of the institutions which had in the past given them 
security and succour in time of difficulties. The lineage is one
empirical issues which we cannot pursue in the present context.
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such institu tion and, if it is d la Meillassoux a mode of 
production, then it survived. This did not happen, at least in 
Southern Africa, because the African elders or the colonial 
authorities willed it. Rather, it was the over-exposed and 
insecure migrant workers who could not afford to foresake it. 
In it were embedded their inalienable corporate and use rights. 
But in the meantime, it was not the imperatives of lineage 
organisation which sent them hurtling into labour migrancy. It 
was rather the immediate needs of their individual households.
This is perfectly consistent since it is the household which has 
always been responsible for production and redistribution in 
Black Africa. This has prompted me to refer to traditional 
African economy as a "household economy", instead of "tribal 
economy" which gives the erroneous impression that there was 
an integration of production in Africa at the territorial level. 
For that matter, even Meillassoux is mistaken in thinking that 
"self-sufficiency" in Africa occurred at the level of the 
community. Indeed, one of the problems facing us now is that 
there were no territorially based units of production in Africa. 
The problem is further compounded by the fact that, while 
production occurred at the level of the household, reproduction 
of households took place at the level of the lineage in societies 
which were universally exogamous and unilineal in their descent 
systems. This reciprocal relationship is the last line of defence 
in African communities. Hence, our hypothesis is that, far 
from loosening  it, co lonial cap italism  s tren g th en ed  it 
unwittingly.
Colonial distortions notwithstanding, defence is one thing and 
self-sufficiency another. The fact that African heads of 
families or their sons migrated in search of wage labour is a 
clear indication that the African household had lost its self- 
sufficiency under the impact of colonial capitalism. The fact 
that the migrant workers oscillated between town and country 
for over a century is a sign of their inability to fulfil the 
requirements of the social reproduction of their own labour and 
that of the household to which they were committed. Under 
the circumstances the lineage became absolutely indispensable 
because it guaranteed protection of their corporate rights
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during their absence in the cities. It also guaranteed minimum 
p ro tec tio n  to the households of its absentee m em bers. 
Dereliction of duty threatened the security of the individual 
migrant and the survival of both the household and the lineage.
In allocating labour the objective of each household is to 
satisfy its subsistence needs. Under the reservation system it 
became increasingly difficult to achieve this objective mainly 
because of dim inishing labour retu rns on m iniscule and 
unproductive farm plots. But according to theory, the 
household should have reacted by intensifying technological 
factors so as to increase labour productivity. This is exactly 
what happened in Southern Africa. The adoption of the whole 
array of the agricultural implements plus some cheap fertilisers, 
mentioned earlier, testifies to this. Indeed, at the beginning 
all migrant workers were "target workers". They went to the 
cities to earn enough money to buy specific items which, more 
often than not, were agricultural tools and cattle. Unhappily, 
all this was to no avail. The decline in African agriculture in 
the reserves con tinued  steadily  but inexorably and the 
im m iseration of the peasantry becam e such that labour 
migration was no longer a temporary affair but a way of life. 
So, what the theory  failed to specify was the minimal 
conditions under which technological innovations can realise 
their value. One simply cannot combine absolute poverty with 
sustained technological progress.
The African household was torn asunder. Heads of household 
and their sons had to spend their most productive years serving 
a new and m erciless god, Capital, while their wives and 
daughters tried to hold the camp in rural areas as best as they 
could. From the point of view of the labour process, both men 
and women were over-stretched and the household economy of 
which they were agents was undergoing a severe crisis, unable 
to reproduce itself consistently. Neither the wages nor the 
agricultural income was big enough to allow the household to 
reconstitu te  itself. In the meantime, new needs such as 
industrial consumer goods, school fees, government taxes and 
medical bills had become part of everyday life. This would 
breed some individualism on the part of household heads, as
116
they would prefer to concentrate their limited resources on 
their own children so as to guarantee them a better life in the 
future. On the other hand, mindful of their corporate rights 
and responsibilities, members of the lineage would not take 
kindly to such individualism. So, for their own good, heads of 
households have to fulfil their obligations towards their lineage 
m em bers. For the household, this is a second area of 
irresolution.
As can be imagined, these competing demands exert great 
pressure on the subsistence fund of the average household. 
One suspects that the wife or mother, being the natural 
provider for her family, finds herself, in the absence of her 
husband, having to engage in a variety of economic activities, 
well beyond the family farm, to make ends meet. This would 
tend to underm ine the hierarchical structure of both the 
household and the lineage. It would appear, therefore, that 
from all angles the household, the most basic unit for 
agricultural production in Africa, is undergoing a crisis of 
production and social reproduction under the impact of colonial 
capitalism. It has lost its coherence because of competing 
demands for its labour-power and value. If so, what hope is 
there for agricultural recovery and food self-sufficiency in 
Africa?
Prospects for Agrarian Transformation in Black Africa
At the moment prospects for agrarian transformation in Africa 
are bleak. There are two major reasons for this: (a) petit-
bourgeois governments all over the continent are, with the 
exception of a few socialist-oriented governments, committed to 
neo-colonial agricultural policies and programmes; and (b) in 
the meantime, African peasants, as a class, are, unlike their 
counterparts in Asia and Latin-America, not organised and 
conscious enough to be agents of revolutionary agrarian trans­
form ation in Africa. Concerning the first point: it was 
inevitable that African governments would after independence 
adopt programmes which were a continuation of the past. 
Their national political and economic project was petit-
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bourgeois from its inception. Their biggest aspiration was to 
establish a bourgeois society in which individual appropriation 
of value would be the rule. In agriculture this got associated, 
in the true spirit of the colonial bourgeois economics, with 
individual land tenure. Indeed, the often-quoted "success 
stories" (Kenya, Ivory Coast, Malawi and Cameroun) carried this 
policy furthest. Bourgeois scholars have seen this as a 
vindication of their point of view.
H e re , th e re  m ight be confusion betw een grow th and 
development - a not uncommon mistake. It would be silly to 
deny the fact that until the onset of the present crisis in 
Africa the countries referred to above showed some of the 
highest growth rates in Africa. The corollary of this, at least 
in Malawi and Kenya, was an accelerated rate of landlessness 
and poverty among the peasants. The evidence from the Ivory 
Coast and Cameroun is inconclusive. There is no indication of 
abnormal rates of landlessness. There is, however, observable 
stagnation of peasant agriculture, increasing unemployment, and 
general poverty in the so-called subsistence sector in both 
countries. Furthermore, in the case of Kenya, since the food 
crisis in Africa there has been a breaking up of the big estate 
farms by peasant squatters who are asserting their original 
usufructuary rights. This is a noteworthy development because 
it shows the resilience of the lineage principle in Africa even 
under what is supposed to be capitalist organisation. Similarly, 
estate farmers in the Ivory Coast are abandoning agriculture in 
favour of industrial/commercial enterprises in the urban areas. 
It would be interesting to see what happens to the land so 
abandoned. Our guess is that it will revert to the lineages of 
the former owners. The obvious conclusion to draw from all 
this is that petit-bourgeois agricultural policies and programmes 
have, even in the best examples, failed to bring about a 
genuine agrarian transform ation in Africa. As a result, 
everywhere they are faced with reverses and a deepening 
agricultural crisis.
W hereas e lsew here in A frica , with the tew exceptions 
mentioned, land distribution has not been a major issue and 
cap ita list production has occurred on the main without
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individualisation of land rights, in Southern Africa, due to the 
settler problem, land distribution remains one of the biggest 
obstacles to African development. This constitutes part of the 
struggle against white minority regimes or against white settler 
domination. However, the programmes advanced by the national 
liberation movements leave much to be desired. As elsewhere 
in Africa, they are essentially petit-bourgeois. In Zimbabwe 
the Government has adopted a reformist programme whereby 
they hope to settle some thousands of African families on 
mainly "individually allocated" land, without the expropriation 
of the white estate owners who hold vast amounts of unused 
land. The amount of land that the Government has been able 
to secure so far through purchase is barely 5 percent of the 
land owned by white farmers.
Government officials blame this petty reform ism  on the 
Lancaster House agreement. Some might interpret it as 
petty-fogging by a petit-bourgeois government. The same 
applies to the Swazi Government which since independence has 
been waiting for loans or grants from the British Government 
to buy more land from white landowners for African settlement. 
When it comes to South Africa itself, it is patently clear that 
the Government, with its Bantustan policy, does not propose to 
re-distribute the land for the benefit of the peasants. In the 
meantime, beyond the popular slogan, "all land to the tillers", 
all South African liberation movements uphold the bourgeois 
right "to buy and sell land". They have various excuses for 
this, the most commonly articulated being that at this stage 
theirs is a "national (bourgeois) democratic revolution". Of 
course, the term "bourgeois" is conveniently left out in their 
propaganda texts. But the substantive question remains: would 
the black South Africans be able to realise a bourgeois 
revolution under imperialism and in the light of what has 
already happened elsewhere in Africa?
Proposals for a Genuine Agrarian Transformation in Africa
Starting from the assum ption that bourgeois dem ocratic 
revolutions in the Third World have proved unrealisable under 
imperialism and that, as a consequence thereof, petit-bourgeois
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neo-co lon ia l policies in A frica have ended up in petty 
dictatorships and a deepening agrarian crisis, the following 
proposals might go a long way in solving the problem:-
1. The African trad itional land tenure systems, which 
recognise no individual ownership rights in land but rather 
usufruct rights to which all members of the community 
are entitled, be maintained. In order to combine equity 
with development or economies of scale, production and 
appropriation of value be organised on a broader basis 
than individual households or families.
2. In practice the latter will involve rehabilitation of the 
African households which have been seriously undermined 
by colonial capitalism through the system of migrant 
labour and reservations. This amounts to a call for 
equitable distribution of all available land in countries 
such as South Africa, Swaziland, Zimbabwe and Malawi, 
and for cessation of the system of m igrant labour 
(something which is being attempted in Zimbabwe).
3. For households to reproduce themselves consistently and 
to feel fully committed to territorially-based units of 
production and distribution (village cooperatives or 
communes), they will have to be freed from the control of 
lineages. This can be done not by declaring war on the 
lineages but by transferring the administration of landed 
resources from lineage elders or chiefs to the productive 
units themselves and by creating therein greater security 
for the households than has been the case hitherto. 
Diminution of the power of the lineage elders would mean 
greater autonomy for the juniors but not necessarily for 
women, as each elder or junior is the head of his own 
family or household. Special measures would have to be 
taken to ensure equality between men and women. So 
far, even cooperatives have been dominated by men in 
Africa, not because they did all the work, but because 
everything was registered in their names even in those 
cases where women did all the work e.g. the pyrethrum 
industry in Kenya.
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4. While it would be desirable that the government holds all 
land in custody on behalf of the people,[10] and that it 
accepts responsibility for the overall plan for agricultural 
production and marketing, it would be equally desirable 
that the producers participate in the allocation and 
distribution of resources. In the past governments have 
expropriated producers in favour of the ruling elite and 
u rb an  dw ellers in g enera l. This has led to the 
disaffection of the producers and consequent decline in 
p roduction . A ttem p ts by governm ents to find an 
independent base for accumulation through state farms 
will not do either, since state farms in Africa have acted 
in direct competition with the small producers for the 
allocation of limited resources for agricultural production, 
without showing any surpluses but, instead, continual 
deficits. Also, at the political level they reinforce the 
bureaucratic approach to development.
5. Finally, scientific research and technological development 
should be geared towards the fulfilment of the objectives 
outlined above. In the past the governments relied on 
imported technologies which favoured export agriculture in 
the so -ca lled  m odern sec to r. T hese techno log ies 
encouraged specialisation or monoculturalism by being 
indifferent to traditional staple crops e.g. the maize 
monoculturalism in Southern Africa which has proved to 
be so ruinous of the soil. Traditional staple crops, 
despite their light yields, were better suited to Southern 
African soils. Every attempt should be made to re-instate 
and up-grade traditional crops through scientific research, 
w hich tak es  ad v an tag e  of the  ex is tin g  stock  of 
information among the ordinary producers. Naturally, the 
development of indigenous technologies is contingent on 
the re-orientation of the educational system in general. 
The few ag ricu ltu ra l colleges in A frica still teach 
European agriculture in the tropics.
The above five points would provide a basis for a self-reliant
agricultural economy in Africa. But it should not be imagined
that all coun tries  can be self-su ffic ien t in agricultural
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production. Lesotho is one example in Southern Africa which 
comes to mind. In trying to overcome these problems, a 
regional approach should be adopted. It would not make sense 
to rationalise production at the level of households and not at 
the level of governments. Myopic nationalism is antithetical to 
collective self-reliance which should be a guiding principle 
amongst people. Likewise, self-sufficiency and food security at 
the national level should not be confused with the same at the 
level of the people. The latter is contingent on the elimination 
of class deprivation and exploitation which in Southern Africa 
is compounded by racism. For all we know, people in Southern 
Africa might still starve in the midst of plenty. This is a 
problem, not of petty reformism or charitable ameliorations, but 
of the Southern African agrarian revolution in which South 
Africa is the kingpin.
NOTES
1. As Monica Wilson puts it: 'The peasants described here
differed in one important respect from those to whom the 
name is commonly applied: they were radicals who could
and did adapt to a new world" M. Wilson and L. 
Thompson (eds), The Oxford History of South Africa. 
Oxford, 1971. p. 53.
2. According to Bundy, in the early 1830s "fifteen hundred 
wagons of produce were taken to Grahamstown market 
each year and the district of Albany exported over 50,000 
Sterling Pounds of goods a year. By 1835, when Port 
Elizabeth was handling 80,000’s Sterling Pounds worth of 
export produce, a certain Mr. Kay estimated that "from 
50-60 Sterling Pounds of this was goods obtained from 
Xhosa producers". C. Bundy, The Rise and Fall of the 
S ou th  A fric a n  P e a s a n try . L ondon . 1979. p. 31. 
S. Trapido, Landlord and Tenant in a Colonial Economy: 
the Transvaal (1880-1910), Journal of Southern African 
Studies. 5, 1 Oct., 1978. D. Denoon, Southern Africa 
Since 1800, London. 1972.
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NOTES
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3. For the Transvaal, Trapido states that: "In December
1903 the Vereening Estates and Land Co. farms had 
20,506 acres under cultivation... White tenants and their 
familes... cultivated 3,120 acres. Black tenants cultivated 
16,2% acres". Elsewhere he concludes: "It comes as no
surprise therefore  to discover that a ’merchant of 
Pretoria’ could tell the Standard and Diggers News that 
after ’careful computation of the market books’ he had 
concluded that ’Kafirs take away 47,000 Sterling Pounds 
from the local market for every 26,000 Sterling Pounds 
taken away by Boers". S. Trapido, "Landlord and Tenant 
in a Colonial Economy: the Transvaal (1880-1910)",
Journal of Southern African Studies. 5, 1 Oct. 1978.
4. During the reading of the Bill on Rights of Coloured 
Persons in Respect of Fixed Property in 1908 in the 
Orange Free State, it was acknowledged that "two-thirds 
of the grain produced in the Colony was grown by 
blacks". According to one commentator, competition 
was such that "The white farmers welcomed with open 
arms any black family with stock and equipment who 
could plough and sow" for them.
5. In the 1850s and 1860s it is reported that Africans in 
Natal had stepped up crop production "to such an extent 
that in many areas the local population produced 
sufficient surplus grain to support white villages (as well 
as many individual white graziers)". Bundy, op. cit. p. 
172.
6. Dr. M. Rukuni of the University of Zimbabwe, who 
happens to be working on the same problem, believes that 
the FAO estim ates are "too optimistic" - personal 
communication in Maseru, January, 1987.
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7. C. Meillassoux. Anthropologie Economique des Gourou de
C o te  d ’Iv o ire . P a ris , 1964. A lso , The Soc ia l 
Organisation o f the Peasantry: The Economic Basis of
Kinship, Journal of Peasant Studies, No. 1, 1 Oct., 1973.
8. Samir Amin, The Dynamic and Limitations o f Agrarian 
Capitalism in Black Africa in P. Gutkind and P. Waterman 
(eds) African Social Studies. London, 1970. P.P. Rey, 
Colonialisme, Neocolonialisme et Transition au Capitalisme. 
Paris, 1971. P.P. Rey, The Lineage Mode o f Production. 
Critique of Anthropology. No. 3, 1975. H. Wolpe, The 
Articulation of Modes of Production. London, 1980.
9. It might be true that colonial plunder, where it occurred, 
was not necessarily systematic, given the fact that it was 
essentially extra-economic. But the same could not be 
said of imperialism, from which no Third World country 
escaped. In the case of imperialism, which relied on 
deliberate  export of capital for higher profits, the 
extraction of surplus-value or exploitation of cheap local 
labour and raw materials was and still is systematic.
10. Nationalisation of all land in African countries should be 
seen only as a juridical ploy for preventing expropriation 
of the vast majority of the people by multi-nationals and 
local monopolies, and not as an excuse for state monopoly 
of any kind.
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SOME FACTORS WHICH IMPINGE UPON 
FOOD SECURITY IN SOUTHERN 
AFRICA: THE CASE OF SWAZILAND
B.B. Sikhondze
Introduction
Insecurity in food supplies often precipitates social and political 
problems which may later lead to demonstrations heralding 
changes in existing political institutions. The Ethiopian case is 
one o f 'such  living examples where not only food shortages 
experienced by the underprivileged but even social and political 
problem s did force the s ta te  to gravitate to the most 
undesirable situation - undesirable to the privileged echelons of 
the society. Whatever the direct and immediate cause of the 
revolution, food shortages which resulted in famine and loss of 
life contributed directly to the eruption of political upheavals 
in Ethiopia. In short, instability in food supplies more often 
than not leads to some political instability. The Ethiopian 
example is just one out of many; and in Southern Africa similar 
events have recently shaken the latter orbit of the African 
continent in these closing years of the 20th century. In 
Swaziland, for instance, shortages in food supplies such as 
vegetables, meat and fruits experienced from 1978 to the early 
1980s, threatened the political stability of the state. Similar 
problems also shook the political foundations of Lesotho 
recently and the immediate causes of the upheaval was the 
discontinued food supplies to Lesotho by South Africa. 
However, the gist of the paper is not the examination of the 
aftermath of food shortages as the causes of food instability in 
Southern Africa. In the attempt to write the paper Swaziland
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was chosen as a case study due to its problems being more 
familiar with the author than those of other states in the 
Southern African orbit of the continent.
The areas upon which the study centres are political, economic 
and climatic factors inhibitive to food security in Southern 
Africa with special emphasis on Swaziland. Basically, the 
issues at stake are the attitudes of the administration towards 
the tenure of land and land-use patterns and their connection 
with the mandate of traditional leaders such as chiefs in so far 
as the allottment and tenurial periods are concerned. In most 
instances chieftain authority  has been inhibitive to most 
developmental projects especially those which threaten to wear 
thin their authority over their subjects. But what is crucial is 
also to ascertain the type of relationship existent between the 
policy of the adm inistration about food security and the 
authority of the chiefs that is said to be obstructionist to 
production. If such a policy is wanting in firmness chiefs will 
water down most of its ideals especially those that threaten to 
weaken their somewhat autocratic authority over those whom 
they lead. Yet another crucial issue during this period of the 
tw entieth century is the recognition of the dual role of 
so-called food crops in the rural economy of the country. 
Some food crops are grown to satisfy consumption and cash 
needs, and the determ ination of the ratio is left to the 
producers themselves, who know more than any outsider the 
various needs of their domestic economies. In short, the 
security of the market for such crops, sometimes internal and 
also external should be provided by the administration in 
conjunction with the stage by stage cooperation of the 
cultivators themselves. The unavailability of reliable consumer 
markets injects insecurity into the growers which would in turn 
water down their enthusiasm for participation in the production 
of food crops. That is not the end rather a step to yet 
another very decisive stage which is none other than the 
determination of the consumer price. The latter is decisive in 
so far as the lucrative and non-lucrative nature of the 
commodity price determines the level of production. In close 
rela tion  with the la tte r would be the question of credit 
facilities. The la tte r are made available to debtors on
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condition that they are payable back with some interest, and 
before credit organisations are instituted; feasibility studies are 
conducted to ensure that the project will not be a liability to 
the state, rather it should possess the potential to generate 
capital in addition to feeding the nation adequately. Lastly, 
one of the fundamental issues in the history of agricultural 
production today is the state of water resources and its 
potential to support irrigation farming. Most small-scale 
farmers depend on rainfall for their farming activities, a 
drawback to the promotion of food production as well as that 
of other crops. At this point the discussion will delve into 
these problems, the question of politics being the first on the 
agenda.
Traditional Authorities and Food Stability
The desire to maintain the status quo in so far as the political 
hierarchy is concerned in Swaziland has proved to be one of 
the most powerful handicaps to the realisation of self- 
sufficiency in food production and supplies.
In each chiefdom there is a chief who takes charge over the 
allocation and redistribution as well as the use patterns of 
land, as a means of production! In the majority of cases some 
of these political leaders have not been enlightened on the 
prerequisites for economic growth and/or development. The 
dearth  of education, which will or should enable these 
authorities to lead their subjects with some up-to-date and 
relevant awareness, has often handicapped developmental 
projects. For instance, the allocation of land has not been 
governed by the economic needs of the leader’s subjects, rather 
other related factors have intervened. Economic considerations 
have often been superceded by issues of social and political 
nature.
Before land allocation is made chiefs have often been bothered 
by the social and political background of their followers. In 
cases where the applicant’s social and political background is 
either humble or unknown very little land would be allotted.
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This is done in a bid to maintain the status quo whereby the 
destitute should continue in that state while the well-to-do are 
assisted to continue with capital accumulation by amassing more 
of the means of production land - as is allocated. In short, 
limitations on the amount of land allocated to people who are 
not associated with chiefs or their assistants are a cause for 
meagre and marginal food supplies.[2]
Once land allocated to each family proves to be too little for 
grain  p roduction , which forms a staple food crop, the 
cultivation of supplementary crops such as millet and sorghum 
and beans, automatically gets cut out of the economic activities 
of the growers. Lack of such diversification is detrimental to 
the viability of any nation not only in terms of food supplies 
being limited but even in so far as balancing up one’s diet is 
concerned. In other cases commoners who are quite prosperous 
in their agricultural production would be forced to give up 
parts of their land for redistribution to those who need more. 
What it all means is that some chiefs develop antipathy towards 
their productive subjects, a phenomenon that counteracts any 
form of development or progress. In those instances where 
land reductions may prove a futile attempt to throttle progress 
in agricultural production some case that would necessitate the 
expulsion of the subject would be concocted. Since there is no 
law providing security to the subjects, the latter live in 
perpetual fear of being expelled and as a result become less 
productive agriculturally. Not only do these factors impinge on 
grain production but virtually every economic activity gets 
affected thereby rendering the rural economy weak and 
dependent on the South African agricultural economy.[3]
Apropos of the latter obstruction to the realisation of food 
stability is lack of government support for the projects that 
are geared towards security in food supplies. For the Rural 
Development Areas projects, hereafter referred to as RDAs, to 
take off, the government needs to design a clearly defined 
policy on land allocation, tenure and use patterns that would 
supercede the whims of the traditional authorities like chiefs 
and their assistants. A spectacular example is that of land 
enclosure which is anathema to some chiefdoms while others do
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permit its practice. Land enclosure allows the growers to 
cultivate their fields anytime of the year w ithout much 
interference from livestock and similar intervening factors. 
Also, land development projects could be implemented without 
any fear that the investment would turn out to be tantamount 
to some waste in the sense that wandering animals would come 
in any time to destroy whatever crop that could have been 
cultivated. In short, land enclosure encouraged growers to 
invest in the form of rejuvenating the soil and other things 
without any reservations because they would realise the fruits 
of their capital and labour power in due course. But where the 
politicians reserve their pronouncements in relation to the 
development of the rural economy, output in production goes 
down. However, in certain  instances, some decree gets 
published, for instance in 1980, when Prime Minister, Prince 
Mabandla, passed some national policy towards redeeming the 
food situation by making each military barrack to produce its 
own food, he did not receive much support.[4] It was due to 
such apathy that his policy towards remedying the food crisis 
fell on rocky ground, especially after his overthrow. Prior to 
his fall the Malkerns Camp had begun some industrious work on 
the project to the extent that not only did they feed the 
whole defence force but even went to the extent of depositing 
some of the maize onto the local market. Vegetables were also 
produced in abundance for consumption by the military as well 
as for sale, and this development coincided with the short 
supply of South African vegetables to Swaziland following some 
cholera outbreak which led to these being stopped at all the 
border posts.[5]
Alongside these obstacles is yet another bewildering obstruction 
to the improvement of the agricultural and rural economy of 
the state. In the same way as in the above case, the state has 
remained inactive in relation to the consumer market for 
agricultural produce such as foodstuffs. This aspect stands 
astride the economic and political issues in so far as its 
absence (market) affects the economy of the producers and at 
the same time its absence results from either the failure or the 
unawareness of the state or administration to provide it or 
realise its viability to the improvement of the national revenue.
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Ensuring the establishment of a viable food market locally 
would encourage each region to step up production of each 
crop suited to a region thereby introducing some economic 
interdependence between the climatically various areas of the 
territory. In other words, local producers need the state to 
support them against any outside producers by decreeing some 
policy that will govern trade in agricultural products. Such 
security would gradually lead to some food stability. But since 
Swaziland has not yet designed such a policy the state of food 
security becomes precarious by the day as the population 
increase assumes a faster rate than that of food production.[6] 
This aspect links up with the various economic problems that 
have stood very firmly on the way of progress in so far as 
food security is concerned.
Cultivators and Financial Facilities
When maize gradually replaced traditional foodcrops like millet 
and sorghum in the 1950s, the position of food and food supply 
became precarious. This was caused, among other factors, by 
the new technology and concomitant demands the latter crop 
(m aize) had on its growers. The simple and relatively 
backward mode of production which had been used to produce 
m illet and sorghum needed some overhaul, an expensive 
undertaking in terms of time, capital and labour power. In 
practical terms what this process meant for the grower was 
that while he was busy upgrading his farming technology so 
that he could adopt maize at the expense of millet and 
sorghum, his harvest in maize did not rise adequately. In 
o rd er to m aster the technology tha t would give them 
(cultivators) reasonable returns, they also needed to identify 
the types of soils and climatic conditions that were suited to 
the production of the crop in question. This process lasted 
until the latter days of the ’60s, when in September 1968, 
Swaziland was once again declared an independent African 
sovereignty. Since this political event occurred at a time when 
the people were struck by famine, made worse in the same year 
by some drought, the government deemed it imperative to 
address itself to the food issue before anything else.[7]
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As though this was the long awaited opportunity, the World 
Bank moved in swiftly and introduced to the still ’confused’
government solutions that could ease the food shortage
problem. As an indication of a ’confused’ state of mind 
regarding the direction to be followed to alleviate the food 
shortage in the country, the ’independent’ government accepted 
the econom ic package of the bank. Among the most 
undesirable clauses of the package, was the fact that maize 
should be turned into a commodity in order to whip up 
sufficient enthusiasm among the cultivators not only to expand 
the area under cultivation but to seek means of maximising 
their harvests of the crop. At this stage it had dawned even 
on the less observant that maize and the farming technology of 
the growers were not congruous. Supporting the expansion of 
maize production before an overhaul of the farming system of 
the growers was tantamount to rubbing salt onto an ulcerous 
wound. Yet another alternative could have been to promote 
the cultivation of those crops that were already on the losing
end. These were the traditional ones such as millet and
sorghum whose production technology was already well- 
known and could only need some improvement here and there 
to jerk up output to keep abreast of the expanding population.
But before the discussion goes beyond this prem ise an 
unavoidable question at this juncture would be, what was the 
objective of the bank to intervene and seek to commoditize 
maize? To commercialise a crop and meet satisfactorily the 
consumption needs of a nation seem to stand parallel to each 
other. It would be fallacious to describe these bank ideals as 
sympathetic to the problems of the Swazi nation which was 
attempting to stabilise the base of the very foundation of the 
country prior to their embarkation upon other subsequent 
p r e r e q u is i te s  fo r  d e v e lo p m e n t .  A p ro p o s  o f th e  
commercialisation of subsistence agriculture was the basis upon 
which the marketing of maize would be done. Cultivators had 
been ordered by the financing organisation through the 
Ministry of Agriculture, to deposit to the market 75% of their 
maize harvests while retaining 25% for domestic consumption.[8] 
The cultivators were further enlightened on the fact that their 
receipt of financial assitance to promote farming from the bank
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was dependent on their observance of the proportion of maize 
for the market and for domestic use.
Naturally farmers or growers, like all other groups of human 
beings, are intelligent in so far as they know their needs and 
can plan carefully any future adventures geared towards 
meeting the needs. In the Swaziland of the 1970s, such as 
1971 and 1972,[9] growers were preoccupied with the problem 
of what should be done to stabilize food supplies? The 
question of producing for capital acquisition and accumulation 
was secondary to those of feeding because a nation without 
food is dead. In order to qualify for the bank finances 
growers "accepted" somewhat without flinching the economic 
package of maize while retaining the balance for domestic use.
The explanation of the latter statement is based on the culture 
of the Swazi. Whenever a traditional Swazi speaks of his 
family, not only does he have in mind his wife and children 
but it goes beyond just that perimeter: Swazi families are
extended and support extends to all other needy members. 
These could be great-grandparents, parents, aunts, uncles, 
nephews and nieces, which automatically meant that the 25% to 
be retained for consumption purposes never went even half way 
to m eet the needs of extended families. Culturally, the 
protagonists of the economic development package were not 
well-versed with the way of life of the recipients. In short, 
the problem of international aid is that the amount and uses of 
the money lent are discussed and concluded at a much higher 
level, which excludes the participation of those directly 
affected by the credits. The result of this has often been the 
destruction of whatever might have been constructed and the 
promotion of suffering consequent upon the consistent decline 
of food supplies.[10]
The commercialisation of maize also went along with the 
introduction of new seeds that required a relatively short 
period for maturing. These seed varieties could not be grown 
anyhow and anywhere but did also require some special know 
how which governed the time for planting, fertilizers to be 
used, soils where the varieties would prosper and many related
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prerequisites. Growers in the pilot areas were expected to 
discard traditional maize seeds in favour of the former because 
these hybrid seeds took a much shorter time to ripen and be 
harvested.[11] The implications of such a project were that 
seeds could not be procured from any past harvest because 
such seeds would not produce an adequate return no matter 
how good the crops might have been. Cultivators would 
therefore have to purchase seeds every year. Along these 
purchases were also those of fertilizers and urea as well as 
insecticides all of which worked jointly towards a good harvest. 
Some cultivators, among those whose purses were flagging, had 
depended on kraal manure for a good harvest when they still 
planted their traditional seeds. But in the case of hybrid seeds 
kraal manure needed the support of fertilizers and urea both of 
which are expensive which meant that poor small scale growers 
could not afford to acquire enough to meet their requirements. 
Such was a capitalist mode of production carefully calculated to 
exclude and eliminate from the world of commercial farming 
those who were poor in support of the rich. At this time, 
1972 and onwards, industries that produced and sold these 
inputs in Swaziland, had their base in South Africa, and that 
explains why input prices were at a level far above that of the 
poor Swazi grower. The strategy was to continue in the 
support of the agricultural industry of South Africa that has 
co n tin u ed  to  p a tro n ise  ag ricu ltu ra l econom ies of the 
neighbouring states to a point where they become dependent in 
every sense.[12]
Since maize has been undergoing some transition from being 
purely a subsistence to a cash crop, the need to secure a 
viable market for the crop has been growing. It was part of 
the Ministry of Agriculture’s duty to ensure some smooth 
network between the producing fields and the consumer market. 
This could have served as a powerful incentive to produce more 
maize than before among those whose responses to the 
commoditization of the crop were positive. But the situation 
has rather been discouraging due to the fact that the only 
local agent, the Swaziland Milling Company, has not been 
injecting zeal into the growers to maximize their maize 
production.[13] The reverse has been the case mainly because
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the company would purchase maize from large scale producers 
and other corrupt politicians. Once all this maize has been 
consumed the quarter reserved by the consumer for locally 
produced maize, reaches saturation point. At this stage only a 
marginal proportion of small scale growers’ produce of maize 
gets purchased, with the bulk being turned back.[14] This kills 
whatever incentive there might be among the growers, and 
inspite of a series of petitions made to the Ministry of 
Agriculture to intervene on behalf of the growers, there has 
not been any progress, ra ther the situation continues to 
worsen.
The explanation to the latter problem is not hard to find. 
Influential politicians in the country become partners with 
organisations of this kind by having shares in these businesses 
so that instead of attending to the needs and problems of the 
people to whom they minister they guard their own interests. 
W hat m ost po litic ians are concerned with is to satisfy 
themselves and agnates and forget about other members of the 
nation. This problem goes hand in hand with that of credit 
facilities which are a necessity for any agricultural sector to 
take off. By independence in 1968, already the Swazi Bank had 
been established to help make available to Swazi farmers 
financial assistance with a view to improve their farming 
economy.[15] An assistance of this nature was meant for 
farmers and not cultivators who produced for the sake of 
meeting consumption needs first, and as a result small scale 
growers who produced for domestic use were left in the cold. 
The view that credit facilities were meant for commodity 
producers is borne out by the fact that both food and 
commodity producers competed under the same conditions for 
financial help inspite of the fact that producers of the former 
variety of crops did not produce for sale, and even when they 
did their crops did not command a reasonably lucrative 
price.[16]
There is yet another anomaly in the selling of inputs by those 
companies which produce them, in that, both cash crop farmers 
and growers of food crops purchase their inputs of fertilizers,
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insecticides and other requirements at some uniform price. 
This practice has given rise to some dissatisfaction among food 
crop cultivators due to the fact that failure to lower the price 
for them was too destructive. The bone of contention is that 
the crops they grow are meant to meet consumption needs and 
not to generate capital. In the case of cash crop growers the 
situation is slightly different in that the money spent on the 
inputs is recoverable with some profits over and above the 
equivalent of the expenses incurred at production. The 
argument goes on to involve the dimension that even if maize 
were looked upon and treated as a commodity the price it 
commanded on the market did not in any sense justify the 
expenses which are often incurred at the production level. In 
short, it did not offer a competitive price in order to attract 
many growers to produce not just an equivalent of their 
domestic consumption needs but also to afford some marketable 
surplus.
The discussion above has already referred to credit facilities 
m eant to help farm ers purchase most of their farm ing 
requirements. At this point it is necessary to once again refer 
to other facilities of a secondary nature in the case of maize 
production and marketing. Indigenous Swazi farmers and 
cultivators lack a marketing system that will distribute food 
from those areas which have the potential to produce it to 
those that suffer from some continuous deficit. The circulation 
of such locally produced items would ensure farmers who 
concentrate on food production of a viable and secure market. 
This could have worked out conveniently for both groups of 
farmers (cash and food crop producers) and could have further 
encouraged them to push up production on crops that are 
suited to their respective environments. In short, this issue 
ties up very neatly with that of food distribution as one of the 
obstacles to realising food security in Southern Africa. Lack 
of machinery that will facilitate food distribution from areas 
that produce to those that suffer from shortages in food, 
makes it difficult for the producers to know the level of the 
need in order to maximise foodstuffs in the country. This 
aspect corresponds neatly to that of food storage whose
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absence and undeveloped state would constantly bedevil the 
security of food supplies in the country. What has been 
happening as a result is that farmers, after the Ministry of 
Agriculture’s advice to sell their maize crop before it was 
spoiled due to poor storage, have been selling their crop to the 
Swaziland Milling Company who store it, but in South Africa. 
Due to lim ited and poor storage facilities of individual 
cultivators and farmers, it becomes imperative to sell their crop 
in a hasty manner to get rid of it before it gets spoiled. This 
deprives them of any form of bargaining power in terms of 
negotiating the price to a level not too depressed for the 
producer. Since every effective Ministry of Agriculture would 
know or at least have some general knowledge of the level of 
the standard of living of the people it ministers to, the onus is 
on the ministry to ensure the provision of storage facilities 
where the poor growers could store their food for future use 
or sale.
On the field studies that we conducted, growers who could not 
afford to purchase their own storage tanks felt that if the 
government intervened and provided these facilities on a rental 
basis, and whenever the sales were made have it deduct rent, 
the precarious food situation could be saved. In their 
testim onies they gave the impression that they were fully 
aware of the expenses involved in the exercise. Not only does 
it involve the purchase of tanks but the acquisition of certain 
chemicals without which it would be difficult to store the crop 
in a way that attacks by moths can be counteracted. The 
provision of local storage would also make it possible for the 
food to sell at affordable prices even for the poverty stricken 
yet when stored outside the country the prices get so inflated 
that some people fail to purchase adequate amounts.[17] This 
leads to starvation and a nation that suffers from the latter 
cannot invest its resources profitably to promote the nationally 
constructive development projects. Food that is stored outside 
a country becomes more expensive than the locally stored one 
due to transport charges and tariffs at the port of entry. In 
short, these facilities are a necessity for the stabilisation of 
food supplies in the country and these cannot be realised 
unless the finance necessary is adequately available.
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It would be erroneous to leave out yet another variable in this 
area, and that is climatic conditions which either work counter 
or for food stab ility  in S ou thern  A frica , especially in 
Swaziland.[18] The latter territory is divided geographically 
into four different climatic zones, namely the highlands which 
have a fairly temperate climate, the middle-lands which possess 
a climate that is somewhat temperate and yet can be dry and 
hot at other times, the lowlands which are dry and finally the 
Lubombo mountains or plateau with some temperate climate but 
less so relative to the highlands. Maize production fitted 
neatly to the first and last regions of the country, while the 
midlands could grow the same crop and a variety of others. 
The low lands are congenial for cattle grazing and the 
production of sugarcane and cotton as well as other crops, 
provided wherever they are grown there are sufficient water 
resources to allow for adequate irrigation farming. Since not 
every farmer could afford the latter form of farming, those 
poverty-stricken ones depend on the availability of rain. 
Reliance on rain for farming is a major handicap in Swaziland, 
and yet the majority of growers, if not all, on Swazi Nation 
Land practice dry land farming. The implication of this 
dependence on dry land farming is that should the rain delay 
to fall, the farming season would also be delayed.
While even casual observers are aware of the effects of 
droughts on farming something much more constructive could 
be done. The M inistry  of A gricu ltu re , an executive 
organisation that government gave the power or right to 
investigate all the obstacles that stand on the way of progress, 
stands to blame for failure to rehabilitate those areas that do 
not receive enough rainfall for agricultural farming to flourish. 
As a government’s executive body in that section it has the 
right to make the necessary representations to the government 
regarding the state of affairs in farming. It does not mean 
that if there is lack of rainfall then farm ing cannot be 
undertaken. For instance, the territory is endowed with large 
amounts of water that could be harnessed to facilitate farming, 
either by diverting some water from the big rivers that flow
Climatic Conditions and Food Stability
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through the country and/or employ means to draw the water 
which lies buried in the swampy parts of the country by means 
of boreholes. In dry countries such as Burkina Fasso and 
others these means can be used to make it possible for farming 
activities to go on.
History has indicated that unless the latter means of ensuring 
some stability in food are harnessed this part of the continent 
will suffer from severe famines. There have been droughts 
before, especially from the late 1960’s and the 1970’s, but 
droughts that began their invasions of the region from as early 
as 1980 onwards, have left behind a trail of suffering. What is 
peculiar about the droughts of the 1980’s is that there seems 
to be some abnormality in the manner in which rains come and 
the d istribu tion  even within one small area; that unless 
irrigation farming, expensive though it is, is assimilated to the 
habits of the farmers the state of food and supplies will 
continue to deteriorate.
While it might be true that droughts are sometimes responsible 
for fam ines, it is also important to know that there are 
resources that have not been harnessed and if they were 
em ployed  c o n s tru c tiv e ly , the  food s itu a tio n  which is 
deteriorating could be saved. This is indeed a political issue 
because politicians are the ones that make decisions and plan 
for the people whom they lead. Money might be a problem but 
could still be raised for investment in agriculture, which, for 
any na tion , rem ains tha t n a tio n ’s econom ic backbone. 
International financial aid, could be used to integrate irrigation 
farming to the economic activities of the farmers in the region. 
In short, the money could be invested in boreholes for very 
arid places and for the construction of canals where big rivers 
flow. O ther means of irrigation like pipes could also be 
acquired to promote agricultural farming that could lead to 
some stability in food production in the region. In a nutshell 
the whole issue becomes a political one because something 
could and should be done by the politicians to save the 
situation. The need for them to know their priorities is 
crucial.
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In conclusion, while one has dealt with the political, economic 
and climatic obstacles to food security in Swaziland, it seems 
that the main handicap to food security in the country is 
political. The need to adopt a clearly defined land reform 
policy cannot be underem phasized. Also there  is some 
unavoidable call for an agricultural programme that will 
enlighten farmers on the main problems that hamper farming, 
and the  so lu tio n s . P o litic ian s  need to work in close 
co lla b o ra tio n  with fa rm e rs ’ associa tions and produce 
cooperatives so that they understand clearly the issues at 
stake. In this way whatever project that might get executed 
will receive the symbiotic cooperation of the farmers because it 
would be relevant to their real problems. Politicians need to 
realise that while it is empirically plausible that farmers work 
to improve their economies, it is equally factual that without 
them the nation would suffer. They provide all the necessary 
food, they boost the national revenue and contribute to the 
viability of the state in several other ways.
NOTES
1. In Swaziland nationals have a right to be allocated
adequate usufructuary rights to the Swazi Nation Land, 
because land is held by the King in trust for the nation. 
The implications of this being that Swazi Nation Land, as 
being one of the categories of land, cannot be held on a 
private title deed land basis.
2. By being threatened with eviction and transfers growers
shy away from industrious farming, and also avoid
adequate development of land lest they be asked to shift
and settle somewhere else. See Bonginkosi Sikhondze, 
Food Production and Industrialisation in Swaziland, paper 
presented to the conference on Scientific Agriculture in 
Africa, sponsored by P.W.P.A., Lome, Togo. 8th - 10th 
December, 1986.
3. Ibid.
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NOTES
4. See The Times of Swaziland. September 25, 1980.
5. Bonginkosi Sikhondze, The Social Impact and Responses to 
the Declining Standard o f Living in Swaziland, paper 
presented to CODESRIA Conference, Dakar, Senegal, 21 - 
23 July, 1986.
6. Lomagugu Masango, The Impact o f RDA Projects on the 
Quality and Quantity o f Maize: The Case o f Ludzeludze,
BA. Dissertation, University of Swaziland, April, 1983.
7. Swaziland Central Cooperative Union Centre. Annual 
Report, on ’Maize Production’, Manzini, 1971.
8. This data is also contained in the Annual Report of C.C.U. 
Manzini, 1972.
9. MEU (May, 1973) RDA’s Maize Production and Marketing, 
Study, No. 4.
10. These testimonies were made by those farmers who were 
interviewed during the field study trips undertaken in 
Manzini; Moses Dlamini, Gundwvini, 25 July, 1984; Sabelo 
Dlamini, Gundwvini, 21 May, 1985; Mhlupheki Shongwe, 
Ngqulwini, 9 August, 1985, and many others confirmed this 
view as being authentic.
11. Lomagugu Masango, The Impact o f RDA Projects, April, 
1983, p. 19.
12. This point is discussed at length in Bonginkosi Sikhondze, 
Food Production and Industrialization in Swaziland, Lome, 
December, 1986. pp. 10-15.
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NOTES
(Continued)
13. Bonginkosi Sikhondze, Some Problems o f Economic 
Growth in Southern Africa: The case o f the Manzini 
region o f  Swaziland, 9th SAUSSC, D ar es Salaam, 
Tanzania, 2-6 June, 1986.
14. Since the year 1983 that has been the situation hence the 
review of this development in The Times of Swaziland. 
September 5, 1986.
15. Ministry of Agriculture. Annual Report. Swaziland. Bank 
Involvement in Farming, 1973.
16. The difference between the prices of cotton and maize per 
kilogramme was as big as R3 - R5 depending on the 
quality of cotton, sometimes it could be far more.
17. In the year 1985 for instance farmers sold their maize 
produce to the Swaziland Milling Company at E18.00 per 
50 kilogramme bag and when the maize was sold back to 
them it had gone as high as E25.00 per bag.
18. Swaziland is the case study for the paper and most of the 
arguments raised are based on the Swaziland experience.
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AGRICULTURAL PRACTICES; 
AGRARIAN ISSUES AND 
FOOD SECURITY: 
THE CASE OF BOTSWANA
Ntwaetsile Teedzani Morapedi
Background
By 1966 (i.e. at independence) over 90% of Botswana’s total 
production was employed in agriculture and agricultural related 
activities. This means that most of the country’s population 
was still in the rural areas. By 1985, about 75% of the total 
population was still in the rural areas and it is anticipated that 
by 1991 about 2/3 of the population will still be in the rural 
areas.
The trend in the Botswana population is demonstrative of the 
fact that in spite of rapid urbanisation since 1965/66 the 
largest section of the population is still rural and will continue 
to be so for some years to come. This means that the 
proportion of the labour force released to other sectors is 
much lower than that which remains in the rural areas. The 
rural-urban population relationship is indicative of the fact that 
most of the rural households are engaged in the production of 
food. This being the case, any policy efforts regarding the 
improvement of the standard of living of the rural areas should 
be largely centred on agriculture. Secondly, any agrarian 
issues/policies taken on national food security should take 
cognisance of the full participation of this rural sector which 
is agricultural oriented to achieve the objective goals of food 
availability. Their food production output would therefore 
determine the amount of food imports including food aid
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required to offset any food deficit.
Agricultural Practices
Both livestock production and arable farming are the main 
activities in Botswana’s efforts towards food production and as 
such national agrarian policies relate to these two major 
activities. Wide differences exist between groups of farmers in 
terms of resources, methods of production and technology 
employed. Because of arid climatic conditions livestock 
production especially cattle, has the advantage over arable 
farming. The cattle industry further dominates all other 
livestock like sheep and goats, poultry and pork. But this is 
mostly a monopoly of the rich since cattle distribution is so 
skewed that 50% of the national herd is owned by only 5% of 
the rural households whereas 45% of the rural households do 
not have cattle at all. This renders it difficult to create any 
observable trends to increasing food grain production amongst 
the poorest households since they drastically lack draftpower in 
the form of cattle for traction.
Botswana’s agriculture is practised on a three-tiered land 
tenure system. These are the freehold (5% of total land), state 
land (25%) and tribal land (70%). Both the freehold and state 
land practice commercial farming and account for 0.4% of the 
total number of farms, hold 14% of total cattle population and 
produce 37% of sorghum, maize, millet and pulses. Most of the 
fruits, citrus and vegetables are produced through irrigation in 
these areas particularly the Tuli Block Freehold land. But 
owing to its proximity to South Africa most of the fruits and 
vegetables first find their way into the Republic of South 
Africa and later are re-imported at high prices.
Most of the traditional farming is practised on tribal land 
which accounts for 99% of all farms, 85% of the national herd 
and 63% of basic crop production. Both rainfed arable cropping 
and the open cattlepost systems are practised. There are two 
distinct groups of farmers; those who farm with cattle and 
aim to make a surplus but on a smaller scale than the
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commercial farmers, and the resource poor with very few or no 
cattle at all whose food output is always below the subsistence 
requirem ents. V ariations in food output and intake are 
therefore a serious problem.
AGRARIAN ISSUES AND FOOD SECURITY 
Background to Food Security;
The major factors that influence Botswana’s national food 
security are its geographical and climatic situation as well as 
its strategic position and the economic dominance of some of 
its neighbours within the region. The uncertainties of rainfall, 
prolonged droughts and a poorly adapted arable subsistence 
agricultural sector and both an increased population growth (3% 
p.a.) and rapid urbanisation have all contributed to the 
country’s increased dependence on food imports supplemented 
somewhat by food aid. The imported foodstuffs are mostly 
consumed in the urban areas and big villages whereas the rural 
areas fmd these rather expensive. Food aid has thus become a 
permanent feature of the food supply situation in Botswana. 
This is a result of recurrent food shortages over the years.
The Demand and Supply of Food:
The annual demand for food grains has since increased from
100,000 tonnes in 1979 to 190,000 tonnes in 1985 and is 
expected to exceed 200,000 by 1991. Recent local food grain 
production/supplies have, except for two years, not matched 
the total demand for food. Instead yields have decreased 
substantially due to continued droughts, poor rainfall, poor soils 
and lack of appropriate technology. Most of the demand for 
vegetables, citrus and fruits are met from imports. Their local 
production is constrained by high temperatures and lack of 
irrigation facilities. The production of basic food crops 
between 1979 and 1984 reflects thus:
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Basic Food Crop Production (1979-1984)
Food Crop 
(in 100 tonnes)
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Sorghum 4.3 29.1 28.3 3.8 5.2 5.7
Maize 2.3 11.6 21.4 12.4 8.5 0.5
Millet 0.9 2.9 1.8 0.5 0.4 0.7
Beans/Pulses 1.0 1.8 2.7 0.5 0.3 0.4
Total 8.5 44.8 54.2 17.2 14.4 7.3
In the meat sector, the growth in beef production has exceeded 
demand but production is export-oriented. Production of 
poultry and pork-related products is almost accomplished but 
urban-biased. That of sheep and goats is promising and with 
its fair distribution amongst small farmers is appreciated to 
meet nutritional requirements. The high incidences of deaths 
from diseases affect both production of this small stock for 
local consumption and for the urban market and export. Very 
little dairy is practised and almost all dairy products are 
imported but end up mostly in the towns and big villages.
The present agricultural practices leave the country prone to 
serious food problems. The system reflects large variations in 
food production and wealth among the peasantry. The wealth 
of the rural households is based upon cattle but these are 
concentrated in a few hands. This enables the gap between 
the rich and poor to keep on widening. Whereas the majority 
of the farmers depend on crop production, many of these do 
lack the means to purchase food during periods of crop failure 
or when food stores from the past harvest have been depleted. 
The situation is aggravated by lack of meaningful employment 
opportunities in the agro-rural industry and this does limit the 
purchasing power of many people. The other fact to note is 
that many of the land-holdings are farmed by women with in­
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adequate farm hands, draft power and essential implements, 
which adds to the household food security problem. About 1/5 
of the males are outside the country and their absence 
increases insecurity of food grain production. However, in 
some cases migrant workers send remittances to their families 
and such aid reduces the incidence of hunger.
The Botswana situation reflects that food supplies still remain 
unevenly distributed between regions, socio-economic groups 
and within families. Large sections of the population remain 
inadequately fed in terms of nutritional requirements. The 
most affected are the young children, expectant and lactating 
m others, the ru ra l and urban  poor, the o ld-aged, the 
unem ployed and under-em ployed in low income groups. 
Agriculture fails to generate employment opportunities yet the 
rural labour force continues to grow. Underemployment 
therefore becomes a very serious issue. Those who make 
surpluses face problems relating to marketing, low prices, 
processing, storage, transport and high competition from hostile 
foreign markets which outbid the local producer in terms of 
quality control, variety and close food substitutes.
Government Response towards Food Security:
A number of policy instruments are used so as to make food 
available for all and redress the depressing hunger situation.
The policy efforts towards food availability are seen in 
Botswana’s agricultural sectoral policy objectives which lay 
emphasis on:
- Providing adequate and secure livelihoods for those 
involved in agriculture.
- Meeting the employment demands of a growing labour 
force and increasing food self-sufficiency.
- Increasing agricultural output, and
- Conserving agricultural land resources.
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The broad aims of the agricultural sub-sectoral policies, 
relating particularly to food production and the goal of food 
security cover:
- The development of a livestock industry on the basis of 
sustained production.
- Development of basic food crop production to provide
improved and more reliable food supplies for most of the
farm families and those who show sufficient management
ability and encouragement of commercial production to 
increase cash incomes. This can be met through the 
provision of a basis for a progressive arable industry.
- Introduction of a system of land use that would allow 
for increased production while conserving the national 
land resources.
Although the policy instruments are sound they may promote 
contradictory or conflicting objectives. For instance, whereas 
high prices from agricultural production, increase incentives, 
food production, promote economic growth, create employment, 
they at the same time may reduce accessibility to food 
consumption. The poor majority will then suffer from hunger,
and the urban workers and/or high income groups resort to 
food imports. However, low food prices are a disincentive to 
the above but promote food consumption. High prices, local 
currency fluctuations with regard to imports of agricultural 
inputs, lack of improved technology also have a bearing on 
food security.
However, a number of policy strategies were initiated to meet 
the goal of food availability, viz:
Food Grain Production:
Government has laid emphasis on the importance of cereal and 
legume production to attain the goal of self-sufficiency in 
staple foods. It therefore initiated programmes that can lead
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to increases in food grain  p roduction . These include 
introduction of seed varieties that could survive the poor soil 
conditions, dry seasons and pests. Research programmes such 
as Evaluation of Farming Systems and Agricultural Implements 
Project (EFSAIP), Integrated Farming Pilot Project (IFPP) and 
Seed M ultiplication Scheme were im plem ented and after 
thorough investigations came out with technical packages on 
farming systems suited to Botswana conditions.
Both the Arable Land Development Programme (ALDEP) and 
Accelerated Rainfed Arable Programme (ARAP) were recently 
introduced to intensify food grain production. The programmes 
respectively take care of developing both small scale and 
medium scale arable farming. They employ packages that can 
substantially improve food grain and ARAP in particular is 
expected to use improved farming technology that would have 
long-term effects of maximising production through higher 
yields and also boost farm incomes. The two programmes 
complement one another as their objectives cover increased 
food production, attainment of self-sufficiency in basic food 
grains and legumes at household and national levels, raising of 
arable farming incomes, income distribution and employment 
creation in arable production activities.
Another step towards local food production is the recently 
launched large scale rainfed and irrigation programme at 
M pandam atenga in the Chobe D istrict. The programme 
encourages farmers to intensify production of basic food crops 
such as sorghum , maize, wheat and possibly vegetables. 
Farmers are allocated land (of 500ha minimum) and qualify for 
funds to purchase basic inputs, equipment/machinery for land 
clearance and destumping.
In spite of these efforts Botswana still remains insecure in 
local food production. Most of the food grain production is 
dependent upon rainfed programmes and has failed mainly 
because of inconsisten t ra in fa ll patterns aggravated by 
recurrent droughts. There is therefore need to develop water 
resources and where available like in the Okavango Delta, 
intensify irrigated agriculture as a useful scheme for staple
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food production, expansion and creation of employment 
opportunities.
Other Strategics towards Food Availability:
Efforts and achievements made in the raising of livestock and 
arable food crops do not alone suffice as the major means of 
making food available to the nation. Present policy strategies 
aim at making food available at all times including drought 
years or deficit periods preserving available food stores or 
production resources for difficult periods to come.
To achieve the objective goals the following institutions/ 
services were devised:
Drought Relief Programme:
Sometimes Government efforts to increase food production are 
paralysed by persistent droughts and result in dramatic falls in 
basic food production. For instance, during the past National 
Development Plan Period the production of cereals and pulses 
dropped below 15,000 tonnes p.a. resulting in increased 
importation of cereals (1983 and 1984) to levels beyond 160,000 
tonnes. Also experienced during such recessions are significant 
reductions in wild plants and wildlife availability on which 
remote area dwellers largely rely, as well as increased cattle 
mortality rates. Such food shortages usually result in increased 
numbers of undernourished children.
To offset these drought hazards the Government introduced 
drought relief programmes. Appeals are usually made to the 
outside world and FAO for free measures to counter severe 
food shortages. Received food stores are usually delivered free 
to feed young children, schools, old age and lactating mothers, 
etc. Food for work program m es are organised for the 
able-bodied persons to receive the food while contributing to 
national developm ent program m es. Since droughts have 
compounded difficulties in the promotion of arable agriculture,
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Government also issues free seed, and financial assistance for 
programmes such as de-stumping, provision of water, tractor 
hire, etc.
The implication of such relief programmes is that diversion of 
finance and manpower to relief measures tends to hold back 
progress in other development projects.
National Food Strategy (NFS):[1]
The NFS is another major government policy strategy that has 
laid the foundation for drought recovery and longterm increases 
in food production at household and national levels. The NFS 
developed Mappropriate medium and longterm responses to the 
situa tion  o f  growing fo o d  deficiencies and deteriorating 
nutritiona l sta tus that had developed in the context o f 
drought". The major areas of concern of NFS are:
- the construction of an adequate data base at both national 
and household levels to support planning for food security 
and the reduction of dependence on outside food supplies;
- priority for the design and implementation of effective 
support and incentive policies for smallholder/subsistence 
farmers and for investment in the limited areas of the 
country that may prove suitable for irrigated or large- 
scale commercial crop production;
- the strengthening of nu trition-orien ted  program m es, 
ranging from information gathering on the causes and 
in c id en ce  of m a ln u tr itio n  am ong various groups, 
educational activities, improved availability of consumer 
goods and prom otion of locally available foods, to 
m easures for the supplem entation of rural incomes 
generally, a high proportion of which is spent on food 
purchases;
- m ed ium  te rm  co n tin g en cy  p lan n in g  for d rough t 
preparedness, relief and recovery measures.
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The NFS has therefore direct relevance to a number of national 
programmes/projects of which the most important are:
- The consolidation of the Department of Food Resources 
which ensures availability of food resources to mount any 
human relief programmes, processing and distribution of 
re l ie f  food and c o o rd in a tio n  of a large p a rt of 
Government Labour Intensive Works Programme, not only 
as relief programmes but post-harvest measures as well;
- Investigation of Botswana’s irrigation potential (for the 
sake of increasing food production) by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Department of Water Affairs;
- Building up and maintenance of National Grain Strategic 
Reserves at levels sufficient to achieve about 3 months of 
import coverage in maize and sorghum to be drawn on in 
times of emergency;
- Post-drought recovery measures to assist arable farmers to 
rebu ild  p roductive assets in con junction  with the 
continuation of ARAP and a number of farming systems 
re se a rc h  and te s tin g  p ro jec ts  which can identify  
improvements in technology;
- Consolidation and strengthening of data collection and 
analysis in areas relevant to drought, nutrition and food 
security, nutritional surveillance and related research;
- Regular training of district officials, health, agriculture, 
education personnel in programmes such as relief planning, 
implementation, food management and distribution.
National Grain Strategic Reserve:
This is a policy move considered as far back as 1974 (but 
implemented in 1980) as a national safeguard against food 
shortages in times of drought, or other emergencies to stabilise 
prices and support government plans for increased agricultural 
production. The Government owns and controls the reserve
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and Botswana Agricultural Marketing Board (BAMB) operates it. 
Food reserves and s to res  at stra teg ic  points based on 
population distribution and needs have so far been established 
throughout the country.
Reserves are therefore used under conditions of severe shortage 
of grain supplies which could not be received from commercial 
stocks or imports or when BAMB decides to market supplies of 
a given quantity when temporary shortages manifest or prices 
rise significantly.
The Reserve has support of the World Food Programme (WFP) 
which in 1980 donated 6000 tones of grain. Grain reserves 
have so far been increased from 6000 to 30,000 tones (by 1984) 
being the equivalent of three months imports. But severe 
droughts usually force draw downs on resources to levels below 
1000 tonnes. But the Government still attempts to maintain 
the balance through a combination of purchase and donor 
co n trib u tio n . The schem e co n trib u tes  sign ifican tly  to 
increasing Botswana’s security of access to basic foods and 
ability to deal with short-term  emergency situations whilst 
reducing the country’s vulnerability to possible disruption in 
food prices.
Crop Forecasting and Early Warning System:[2]
Since 1979 Botswana maintains a crop forecasting and early 
warning system. This enables the Inter-Ministerial Drought 
Committee (IMDC) to monitor the onset of droughts, declare 
drought emergencies and to coordinate relief programmes. The 
IDMC therefore receives reports on rainfall, agriculture, food 
stocks purchases and sales from BAMB and on the nutritional 
status. It is through such data that the committee can assess 
the food situation and in liaison with the Department of Food 
Resources plan for sufficient food supplies and distribution to 
the affected people.
Wild Plants and Wildlife Utilisation:
Hunting and gathering which take place throughout the rural
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areas make significant contributions to rural household food 
consumption particularly  among the non-stockholders and 
remote area dwellers. For the past few years the Government 
has been studying various plants to establish degree of 
utilisation as food and cash crops. The evaluations are still 
going on. Regarding wildlife, the Government issues free 
hunting licences to remote area dwellers who live mainly by 
hunting and gathering. In this way food resources for the 
remote area dwellers are to some extent ensured.
The problem is that although both wildplants and wildlife are 
sources of food and incomes to a number of the rural poor; 
hunting and gathering is not yet considered a form of land use 
and as such the hunting zone is often disrupted by projects 
which do not take cognisance of this important activity.
Pricing Policies:
Regarding food crops, before the establishment of the BAMB, 
all saleable grain was purchased by private traders who had 
little regard for the economic interests of producers and 
consumers. Grain would be bought cheaply, exported to South 
Africa and re-im ported  in times of need and retailed at 
exhorbitant prices. The BAMB guarantees prices and acts as 
government instrument in crop pricing. It guarantees a market 
for producers with immediate cash payment. To enhance food 
production BAMB encourages guaranteed minimum producer 
prices at the start of the ploughing season and this influences 
decision-making by producers.
To enhance production for local consumption and export BAMB 
maintains two price policies for oilseeds, pulses and other 
grains. Since the domestic market for oilseeds and pulses is 
small and lacks processing facilities, these food stocks are 
exported and produces are paid the export price less marketing 
costs. For other food grains, producers are paid an equivalent 
of import price plus a transport differential, thus making BAMB 
pay prices higher than those prevailing in South Africa. This 
creates an incentive to producers to sell their grain locally and 
thus ensure that all grain produced locally is stored locally and
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re-distributed in times of need. BAMB also keeps sorghum at 
premium over maize to encourage production as a drought 
resistant crop and major staple food crop. For producers to 
sell produce within easy reach BAMB maintains 14 depots and 
agencies in towns and major villages. This reduces transport 
costs, accordingly.
Like BAMB the Botswana Meat Commission (BMC) maintains 
guaranteed prices for producers. It pays prices equivalent to 
export prices based mostly on those prevailing in the EEC 
market. Such efforts lead to improvements in beef quality and 
increased offtake. But the system is still affected by high 
transport costs but may be alleviated by the establishment of 
the Maun and Francistown abbatoirs. The BMC prices have 
also led to a tendency of cattle producers to keep on 
increasing their herds, a trend which results in overstocking, 
overgrazing, and land use degradation.
Finally, Government maintains a favourable pricing policy in 
basic com m odities so as to enhance food p roduction . 
C om m odities such as ve te rinary  req u is ite s , stockfeeds, 
seeds/fertilisers, implements and farm equipment are retailed at 
reasonable prices or sometimes even subsidised. There are in 
addition various institutions and support services associated 
with food production. These institutions play major roles in 
areas of providing markets, capital, inputs credit, etc., to 
farmers. Also of importance is the policy towards manpower 
training in various fields and the base ministry, departments, 
research stations and extension support all aimed at increasing 
food production.
Evidence of conflicts in the beef industry exist. This was 
promoted by beef prices hiked to international levels. This 
trend on the supply side stimulated growth in beef production 
with high m arketed surpluses and as such increased real 
producer incomes and created  employment opportunities 
particularly in the tertiary industry. The stimuli at the same 
tim e led to increased cattle population resulting in range 
deterioration. On the demand side (for beef) high prices 
decrease the purchasing power of the consumers particularly
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that of the rural poor and the urban workers. Many consumers 
do not therefore get adequate access to beef. Because of the 
lucrative nature of the cattle industry the social system of 
lending out cattle for draftpower and milking purposes to the 
non-cattle holders is now dying at a very fast rate.
Regarding food grain, low prices were at first emphasised. 
This means buying the farmers produce at very low prices and 
selling at such. The dilemma here is that both the producers 
and the consumers react to low prices in opposite directions. 
To consumers such low prices offer scope for greater food 
in take, wide variety of stuffs, high quality of diet and 
occasional increases of basic commodities. This also promotes 
consumption patterns of locally produced food grains. To the 
producers such low prices somehow kill their production 
incentives, reduce their real incomes vis-a-vis prices of 
essential inputs most of which are imported. Farmers are 
therefore reluctant to sell to the local Marketing Board in 
preference to South African markets which bring their grain 
much higher prices. If sold to SA markets the grain would 
eventually be re-imported this time at prices very much above 
the consumers’ purchasing power.
Once producer prices were raised over and above prices 
obtaining in SA the trend induced supply responses, raised 
producers’ real incomes and efforts to expand production. The 
problem is that the majority of the rural consumers now find 
the prices for locally produced staple food rather too high. 
This trend has a negative impact on peoples’ nutritional values.
The general perspective regarding food consumption patterns is 
that Botsw ana’s locally produced foodstuffs, m eat, grain 
legumes, citrus, vegetables, etc., are found to be rather too 
expensive when compared to similar products from SA markets. 
People’s consumption patterns have thus changed towards 
imported foodstuffs from SA, a member of the Customs Union. 
This trend is also aggravated by the appreciation of the value 
of the Botswana Pula currency over and above the SA Rand 
which induces wholesalers and retailers to take advantage of 
and purchase goods more cheaply from SA and accrue high
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profit margins that way. There is therefore  too much 
dependency on imported foodstuffs particularly by the urban 
workers who could be promoting the consumption of locally 
produced foodstuffs. For instance, whereas sorghum is the 
trad itional staple food and a drought resistant crop, the 
consumption of this cereal is still superceded by that of maize 
and related products which are easily and cheaply available in 
whatever ready-made form from the SA maize millers. Such 
imported products are not just cheap or in various processed 
forms but of high quality as well. A good number of sorghum 
mills are operating in the country but consumers find the 
prices of locally processed sorghum meal rather too high when 
compared to imported maize products.
The unchecked trend of wholesalers and retailers to freely 
import cheap foodstuffs from another Customs Union member is 
rather disruptive to the supply and distribution of local food 
products. The system imposes heavy strains on the traditional 
food production capacity.
Conclusions:
Conclusions drawn from Botswana experiences regarding the 
food security situation are that various efforts were taken over 
the past 20 years or so to improve agricultural productive 
capacity and overcome the problems of local food shortages 
resulting in hunger and a malnourished population. In spite of 
these efforts the goal of self-sufficiency in food production is 
not yet accomplished in Botswana. This is a deficiency that 
characterises most of the countries in the SADCC region. The 
main and common problems still faced by Botswana (and other 
countries in the region) are those which include:
- persistent droughts, this affects mostly arable farming 
most of which is dependent upon rainfed production;
- weak infrastructure which includes poor government 
policies which do not properly address the problem of 
food security and also fail to provide the necessary
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- poor or lack of appropriate technology which includes 
draftpower, improved seeds and essential inputs and 
difficulties of adopting scientific extension programmes 
to local farmers needs;
- lack of meaningful employment opportunities in the 
agro-rural sector which often results in out-migration by 
able-bodied males seeking wage employment elsewhere.
Failure to produce enough food particularly food grain often 
leads to situations characteristic of:
- severe food shortages;
- food deficits are often met from imports including food 
aid;
- imported foodstuffs change consumption and dietary 
patterns in favour of im ports irrespective of their 
nutritional values or appropriateness as staple foods.
These food imports and aid tendency are dis-incentives to local 
production. In some cases imported food commodities are 
ra th e r too  expensive and as such the m ajority  of the 
households do not get adequate access to food.
Generally during times of shortages the most vulnerable groups 
to food shortages are children, expectant and lactating mothers, 
the ru ra l and urban  poor, rem ote  a rea  dw ellers, the 
unemployed, underemployed, the old age, etc. These are the 
very groups which normally are considered for food aid and 
other social services and means of livelihood. For instance by 
1983, 220,000 rural vulnerable groups received drought rations,
12.000 vulnerable people received non-drought rations, and
166.000 rural primary school children and 21,000 urban children 
received rations on school days. For 1987 it is estimated that
250.000 primary school children, 73,000 expectant women and 
nursing mothers, 180,000 children between six months and five
institutions to deal with food issues;
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years of age and 7,000 tuberculosis ou t-patien ts will be 
receiving rations under the food programme as vulnerable 
beneficiaries.[3]
It is further concluded that if the present strategies for food 
self-sufficiency and food security are not rigorously changed, it 
will take Botswana a long time to solve the food problem. 
These strateg ies are ra ther too mild and are short-term  
measures that cannot accomplish long-term objectives. There is 
therefore, the need for consideration of new strategies for 
adoption so as to make food available to the entire population.
NOTES
1. Ministry of Finance and Development Planning - Report 
on National Food Strategy. Gaborone, 1985.
2. FAO: Technical Cooperation Programme: Preparation of
Project Proposals for the Establishment of an Early 
Warning System for Regional Food Security (SADCC 
countries). 1982.
3. Botswana Daily News. No. 38. 25.2.1987.
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FOOD SECURITY IN LESOTHO: THE 
CHALLENGE AND THE STRATEGY
Atnafu Tola
Introduction
In recent years there has been a widening gap in Lesotho 
between domestic food production on the one hand, and both 
demand and requirement for food on the other. Since the 
1970s there has been a consistent downward trend in the 
production of cereal grains and the hectarage devoted to the 
cultivation of these, with a corresponding increase in the 
import of food both commercial and donated. This is the 
direct result of government inaction in stimulating peasant 
farmers to grow more food. The offshoot is a particular 
scenario of increasingly falling per capita food production and 
the lack of strategic food reserves against the worst case of 
drought or other natural disasters. Unless generous and 
prompt payment, rapid expansion of collection and storage 
facilities, credit and agricultural advice are made readily 
available to peasant farmers, the food situation will reach crisis 
proportions in the foreseeable future.
The Challenge
At any one time, the total food available for the Basotho 
nation is the sum total of domestic production, commercial 
imports and food aid. When the nation attains food self- 
sufficiency, commercial imports and food aid will be eliminated.
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Despite several years of food self-sufficiency programmes, 
Lesotho is still a net importer of food.
Although this trend has been increasing for some time, the
situation has become serious since the early 1980s. The
contribution of domestic production to total food supply has 
been decreasing at an alarming rate. In 1983/84, Lesotho met 
only 40% of its total food supply from domestic production. 
The largest amount of food, 46 percent, came from commercial 
imports. 14 percent was covered by food aid, mainly coming
from Canada, Belgium, China, Germany, Italy, U.S.A. and the 
EEC. The U.S.A. is the largest donor, accounting for about 
60% of the food aid to Lesotho with the EEC contributing 36%.
Commercial imports of major food items rose sharply to fill the 
gap of falling domestic production. In 1983/84, there was a 
net increase of 21,000 tonnes over 1982/83. What is most 
startling is that the total food supply to the society in 1982/83 
and 1983/84 was 183,000 and 102,000 tonnes less than 1977/78 
and 1978/79, respectively. The relatively favourable trend in 
domestic production established during the second part of the 
1970s has been wiped out in the early part of the 1980s.
Between the mid and late 1970s, Lesotho was able to provide 
50 to 60% of its total food requirements. A gradual but 
general decline started to emerge in the late 1970s and the 
rest of the 1980s. As a result, commercial imports and food 
aid increased by 32% and 180% respectively in the ten years 
form 1974 to 1984.
Commercial imports of food grain have been estimated at about 
M40 million out of a total bill of M l 10 million for all food and 
live animals imported in 1982. This represents 36% of the 
total imports of food.
In less than five years, that is, from 1978 to 1982, the value of 
commercial imports registered a dramatic increase of 45%. 
Taking all commodity imports into account, commercial imports 
of food represent 20% in 1982. This, of course, negatively 
affects the balance of payments of Lesotho with exports valued
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at M40 million in 1982.
Even though m ost deb t-ridden  African countries spend 
something like 20 to 50% of their foreign exchange earnings in 
debt-servicing, thereby enormously reducing their ability to 
finance imports for economic development, the case of Lesotho 
is more alarming than other African countries because the 
country spends three times more than the value of exports on 
commercial food imports. Lesotho’s gross external liabilities 
were US$128 million in 1984. Again, total long-term debt 
services as a percentage of export of goods and services was 
51 in 1984.
An Increasing Menace: Population Growth and 
Diminishing Domestic Production
The relationship between population and food supplies has been 
subject to major economic debate for the last 200 years. Even 
though agriculture contributed a low 18% of Lesotho’s GNP in 
1982, nevertheless, about 90% of the population were engaged 
in one form of agriculture or another.
Agriculture is still traditional and a high rate of population 
growth prevails. In such a situation it is possible to uphold 
the pessim istic M althusian population projection, where 
provision, it is argued, should be made to increase food 
supplies so that seriously affected households in particular are 
aided and that the economic lot of the broad masses of the 
population is improved.
Between 1970 and 1982 Lesotho had an average annual growth 
of population of about 2.4%. The projection for 1980 to 2000 
is about 2.8%. In other words, by the year 1990, Lesotho will 
have a population of 2 million. This represents a 100% increase 
over 1982.
Since 1977/78 there has been a reverse process both in total 
food supplies and dom estic  production. Of particu lar 
importance is the "nose dive" of domestic production which
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failed  to m atch the co rrespond ing  steady increases in 
population. As a result almost half of the population had been 
declared  critica lly  affected  in 1984. Even though the 
population has been growing at an average annual rate of 2.4% 
in the 1970s and 2.8% in the 1980s, total food supply did not 
keep pace with population growth in the early part of the 
1980s. In 1983/84 the population consumed 40% food than in 
1977/78 against a net 8% increase in population.
Food Security
Food security refers to the ability of food deficit countries, or 
regions or households within these countries, to meet target 
levels of consumption on a yearly basis. What constitutes 
target consumption levels and ability to maintain consumption 
are two central issues of a country’s food policy.
It should, however, be made clear right from the start, the 
difference between national food security and national food 
strategy.
According to C.P. Timmer, a national food strategy is comprised 
of four basic objectives:
a) efficient growth in the food and agricultural sector;
b) im proved  incom e d is tr ib u tio n , p r im a rily  through 
employment creation;
c) satisfactory nutritional status for the entire population 
through provision of a minimum-subsistence floor for basic 
needs;
d) adequate food security to ensure against bad harvests, 
natural disasters, or uncertain world food supplies.fl]
From the above it is ra ther difficult to draw a line of 
dem arca tion  betw een the two system s, except that the 
subordination of food security to food strategy may be
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indicated. For clarity, national food strategy can be described 
as a long-term process whose positive outcome depends not 
only on increased  grow th of the secto rs  of food and 
agriculture, but also on the economy as a whole with special 
reference to the accelerated growth of the secondary sector, 
that is gainful employment and income distribution. On the 
other hand, food security is a conscious and deliberate act on 
the part of the state to increase food stocks, foreign exchange 
reserves and to intensify national and international mobilisation 
to counter the misfortunes of agriculture, for example, bad 
harvest, natural disaster, social and political turmoil, aided by 
the day-to-day activities of an early warning system.
Thus, food security cannot be seen in isolation from food 
strategy. In this respect, because it is believed that objectives 
(a) and (b) of a national food strategy are the pillars of the 
entire system of adequate food supply to the Basotho nation, 
an attem pt has been made to devise a strategy for the 
development of the rural sector specific to the conditions of 
Lesotho.
In considering food security, the primary task for a country is 
to s tip u la te  m inimum  recom m ended levels of nutrition  
consumption for households during times of food shortages. 
Due to incom e in eq u a litie s  or low level of econom ic 
development, food supply instability will be felt severely by the 
poor and by those suffering from chronic malnutrition caused 
by persistent poverty.
Distinction should be made, however, between the former and 
the latter groups, and so the solutions to the latter’s problems 
call for provisions outside food security. As a marginal 
remark, it should be stressed, however, that changes in income 
distribution in favour of the mass of the population may have 
some desirable results.
In Lesotho, by and large, two groups of people are found. The 
first, about 50% of the population, who live on "Emergency 
Food Aid" can be classified as rural. The underlying and
im m ediate causes leading to famine, food shortages and
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malnutrition, can be attributed to economic underdevelopment 
and a low level of income generated by agricultural activities. 
The second, a segment of the population is found in the 14 
u rb a n  d e s ig n a ted  c e n tre s , w here  u n em p lo y m en t and 
underemployment is rampant.
Insecure supplies of food and the general problems associated 
with food security  are undoubtedly the product of the 
misfortune of agriculture. In Lesotho, in the past decades the 
country has suffered from periodic drought and shortages of 
rainfall for crop production. Drought has been shown to occur 
in nine to ten year cycles for the nation as a whole, and in 
two to three year cycles for particu lar areas. In other 
countries, and Mozambique is a good example, natural disasters 
and political upheavals help to reduce national output and often 
disrupt established m arket channels. The most common 
phenomenon in Africa is the general tendency of domestic 
agricultural output falling short of population growth.
Another area of food security relevant to Lesotho will take 
into account the immediate micro-economic impact of reduced 
domestic production and the corresponding price rises. The 
unprecedented rural-urban drift coupled with a high rate of 
unemployment, produces urban destitutes. There is often a 
considerable danger of these displaced people taking themselves 
to the streets unless their problems are addressed within the 
provisions of food security. There is also a growing body of 
literature in Lesotho which characterises its rural landlessness 
as the worst in Africa. This means that in addition to the 
urban destitute, about 20% of the rural population are a special 
case for food security.
The second aspect of food security relates to the opposite 
circumstances of a food deficit country. It assumes that a 
country has attained the ability to produce all or even more 
than its food requirements but large segments of the population 
still have insecure supplies of food. The state is duty bound 
to meet the nutritional needs. The situation is not typical of
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most African countries south of the Sahara. For purpose of 
clarity, the U.SA. is taken as a classical example, where over 
a million people are considered food-deficient by American 
standards.
Aspect three of food security refers to societies where there is 
specialisation in agricultural production, for example in wheat, 
or cotton, or bananas, or pineapples or sugarcane. Fluctuations 
in production or reduced prices for their produce, or rising 
prices for non-food p roducts inevitably affect farm ers’ 
consumption of certain foods due to reduced income. These 
farmers are then objects of food security.
Provisions of Food Security
Two broad approaches will be considered.
Domestic Food Reserve
The issue of what is the best form of food security is difficult 
to resolve and covers considerations of whether a reserve 
should be international, regional or national. Should it consist 
of food or be a monetary reserve? Should it simply be a food 
insurance scheme? These considerations have been debated in 
international circles after the food crisis of 1973/74.
Umalele and Candler suggested three major components of a 
domestic food reserve at any time:
a) an Official "National Food Reserve";
b) stocks held by the official marketing organisation for its 
routine purchase and sale activities;
c) stocks held by the private sector, predominantly individual
farmers.[2]
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National Food Reserve
The recurrent food shortages facing Lesotho result from a 
variety of factors but mainly from the low level of economic 
development and poor growth of food output together with 
y e a r- to -y e a r  s h o r t- fa l ls  in p ro d u c tio n  on account of 
unfavourable weather conditions.
Since more than 50% of the population are critically affected in 
any calendar year, provisions of food stocks and storage 
capacity are undertaken. These include Food for Work, 
Prim ary S ch o o l Feeding, Post Primary E ducation and  
Institutional Feeding programmes and the Mountain Emergency 
Food Reserves. Stock as at 30th June, 1984, amounted to 7,385 
stocks units. In addition to these stocks, a strategic reserve 
of wheat is maintained by Lesotho Flour Mills on behalf of the 
government. In 1984, this reserve amounted to 7000 tonnes. 
S trategic reserve accounted for a bare 2% of total food 
available in 1983/84, or approximately a week’s supply of food 
for the entire nation.
Buffer Stock Price Stabilisation
Most Southern African countries use Marketing Boards, which 
are  p a ra s ta ta l o rgan isa tions , partly  as a food security 
instrument but primarily as a bufferstock price stabilisation 
mechanism. The exercise is simple. Buffer-stocks are built up 
to raise market prices in periods of overabundant supplies, and 
run down to lower prices when current supplies are less than 
normal. The wisdom of this state-sponsored activity is very 
questionable. First, there is no food surplus to start with and 
second, even if there is surplus to stock, it is not possible to 
stabilise prices, and third, the system runs contrary to African 
governments’ twin goals of expanding agricultural output on the 
one hand and the transfer of surplus from agriculture to the 
remainder of the economy on the other.
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The private sector contribution to food security has always 
been underestimated by African governments. It plays an 
important role during times of food shortages provided micro- 
economic incentives are available, in other words, prices are 
utilised to coax farmers to release extra food reserve at their 
disposal. Given the fact that rural food consumption patterns 
are substan tia lly  m ore diverse than hom ogenous urban 
consumption, and involves consumption of several different 
crops, price increases of certain food items consumed by the 
rural people may temporarily alleviate the crises of food 
shortages in urban  areas. But, if the food crisis has 
completely depleted rural individual stocks the diversity of 
rural consumption may aggravate problems of ensuring rural 
food security through official channels. The rural economy is 
often inaccessible and government bureaucracy and political 
considerations are urban-biased. But, above all, food coming in 
the form of aid does not take into account food consumed in 
rural areas. So, under the regime of serious food shortages, 
the rural poor are most vulnerable.
Monetary Reserve
Whether the Lesotho government should opt for holding assets 
in the form of either food stocks, or monetary instruments, 
such as foreign exchange reserves or cash balances to purchase 
food when the need arises, depends on the state of the balance 
of payments. Assuming surpluses both in the current and 
capital accounts, rational use of scarce resources dictates a 
restricted use of foreign exchange.
National food security can only be achieved at a lower cost by 
varying the amount of imports while maintaining a relatively 
small buffer stock. In other words, maximum caution is 
required to hold liquid assets in the form of foreign exchange 
reserves rather than in the form of food. Lesotho’s gross 
international reserves were estimated at US$ 49 million in 1984. 
These reserves can only cover imports for six weeks.
Stock held by the Private Sector
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Although Lesotho is a price taker, increased foreign exchange 
reserves will improve her bargaining position in the world 
market dominated by a handful of nations, namely the U.SA., 
Canada, Argentina, Australia and the EEC countries. It is 
again advisable that households should hold cash rather than 
food. On the whole, there is no easy formula through which 
to achieve national food security unless the country embarks on 
a radical transformation of the agricultural sector.
National Early Warning System
The Global Inform ation and Early W arning System was 
estab lish ed  on the recom m endations of the 1973 FAO 
Conference and World Food Conference held in 1974. Its main 
objectives are to give advance warning of impending changes in 
w orld food conditions, and to enhance the capacity of 
government and international organisations to take prompt and 
appropriate action to deal with emerging food shortages. To 
achieve its objectives, the system is enjoined to monitor 
continuously world food supply/demand conditions, to identify 
countries or regions where acute food shortages and worsening 
nutritional conditions are imminent, and to assess possible 
emergency food requirements. In 1983, the system had 92 
member countries.
The National Early Warning System is an offshoot of the Global 
Information and Early Warning System. It is the totality of 
arrangements, facilities and services, through which national 
administrative staff related to food security, carry out data 
collection and coordination in order to provide the required 
information on the food situation in a country.
The First National Early Warning System in Lesotho, which has 
been under consideration, may well be launched very soon 
under the auspices of the FAO. Prior to this, there have been 
several related activities, including three national nutrition 
planning conferences held in 1975, 1979 and 1981. The last 
conference dealt specifically with food security and nutrition 
surveillance with the sole aim of achieving self-reliance in food
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by 1980.
At all these conferences, it was clearly stated that there has 
been a widening gap between domestic food production, on the 
one hand, and both demand and requirements on the other. It 
was also noted that there  does exist in several parts of 
Lesotho isolated famine, serious malnutrition in children under 
five years of age, and a worsening situation of individual 
households in remote areas.
To alleviate the food crisis, the Lesotho Food and Nutrition 
Council (LNFC) was given the following tasks:
a) Food Security,
b) Surveillance and Early Warning;
c) Skill promotion at the village level.
Surveillance and Early Warning was intended to provide food 
and nutrition data for programme managers, planners and policy 
makers about cases of malnutrition and rehabilitation; to warn 
of impending drought and crop failure; to plan appropriate 
packages of food and nutrition interventions; and to monitor 
their implementation and impact in reducing malnutrition.
It is not the object of this paper to evaluate the activities of 
the institutions involved in related Early Warning Systems, but 
it is imperative to suggest important parts of the systems 
which have not been covered so far, so that the system can 
effectively render optimal services to Lesotho.
The Early Warning System is part and parcel of food security. 
It is designed to assess food shortages with particu lar 
refe rence  to crop fo recasting  and the im provem ent of 
agricultural statistics. In broad terms, the main purpose of the 
system is to provide a clear signal, in advance, of an impending 
large-scale food shortage so that there is sufficient time in 
which to prevent its occurrence or at least to minimise its 
effects.
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In practical terms the system provides individual governments, 
especially  those vulnerable to crop failures, with early 
information which can improve the planning of national stock 
releases, of commercial food imports, of requests for food aid, 
and of requests for financial assistance, as well as initiating 
other national action to meet emergency situations; to pin­
point provinces, districts, or segments of the population which 
are critically affected and thereby provide the necessary food 
delivery to avert famine.
Need for an Early Warning System
The earlier a government is alerted about threatening shortage, 
the greater is its capacity to take anticipatory steps, improve 
the preparedness for eventualities and take mitigating action. 
A forewarning of crop failures or possible disruption in the 
distribution system facilitates timely action with regard to 
importation, if necessary, and planned management of available 
food supplies. Even a few days or hours notice of such 
phenomena as floods, earth-tremors, typhoons or other natural 
disaster, enables a government, even a householder, in fact, to 
take precautionary measures to move food to safe places or to 
such areas where it may be most needed. It is therefore in 
the interest of Lesotho to establish new national monitoring 
and early warning systems, in addition to strengthening existing 
ones, so that timely signals are available about imminent food 
shortages.
The usefulness of the early warning system to Lesotho depends 
on the ability of the government to improve the existing data 
base. If information collected in the field about areas planted 
with food crops, about crop conditions, about prices and 
relevant data - that is, amongst other, weather conditions, 
pests, locusts, infection, estimated production, use of farm 
inputs, government procurement, and imports - is scanty and 
does not reach the users in time, the nation’s food security 
will be seriously handicapped.
It is of paramount importance to narrow the information gap if
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a national warning system is to fulfil its task of averting 
famine, hunger, and malnutrition in a developing society as 
Lesotho.
Increased Agricultural Productivity and Income
Agricultural development and the raising of levels of nutrition 
in Lesotho require increased agricultural production to meet the 
continually growing demands of an increasing population; to 
reduce reliance on overseas supplies; to provide reserves to 
cushion the effects of crop failure in bad seasons; to increase 
non-food agricultural production to meet the raw material 
needs of industries that will expand in the future and to 
provide productive employment in rural areas; and above all, to 
improve the quality of life in rural areas.
The required increase in farm output to meet these vitally 
needed economic goals represent a formidable challenge to 
Lesotho because the country lacks a strong economic base. 
The problem is compounded by the rapid growth of population, 
the genera l and rap id  downw ard slide in ag ricu ltu ra l 
productivity, and the total lack of mechanized high-income 
irrigated agriculture that could probably ease the burden on the 
balance of payments. Alternatively, the non-existence of an 
expo rt-o rien ted  industry  and m anufactu ring  secto r has 
compounded the problem of the balance payments.
For Lesotho to break away from her dependency on imported 
food and be able to build a strong and viable economy capable 
of delivering the required food, it is in the national interest 
for a radical structural transformation to increase agricultural 
production to be carried out.
In genera l, increased  agricu ltu ral production is closely 
associated with rural development. A World Bank sector policy 
paper defines rural development as:
a strategy designed to improve the economic and
social life o f a specific group o f people - the rural
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p o o r .  I ts  o b je c tiv e s  e n c o m p a ss  im p ro v e d  
productivity, increased employment and thus, higher 
incom es fo r  larger groups, as well as m inim um  
acceptable levels o f  food, shelter, education and 
health.[3]
The focus of this part of the paper is on a rapid means of 
raising agricultural output and achieving widespread increases 
in farm income, a central requirement of rural development in 
Lesotho.
Historical evidence indicates that the first concern for the 
rural population is an increase in income. Purchasing power 
provides access to other benefits. In this respect, agricultural 
development effort in Lesotho should have income generation 
through increased productivity as a primary objective.[4]
A m ovem ent away from the present rut in agricultural 
production requires governm ent action to do two things: 
firstly, there must be action to stimulate small farmers to grow 
more food in order to meet the needs of the rural households, 
and secondly, action to allow individual farmers to produce a 
surplus for sale so that the total output of a given rural 
locality exceeds total local requirements and permits sales in 
urban centres, other rural regions, or in international markets 
as has been shown to be successful in Zimbabwe.
It has become an established fact that subsistence peasants can 
be induced to increase their productivity provided four 
requisites are met. These requisites are:
1. An Improved Farming System
This refers to a combination of materials and practices 
with an acceptably low level of risk, that is clearly more 
productive and profitable, than the one currently used 
which must be available to the farmer. Improvements in 
tech n o lo g y  or p ro d u c tio n  system s which prom ise 
significantly higher yields and incomes than previous
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practices are essential to initiate change. Provisions must 
be made to show the farmer which combination of all the 
production factors and crops will give him a maximum net 
income, this being a measure of success for the farmer.
2. Instruction to Farmers
The farmer must be shown, on his own farm or nearby, 
how to put the  practices into use, and he should 
understand why the new farming systems are better. This 
could be achieved only when there are skilled and 
dedicated extension workers.
Although classical economics has identified capital as the 
"missing factor" in developing economies, in Lesotho one 
could fairly accurately conclude that extension services 
and market outlets are the two missing factors which need 
to be addressed if this country is to make headway in the 
future. Given the complex nature of extension services, 
four important requisites extension agents should possess 
if they are to gain the confidence of farmers will now be 
considered:
Technological Competency
Extension workers must have a basic understanding 
of agricultural science and be able to conduct field 
experiments to test whether innovations would be 
feasible and profitable for the farmer. They must 
also be able to diagnose common problems and 
abnormalities and to prescribe proper solutions.
Economic Competence
They must be able to help farmers estimate, that is, 
calculate costs and benefits, the profitability of 
choices such as combinations on inputs, cropping or
173
animal husbandry practices, or alternative markets.
Farming Competency
The extension agent must be capable of performing 
all physical tasks th a t a farm er perfo rm s in 
producing crops or anim als. As mechanisation 
advances, the agent must learn to operate and 
maintain various machines.
Communication Competency
The agent must be able to describe new advances to 
rural people and help them to try new ideas. The 
agent must be able to plan, prepare and present 
appropriate information for the relevant audiences 
and to obtain feedback from them. The relevant 
audiences include farm ers, chiefs, credit agency 
personnel, input distributors, wholesalers, retailers, 
consumers and project personnel of bilateral and 
multilateral agencies.
3. Supply of Inputs
In order to shift subsistence farmers to a high-yield 
system, they must invariably use inputs. Due to the 
limited mobility of farmers, the required input, that is 
improved seeds, fertilizers, pesticides or other materials, 
will remain inaccessible unless outlets in a village in the 
area sell them. Farmers should be able to buy all the 
inputs they need at a single location, in the small 
amounts they need, and on credit if they need it. Prices 
on inputs must be such that these prices allow the 
profitable use of the inputs.
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4. Availability of Market
Most agricultural commodities are bulky and some are also 
highly perishable. Consequently, there must be purchasing 
points near each farm to which the farmers can bring 
products and receive a fair price. Farmers must be 
convinced that they will get a price for their product 
which seems to be an incentive before they decide to 
invest in inputs, and that they can expect a higher rate 
of return than if they did not invest.
Recent researchers have concluded that the marketing of fresh 
vegetables in Lesotho is predominantly underdeveloped. There 
are no market outlets and the bargaining position of farmers is 
weak. Am ong o ther th ings, the lack of m arkets  has 
contributed to low national production.
To remedy the situation, government investment in storage 
facilities, transport, markets and communication are essential 
factors which will allow farmers to sell they products easily. 
Government guaranteed prices are, however, the most effective 
incentive that will shift peasant farmers from subsistence to 
production for the market.
Conclusion
The central point discussed in this paper is how to feed a fast 
growing population, projected to reach 2 million by the year 
1990 in a time of acute food shortages.
While food security in its entirety is a device intended to build 
strategic food and monetary reserves in anticipation of minor 
or major setbacks in food production, Lesotho has been living 
for decades with an infant national food security supported by 
massive commercial food imports and substantial amounts of 
food aid.
If the present trend in food production continues its downward 
slide, Lesotho may well face dire consequences unless the
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country embarks on a radical structural transformation, namely, 
massive investment in agriculture so that the rural economy 
will be able to produce a marketable surplus.
As sanctions against South Africa start to gain momentum, 
Customs Union reserves, which are about 70% of total 
government receipts, and remittances received from miners will 
dwindle enormously. As a result, commercial imports of food, 
about 50% of the  to ta l food supply, will be hard hit. 
Subsequently, Lesotho will enter a period of extreme shortages 
of food.
In order to avert this pessimistic scenario, it is most urgent 
that scarce resource should be diverted to rural development, 
the best insurance policy for food security in Lesotho.
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COOPERATIVE AGRICULTURAL 
DEVELOPMENT AND FOOD 
PRODUCTION IN LESOTHO
B. M. Swallow and B. Bonis
Introduction
SADCC’s Updated Food Security Strategy paper states that the 
two components of food security are:
fo o d  availability  (through expanded production, 
stocks, commercial or other food trade, or through 
expanded aid) and the ability o f all people to acquire 
that food once made available.[ 1]
In Lesotho the food availability/accessibility issues must be 
addressed from two different perspectives: Firstly, what are
the options facing Lesotho in the event of a break-down in 
relations with South Africa given its dependence on that 
country for imports of food, agricultural inputs, and foreign 
exchange through migrant remittances? Secondly, what are the 
options for developing the agricultural sector to generate 
increased production and employment opportunities? The 
Government of Lesotho must develop contingency plans in the 
unlikely, but possible, event that it is thrown into a short-term 
food security crisis particularly during this uncertain phase of 
Southern African history. Ronsholt has recently outlined a 
number of options possible in such a crisis situation.[2] This 
paper a d d re sse s  the  lo n g -te rm  issues of ag ricu ltu ra l 
development in Lesotho. In particular, it examines the issues 
of farmer cooperation and what role it may have in future
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From the devastation left after the Lifaqane wars (1818-C.1824), 
Lesotho rapidly emerged as a major political and economic 
force under the guidance of Moshoeshoe I. Basotho rapidly 
increased their cultivation of the fertile lowland region and 
used the increased food supplies to meet the subsistence 
requirem ents of their growing population and to trade with 
neighbouring black nations and white settlers in what is now 
the O range F ree  S tate. Dem and for Lesotho produce 
heightened with the discovery of diamonds in the Orange Free 
State (1867) and later with the opening of the gold mines in 
the Transvaal (1885). Lesotho’s food grain exports reached a 
maximum in the decade of 1910-20. After this time exports 
declined as (1) South Africa imposed trade restrictions;
(2) increased supplies of imported and South African produce 
came on the market; (3) the Lesotho subsistence requirement 
expanded; (4) soil fertility gradually declined; (5) technology 
remained stagnant; and (6) more Basotho labour was siphoned 
into the South African workforce. By 1930 Lesotho was a net 
importer of maize.[3]
Since independence in 1966, food demand in Lesotho has 
continued to increase in response to growth in both population 
and per capita income (primarily migrant income). Far from 
keeping pace with this increasing demand, food production has 
actually declined since the late 1970s because of the decreased 
area planted and perhaps most importantly, persistent drought. 
Consequently, Lesotho has had to rely increasingly on food 
imports, most of which have been in the form of commercial 
im ports from South Africa. Concern over the increasing 
dependence on South Africa is reflected in the recent policies 
of the government. The Food for Self Sufficiency Programme 
is one of the programmes focussed on expanding food grain 
production, while a number of government initiatives and donor 
projects have been focused on vegetable production.
Current Food Production in Lesotho
The five m ajor food crops of Lesotho, in order of their
agricultural development efforts.
178
importance, are the staple food grains, maize, sorghum and 
wheat, and the major pulses, dry beans and peas. The major 
vegetable crops include cabbages, potatoes, tomatoes and 
onions, again in order of their importance. Recent production 
of the five major food crops is shown in Table 1. It should be 
noted that these figures are for total production and do not 
represent that available for consumption, adjustments must be 
made for harvest, transport and storage losses and the amounts 
used for seed, which together might amount to some 20 percent 
of production.[4]
Table 1: Lesotho Crop Production 1970/71 to 1984/85
(1000 tonnes)
Crop year Haize Sorghum Wheat Beans Peas
1971/72 59.0 20.0 24.0 NA NA
1972/73 70.0 43.0 36.0 NA NA
1973/74 122.5 84.0 57.0 NA NA
1974/75 70.3 37.4 45.3 13.4 5.8
1975/76 49.1 24.5 44.6 8.7 5.8
1976/77 125.9 62.3 61.4 20.9 7.0
1977/78 143.2 85.8 57.9 10.8 4.4
1978/79 124.9 69.0 33.6 8.4 6.9
1979/80 105.6 59.3 28.2 3.6 4.6
1980/81 105.7 47.7 17.0 3.5 3.2
1981/82 79.8 26.0 14.5 2.6 4.5
1982/83 76.2 30.7 14.8 1.6 3.4
1983/84 79.4 33.8 17.1 1.3 3.6
1984/85 92.4 54.8 18.4 2.5 3.3
Source: Lesotho Agricultural Situation Report, 1985 Edition.
NA indicates information not available.
Except for peas, production in the early 1980s was well below 
that of the late 1970s. Production declined steadily following 
the 1978/79 crop year until 1983/84 when a modest recovery
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was reported. The 1984/85 crop year showed substantial gains 
in production owing to a break in the drought conditions of 
the previous six years and indications are that production was 
up again in the 1985/86 crop year.
Imports of food grains and pulses from both commercial and 
donor sources are reported in Table 2. While commercial 
imports of all products have remained relatively constant since 
1977/78, total imports have increased, indicating an increased 
reliance on donated food.
Table 2: Lesotho Imports of Major Crops 1974/75 to 1983/84
(1000 tonnes)*
Commercial imports Total imports**
Crop year Maize Sorghun Wheat Pulses Maize Sorghum Wheat Pulses
1974/75 62.7 3.1 32.0 0.3 74.5 3.1 33.8 0.9
1975/76 76.4 5.1 31.2 0.1 83.1 5.1 32.7 0.3
1976/77 86.5 5.8 32.8 0.6 96.3 5.8 33.9 0.8
1977/78 109.2 2.1 31.7 0.5 115.0 2.1 33.0 0.9
1978/79 122.4 1.9 35.7 0.6 130.7 1.9 42.6 1.6
1979/80 108.8 1.8 30.8 0.5 118.3 1.8 38.2 1.0
1980/81 121.9 1.4 31.5 0.2 136.8 1.4 37.9 0.9
1981/82 128.5 1.0 30.3 0.5 140.2 1.0 42.1 1.2
1982/83 107.4 1.7 23.9 0.5 116.6 1.7 44.5 1.6
1983/84 117.5 3.3 22.0 0.6 126.6 3.3 48.6 1.7
Source: Lesotho Agricultural Situation Report, 1985 Edition.[5]
* All figures in whole grain equivalent.
** Includes donated plus total commercial imports.
Grain and pulse donations and self-sufficiency percentages are 
shown in Table 3. The self-sufficiency percentages are 
calculated by dividing domestic production by the total imports 
plus domestic production. This procedure is appropriate for 
grains as there are virtually no grain exports. However, this
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calculation is inappropriate for peas and beans as Lesotho has 
been a net exporter of these pulses. Donations of maize were
8.1 percent of total supply in 1974/74; 2.2 percent in 1977/78;
6.1 percent in 1980/81; and 4.4 percent in 1983/84. Since 
1980/81, donations of wheat and pulses have increased 
substantially. There have been no donations of sorghum. 
Percent self-sufficiency in the 1980s is considerably lower than 
in the late 1970s.
Table 3: Lesotho Percent Donated and Percent Self-sufficiency
for Five Major Crops, 1974/75 to 1983/84
Percent donated* Percent self sufficiency**
Crop year Ha i ze Wheat Pulses Ha i ze Sorghcm Wheat
1974/75 8.1 1.4 3.0 48.5 91.0 66.0
1975/76 5.1 1.9 1.0 37.2 91.0 57.9
1976/77 4.4 1.2 0.7 56.6 91.5 54.7
1977/78 2.2 1.4 2.5 55.5 97.7 60.1
1978/79 3.2 9.1 5.9 49.0 97.3 44.3
1979/80 4.2 11.1 5.5 47.2 94.0 32.8
1980/81 6.1 11.7 9.2 48.1 90.0 27.6
1981/82 5.3 20.8# 8.4 38.6 92.2 24.3
1982/83 4.8 34.7# 19.6 39.5 94.8 18.5
1983/84 4.4 40.5# 16.4 38.5 83.8 26.0
Source: Lesotho Agricultural Situation Report, 1985 Edition.
* No sorghum was donated during this period.
** Total production divided by total production plus 
total imports.
# Includes donated whole wheat sold through commercial 
channels.
Fresh vegetables consumed in Lesotho are produced in a variety 
of situations; home gardens, communal gardens, private 
commercial farms (with or without project or donor support),
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institutions, state farms, donor assisted projects, and South 
African farms. Data on Table 4 indicate the degree of reliance 
on South African imported produce (56.6 percent), and the 
relative importance of home gardens, 21.8 percent, compared to 
private commercial producers, 9.3 percent, in meeting total 
demand. Despite the large donor effort in production projects 
and state farms, they supply only 8.4 percent of consumption. 
Over 2200 households are involved in communal gardens, but 
together these produce only 2.4 percent of total consumption.
Table 4: Lesotho Fresh Vegetable Supply-Disposition, 1985
I tem Tonnes Percent of total 
consumpt i on
Consumpti on 48,974 100.0
Project production 2,718 5.5
Private commercial production 4,551 9.3
Communal garden production 1,158 2.4
Imports 27,722 56.6
Home garden production 10,662 21.8
State farm production 1,414 2.9
Source: Swallow and Mpemi 1986.[6]
The Agricultural Production Environment in Lesotho
In this situation of high dependence on food imports, the 
G overnm ent and its donor agencies have taken two main 
approaches to the problem  of increasing dom estic food 
production in the two decades since independence. The first 
has been to stimulate increased production under irrigation; the 
second to stim ulate increased production under dryland 
conditions. Most of the development projects have been 
area-based and have centred around large-scale cooperative 
developm ent. The experience of those projects will be 
reviewed in the next section. Before exploring cooperative
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development, however, it is important to review two aspects of 
Lesotho agriculture: (1) the land tenure system and (2) the
composition of the labour force.
The Land Teniae System
Under the traditional land tenure system, the land of Lesotho 
is held in trust for the people by the King. The King then 
assigns the responsibility for distributing land-use rights to 
chiefs. Under this rule, the chief of each village allocates 
usufruct land rights to the male villagers, provided they meet 
certain criteria: they must be married, pay taxes and respect
the authority of both the local chief and the King.[7] Through
this process, a married woman also gains access to land, 
although the usufruct rights actually belong to her husband. 
Once a man meets all of the above criteria, he is assigned 
three fields, although all three are not generally allocated at 
once and are, most frequently, not contiguous.
As long as the man crops his fields, he can use them 
throughout his entire adult life. In the event of his death, his 
widow is allowed to remain on the land. If the wife is dead, 
the lands revert back to the village chief to be allocated as he 
sees fit. There are no inheritance laws.
It was thought that the traditional land tenure system would 
bring equality, since every male household head has a right to 
three parcels of land. It has been shown, however, that land
distribution is not as equal as once perceived (Table 5). Not
only does the top 25 percent of the landholding population hold 
over half of the land, but the per capita holdings of these 
land-rich  households are over th ree  tim es that of the 
households in the second quartile. While these statistics are 
dated, there is no reason to believe that this situation has 
improved in recent years.
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Table 5: Distribution of Land Among Farm Households
in Lesotho, 1970.
Farm household 
group
Percentage 
of land
Mean
holding 
size (ha.)
Mean
family 
size (#)
Mean
holding
(ha.)
Top quartile 52 4.4 6.0 0.73
Third quartile 25 1.7 5.5 0.31
Second quartile 16 1.2 4.9 0.24
Bottom quartile 7 0.6 4.8 0.13
Source: World Bank (1981), Lesotho Agricultural Sector Review.
Volcme II: Annexes. World Bank. Rome, Italy.
Labour
The amount and quality of yearly and seasonal labour available 
in Lesotho is largely determined by the number of Basotho 
working in South Africa. A pproxim ately 60 percent of 
Lesotho’s male labour force between the ages of 18 and 60 is 
presently employed in South Africa, leaving the de facto 
population of work-age Basotho to be 71 percent female.
Migration extracts a very large number of the physically able 
males, leaving a population of women, children and disabled or 
older men to carry out the home and agricultural activities. 
The impact of this labour loss for agriculture is significant. 
Approximately 130,000 farms have no work-age male labourer 
present for crop farming.
Cooperative Agricultural Development in Lesotho
Throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s, most agricultural 
development programmes in Lesotho stressed the importance of 
cooperation in agricultural production. Government agents and 
donor experts sought to exploit the tradition among Basotho
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farmers to share resources in agricultural production. This 
traditional sharing was seen as a solid foundation on which to 
build larger share production units. Much has been made of 
the potential econom ies of size in both production and 
marketing. By farming together on consolidated land blocks, it 
has been thought that Basotho could overcome the constraints 
imposed by the lack of resources and small fragm ented 
landholdings. In this section the traditions of cooperation in 
agricultural production are first described, then the experiences 
with cooperative irrigation and dryland production schemes 
examined.
Traditional Agricultural Cooperation
Traditional arrangements of agricultural cooperation revolve 
around four important resources for agricultural production; 
land, labour, seed and draught-power (mechanical or animal). 
Lemisana is an arrangement where households, usually male 
members of households, share draught-power in ploughing. 
Individual households will contribute animals, equipment and 
labour to a common ploughing team which will then move from 
field to field. Matsema are work com panies, prim arily 
composed of women from neighbouring households, who perform 
agricultural operations — primarily weeding and harvesting — 
on each other’s fields in return for food, drink, a small share 
of the harvest, or a small cash payment. Seahlolo, (share- 
cropping), is generally a relationship between a labour and 
draught poor landholder cooperating with a farmer who has 
surpluses of these resources. The landholder contribues his 
land, often some food, and half of the weeding and harvesting 
labour. The other partner in the sharecropping arrangement 
will supply the seed, the labour and draught required to plant 
the crop, and half the weeding and harvesting labour. The 
crop sharing relationship is agreed before planting, often a 
50/50 split, though if the harvest is especially poor the 
landholder may receive the larger share.[8]
Sharecropping is common in Lesotho. The 1970 Agriculture 
Census found that in 1970, 18.3 percent of the households in
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the lowlands, 10.4 percent of the households in the foothills, 
9.7 percent of the households in the Senqu Valley, and 9.7 
percent of the households in the mountains were involved in 
sharecropping. Gay found that approximately 50 percent of a 
sample of farming households in the Senqu Project area were 
willing to sharecrop.[9] Respondents cited lack of draught 
power and higher yields as the most common reasons for 
participating in sharecropping arrangements. "Few fields" and 
"too many problems" were the most common reasons for not 
sharecropping.
R obertson  described  considerab le  in te rac tio n s  between 
a lte rna tive  types of agricultural cooperation, and found 
sharecropping to be a dynamic institution which has taken 
different forms over time depending on the agricultural and 
overall economic and social environm ent. According to 
Robertson the advantages of sharecropping is that it is flexible, 
it allows households to extend their agricultural resoures at a 
season’s notice, it allows both landholders and non-landholders 
to spread their risks, and allows all households to fully utilize 
their available resources. In these aspects, it has many 
advantages over the more advanced productive arrangements 
such as fixed land rents and wage labour.[10]
Cooperation in Irrigated Crop Production
Interest in irrigated crop production pre-dates Lesotho’s 1966 
independence. While actual work in irrigated crop production 
has taken many directions since the early 1960s, interest has 
not waned. It is still believed that by carefully controlling 
water and properly timing the application of water and other 
inputs, Lesotho can move closer to self-sufficiency in food 
production. The purpose of this section is to briefly review 
the experience of irrigation development in Lesotho with 
p a rticu la r  a tte n tio n  paid to the issues of cooperative 
development.
Between 1965 and 1975, ten pilot projects were introduced in 
Lesotho. These schemes were originally designed as production
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units for determining the optimal arrangements needed to 
develop viable irrigated agriculture systems. All of the pilot 
projects were located in the western perimeter. In the early 
1970s, donors started coming into Lesotho to begin large, 
area-based projects. The five largest projects were: the Leribe 
Pilot Project; the Khomokhoana Project; the Senqu Agricultural 
E x tension  P ro je c t; the  T haba-B osiu  P ro jec t, and the 
Thaba-Tseka Mountain Development Project. The Senqu Project 
had the largest irrigation component of these area-based 
projects.
For the purposes of this paper it is not necessary to provide a 
detailed description of the historical development of past 
irrigation schemes. Interested readers are referred to Boris for 
more detail on the schem es.[11] In this section only a 
summary of the general experiences is given. Particular 
emphasis is paid to the issues of land consolidation and 
cooperative production.
Thaba-Phatsoa (Pilot Project)
Thaba-Phatsoa is the oldest and most dynamic scheme. It has 
undergone many significant changes since its inception. Work 
toward irrigated  crop production began in 1962 with the 
two-year construction of a 15 acre foot dam. Irrigated 
production actually began in 1964 on 2.4 hectares. For reasons 
which are unclear, this original effort failed, although the 
scheme was revitalized in 1967. By 1974, 75 landholders were 
growing 65 hectares of maize, beans, wheat and potatoes under 
irrig a tio n . In 1975, the severe econom ic problem s at 
T haba-P hatsoa  w ere ab rup tly  unm asked by an outside 
institution, the Agricultural Development Fund (ADF). Because 
of low pay-back rates the Agricultural Development Fund would 
not grant any more loans. At this point Thaba-Phatsoa, as 
well as most of the other irrigation schemes under the Crops 
and Pasture Division of the Ministry of Agriculture ... "[had] ... 
reached a critical stage and ... [were] ... balanced on the point 
of complete failure".
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This economic crisis required the Ministry of Agriculture to 
take immediate action if the pilot projects were to be saved. 
In 1976, the Irrigation Research and Development Project 
(IRDP) took over Thaba-Phatsoa and the contracts made with 
the farmers were revised. However, the project continued to 
accumulate debts, no longer with the ADF, but rather with the 
input organizations, particularly Coop Lesotho (a parastatal 
input supply firm) and LEMA (a government equipment hire 
service). With operational conflicts and no additional funding, 
the IRDP collapsed in December 1977.
In 1978 the Taiwanese took over the Thaba-Phatsoa scheme. 
They concentrated  their efforts and funds on high-value 
vegetable crops and changed the method of irrigation to small 
pumps which supplied water out of the existing concrete 
channels. W hile these donors provided some inputs and 
technical advice to the existing cooperative unit, they leased a 
number of fields from the landholders and went into production 
for themselves. It is also believed that the Taiwanese provided 
a truck for the transport of produce to Leribe, for their own 
use as well as others.
When the Taiwanese left Thaba-Phatsoa in the winter of 1983, 
th e re  w ere 6-10 acres (2.4 hectares) of cabbage under 
irrigation, being worked by nine families. In August 1983, the 
People’s Republic of China took over the management of the 
scheme. For the most part, this donor group inherited the 
small, cooperative group already at Thaba-Phatsoa; they are 
cultivating the same land area and dealing with the same 
people as the Taiwanese did. During the 1984/85 production 
year, 15 hectares of project area were producing vegetables 
under irrigation, with the remaining 61.4 hectares producing 
maize under dryland.
Many financial, technical and social problems existed on the 
scheme during its life. Low yields resulted in low, or negative 
re tu rn s , though in the first seven years m em bers were 
receiving positive returns through subsidization from the 
scheme’s depreciation fund.[12] Inadequate management and 
disorganized labour resulted in a number of technical problems
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and labour shortages. Landholders were confused about both 
the overall and daily operations of the project, disheartened by 
some of the decisions, and generally dissatisfied with the 
organization. The system of profit sharing utilized for the 
first seven years, where member-families contributed labour 
equally but shared profits on a per hectare rather than a per 
family basis, did not work. This system might have been viable 
had original land-holdings been of equal or near-equal size, 
however, land contributions ranged from 0.2 to 1.8 hectares. 
Consequently, m em bers received widely different returns. 
Furthermore, because of direct correlation between landholding 
size and profit share, there  were constant disputes over 
tenurial rights. In short, participants felt like simple labourers 
— asked to contribute toward the scheme as factory workers 
contribute to the building of an automobile. In theory, 
however, members controlled two factors of production, labour 
and land. In fact, they wanted this to be recognized and to 
become more active participants in the management of their 
lands.
Tsa-Khoio (Pilot Project)
This scheme, located in the southern district of Mafeteng, 
followed much the same development pattern as Thaba-Phatsoa. 
Irrigated cropping in this area began as a research endeavour 
in 1965; here, studies on the irrigated crop potential of duplex 
soils continued under the IRDP which folded in 1977. Through 
the work of the IRDP, 100 hectares were put under irrigation.
As with Thaba-Phatsoa, when the IRDP ended, the scheme was 
taken over by the Taiwanese, and provided with the same type 
of assistance. After the departure of the Taiwanese in 1983, 
the People’s Republic of China came in to run the scheme, 
which today consists of th ree individual farmers growing 
cabbage on non-adjacent lands. Producers appear to be 
generating good returns, and the farmers and the Chinese are 
enthusiastic about the operation.
The technical and financial success of Tsa-Kholo clearly led to
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its high acceptability by farm ers. This scheme did not 
experience  nearly  the m agnitude of social problem s as 
Thaba-Phatsoa. While the method of employment during its 
first years was, as with Thaba-Phatsoa, generally considered 
unsa tisfac to ry , with the village ch ief and developm ent 
committees choosing labourers, there seemed to be a better 
relationship  between the scheme members and the Chief. 
Unlike the chiefs on the other pilot projects, the Chief of 
Tsa-K holo "willingly wrote a letter to the effect that the 
committee should employ labour for his field and pay from his 
share, the balance only going to him" (Report on the Request! 
This type of leadership tends to build morale and instigate 
cooperation.
Senqu River Agricultural Extension Project 
(Area-Based Project)
The Senqu Project started in September 1972 with funding from 
the UNDP. The FAO was the executing agency. The 
long-range objective of the project was to:
assist the G overnm ent o f  Leso tho  to increase  
agricultural production above the largely subsistence 
level, and to create employment opportunities by 
prom oting competitive earnings from  agricultural 
production.[ 13]
To achieve this long-range objective a long list of short-range 
activities were undertaken. These included a number of animal 
production, conservation, dry-land crop production, credit, input 
supply, marketing, and irrigation activities. The Ministry of 
Agriculture requested that the project establish consolidated 
farm blocks to demonstrate the advantages and examine some 
of the problems inherent in such organizations. In response to 
this mandate, six dryland and two irrigated farms were created. 
These served as core areas throughout the life of the project. 
By May 1976, three additional irrigated farm blocks had been 
added to the project and a total of 105 associated landholders 
were involved in irrigated production.[14] In May/June 1975, a 
mid-term review mission recommended a full project revision.
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By August 1977, the decision had already been made to cancel 
the entire project.
Like Thaba-Phatsoa, the irrigation component of the Senqu 
Project was plagued by a series of problems which relatively 
quickly led to its demise. To a large extent, the bulk of the 
production operations were carried out by the project staff; 
cropping patterns were selected, credit operations were carried 
out, inputs ordered and distributed, mechanical operation 
executed, and the produce marketed. One hundred percent 
in-kind credit was supplied to the farmers for seasonal inputs. 
The farmers, however, never fully understood the credit system 
and often mistook the arrangement to be share-cropping. This 
led to confusion and disappointment as, after a full season of 
work, the project, at times, claimed all the produce in 
repayment for loans. Without a full understanding of the 
credit system the project had imposed, farmers felt the project 
had cheated them out of their share of the produce and/or 
profits. In contrast to how the system was outlined, bills for 
inputs were not given to the farmers until, or after, harvest. 
At no time during the season did participants have a clear idea 
of how much they owed the project. As the project marketed 
the produce, many times the participants saw the efforts of 
their labour carted away while they received nothing, or very 
little, from the sale. Also, thinking their arrangement to be 
share-cropping, the farmers felt cheated. They could not 
understand if 400 bags of wheat had been produced, why they 
were not given 200 bags. They were further shocked to find 
out that, often, instead of receiving profits or produce, they 
were handed a bill stating how much additional money they 
owed the project.
Problems of the lack of farmer understanding and participating 
in the project may have been overcome if the project had been 
able to generate good returns to the farmers. However, low 
and often negative returns, destroyed any chance for the 
project to overcome these problems. Low returns resulted from 
low yields, inappropriate crop mixes, and farmer attitudes. 
Yields were low for a number of reasons. The weather 
throughout the life of the project was unpredictable and
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destructive. Also, the crops were generally underwatered. 
A f te r  s e v e ra l  seaso n s  of low y ields due la rg e ly  to 
underwatering, labourers had to be hired to move the irrigation 
pipes.[15] The problem of low quality labour was felt acutely
on the irrigation blocks although the reason for it was 
national, rather than regional or project related. Since much 
of the labour in the area had been expatriated to the mines in 
South Africa, many of the people left were women or the old, 
weak, disabled or generally infirm. The people left to carry 
out the work could simply not move large-scale irrigation 
equipment or participate in other physically demanding tasks.
Crop mix was critical, although many factors were ignored in 
the decisions. The crop ro tation  patterns chosen were 
inappropriate for the weather. This was compounded by the 
fact that markets could not be found for some of the crops. 
Consequently, some of the produce went unsold.
The Senqu Project had, from the beginning, not examined how 
the farmers felt about cooperative farming. In an attempt to 
get p roduction  underw ay, farm ers were pressured into 
p a rtic ip a tin g  in the irriga tion  schemes and joining the 
associations. Critical survey work was only carried out after 
the project had been deemed a failure. It is not that the 
farmers did not want to cooperate, but they were never really 
given the chance. Planning, for the most part, was done 
without farmer participation and operations were carried out 
la rg e ly  by p ro je c t  s ta f f .  T he  f a r m e r ’s fe e lin g  of 
non-participation in the cultivation of his own land, coupled 
with the ease of obtaining credit, led to a general feeling of 
apathy toward the project. With the project carrying out most 
of the technical operations on the schemes and supplying full 
credit, the farmers felt no obligation to pay back loans. In 
short, they were not internalizing any of the risk of production 
and felt no compulsion to do so.
Hoiolo Valley Project (Area-based project)
The Hoiolo Valley Project is located in the northern district of
192
Butha-Buthe. The project got underway in April 1978. It was 
proposed that the Irish Government would cover inputs for a 
ten  year p e rio d  and possib ly  longer, a lthough m ajor 
expenditures would be incurred in the first five years. The 
major emphasis of the project was, and still is, agricultural 
production, with particular attention given to irrigation. The 
project is continuing operations at this time.
When the Irish came to the Hololo Valley in 1978, a communal 
irrigation scheme was already operating with some financial 
support from the Unitarian Service Committee of Canada 
(USCC). This communal farm, now under the jurisdiction of 
the Hololo Valley Project, covers 9 hectares and involves 13 
farm ers. The farm ers m anage the schem e th rough  a 
yearly-elected committee. The committee operates under a 
constitution and a set of by-laws.
They keep their own records, administer their own funds, and 
supervise their own work. Farmers work communally (being 
paid a wage of 2 Maloti per day out of common revenues), own 
crops comm unally and share costs and benefits equally 
irrespective of the size of each individual’s landholding. The 
Hololo Valley Project provides technical advice, tractors, and 
other equipment.
In 1982, a second communal irrigation scheme involving 3 
farm ers on 2.2 hectares came into operation. The three 
farmers involved work communally only when laying irrigation 
pipes and applying insecticides. The Hololo Valley Project 
provides most of the technical inputs for production.
In 1983, another new scheme came into operation. It is 
referred to as "a horticultural unit" and involves 9 farmers on 
8 hectares of land. Each of these nine farmers held rights to 
some portion of the land before the project and is paid M150 
per annum for project use of the land, which is an estimate of 
the amount they would have realized had they planted the land 
to maize. Of the 8.1 hectares, 2.1 hectares is covered by a 
demonstration orchard, 1.0 hectares is covered by a fruit tree 
orchard and 4.3 hectares is employed in vegetable production.
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It is hoped that in time the farmers will be in a position to 
take over and the scheme will have recovered the establishment 
costs. The scheme is being funded and managed totally by the 
Hololo Valley Project.
In addition to these three schemes, the project is supporting 
seven individual vegetable producers and 14 individual orchards. 
The individual vegetable plots cover 8.4 hectares and the 
orchards cover 6.8 hectares. The farms are all operated and 
managed by the owners. The source of labour is either family 
members or hired labour supervised by the individual owners. 
The Project put in the irrigation pumps and lines, and provides 
technical advice.
Two additional group production schemes were scheduled to go 
into production in 1986. These schemes were to cover an area 
of 14.2 hectares and involve a total of 22 farmers. Three 
individual schemes covering a total of 3.2 hectares were also 
scheduled to go into production in 1986 (The Hololo Valley 
Project Manager, personal interview, 1984).
The Hololo Valley Project appears to be the most successful of 
the irrigation projects initiated in Lesotho to date. Farmers 
have been able to generate reasonable returns from their 
labour. The daily wage payment seems to be a particular 
attraction on the 9 hectare communal scheme. The Project has 
been flexible in the type of arrangements it supports. Where 
the main purpose is demonstration — on the Horticultural Unit 
— it does not expect farmers to bear the risks. The major 
problems appear to be the lack of labour, possibly because the 
schemes involve many female-headed households, and the high 
degree of reliance on the project. Marketing also tends to be 
a problem. Contracts with buyers in Maseru failed, and now 
the project sells most of its produce at the project site to 
individual buyers.
Projects’ Appraised
Most of the projects focused their irrigation efforts on group 
production . A pparently technical and econom ic factors
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prom pted  the im p lem en ta tion  of rela tively  large-sca le  
production units which, in Lesotho, implies multiple family 
organizations. From a technical standpoint, overhead sprinkler 
systems seem to offer the most reasonable way to control 
water. Once the decision has been made to install a sprinkler 
irrigation system, presumably there were economies of size to 
be gained in the purchase and use of relatively large pumps, 
pipes, and other irrigation components. When combined with 
the econom ies of size that can be achieved in the bulk 
purchase of inputs, land preparation, the use of mechanized 
equipment and management services, the argument from a 
technical/economic point of view would seem to dictate the 
creation of relatively large production units.
However, with no change in land tenure, the implementation of 
large production units required the consolidation of lands and 
collectivization of the labour effort. Yet, with many families, 
often with different goals, working on a single project, social/ 
organizational problems were bound to arise. When combined 
with financial and technical problems, these have often caused 
projects to fail.
Project Experience in Cooperative Dryland Production
Five large area-based projects undertaken during the 1970s 
attempted to introduce group production schemes and land 
consolidation for the development of dryland crop production: 
Leribe Pilot Project, Khom okhoana Project, Senqu River 
Agricultural Extension Project, Thaba-Bosiu Project, and the 
Thaba-Tseka Mountain Development Project. A second type of 
coopera tive  developm ent project, the Cooperative Crop 
Production Programme (later Food Self Sufficiency Programme), 
took the form of sharecropping — in this case the Government 
is the farmers’ partner.
Besides the five consolidated blocks involved in irrigated crop 
production, the Senqu Project also initiated a total of nine 
consolidated blocks which focussed on cooperative dryland 
production. A total of 231 hectares of land and 158 associated
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landholders were involved. These cooperative schemes were 
fraught with all of the technical, managerial and financial 
problems that existed in the irrigated blocks. These were 
com pounded by very low, and often negative, returns to 
farmers.
One successful experience with dryland cooperative farming 
occurred in the Khomokhoana Project with potato production. 
Attractive returns resulted in an expansion of the area planted 
with potatoes from 0.4 hectares in 1971/72 to 66.8 hectares in 
1975/76. In contrast to many of the other schemes, the 
farm ers them selves were involved in every stage of the 
production and marketing process. The farmers devised a 
system of penalties for members who did not adhere to the 
labour schedule which they had worked out.[16] In the 1984/85 
production year a total of 21 producers were producing 
potatoes on 34 hectares of land in what is now known as the 
Potato Growers’ Association.
The Food for Self Sufficiency Programme
A radically different approach to countering the increasing 
reliance on food imports is the Government’s programme of 
sharecropping with farmers. This programme was first launched 
in 1976/77 and was intended to demonstrate the agricultural 
potential of Lesotho on the occasion of the Tenth Year 
Independence Anniversary. The program m e, named the 
Cooperative Crop Production Programme (CCPP), produced 
wheat on a total of 3114 hectares in the winter of 1977/78, 
and ach ieved  average  y ields of 1152kg per h e c ta re . 
Landholders in the selected areas took very little risk, provided 
a minimal amount of labour, and were guaranteed to receive a 
share of the production, regardless of the overall financial 
returns. The wheat programme covered 6386 hectares in 
1977/78, and 4576 hectares in 1978/79.(17] Though farmers 
were generally satisfied with their returns from the programme, 
poor planning and management contributed to heavy financial 
losses and the programme was terminated in 1980 and replaced 
by the Food Self Sufficiency Programme (FSSP).
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In July of 1980 the Government signed a five year agreement 
with Taiwan to support the FSSP. The objectives of the 
project were to:
(a) achieve self-sufficiency in maize and sorghum production 
within the period of five years;
(b) achieve full u tilisa tio n  of Governm ent-ow ned farm 
machinery and equipment; and
(c) in it ia te  a g r ic u ltu ra l  p ro d u c tio n  based  on village 
cooperatives.[18]
Yields of over 5,000 kilograms per hectare were predicted, and 
by expanding the total coverage of the project to 12,000 
hectares, total production of maize and sorghum was expected 
to reach 60,000 tonnes by 1984/85.
The total area covered by the programme expanded from 10,439 
hectares of maize, wheat and sorghum in 1980/81, to 33,940 
hectares in 1983/84. Average yields were only a fraction of 
those predicted; average yields between 1980/81 and 1982/83 
were 856 tonnes per hectare for wheat, 1339 for maize, and 698 
for sorghum.[19] In the 1982/83 crop year 28,782 households 
were involved. The farmers’ share of the revenue from the 
maize production was 52 percent in 1981/82, 37 percent in 
1982/83 and 33 percent in 1983/84. Farmers received 25 
percent of the revenue from the wheat production in 1980/81, 
32 percent in 1981/82, 30 percent in 1982/83, and 30 percent in 
1983/84.[20]
Production in the programme is highly mechanized. Tillage, 
planting and fertilisation was conducted with tractor-drawn 
equipment. Herbicides and insecticides were applied by aerial 
spraying. Farmers were only expected to weed or cultivate the 
crops, and provide assistance in harvesting.
The costs to the Government of this large scale programme 
have been enormous. Between 1980/81 and 1982/83 the 
Republic of China provided loans totalling US$6.6 million; the
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Government of South Africa provided a line of credit of R2 
million; three Barclays Bank loans were granted for a total of 
R3.6 million; a R4 million overdraft facility was provided by the 
Bank of Lesotho; and Government of Lesotho subventions for 
the programme were M0.775 million in 1980/81, M6.563 million 
in 1981/82, and M3.894 million in 1982/83. Total revenues 
generated from the programme’s share of the crops were 
M0.095 million in 1980/81, M 1.945 million in 1981/82 and M3.783 
million in 1982/83.(20]
During 1984 several modifications in the FSSP were instituted 
to increase farmers’ involvement, transfer responsibility for the 
Technical Operations Unit to the Ministry of Agriculture, and 
avoid duplication of services provided by other government 
in s titu tio n s .[21] Ind ica tions are tha t these  and other 
modifications have significantly improved the financial viability 
of the programme.
As it was organized prior to 1984, farmers had very little 
control over the use of the land which they committed to the 
FSSP. They were not involved in the production, planning, or 
in many of the actual farm operations. There were few 
opportunities for farmers to learn from the programme, apart 
from the benefits of large-scale, capital-intensive production 
practices. There is very little possibility that farmers could 
adopt such production practices themselves. On the positive 
side, national food crop production may have been increased 
under the programme; farmers received reasonable returns from 
their landholdings; and some cropland which may otherwise 
remain idle was kept in agricultural production.
CONCLUSION
From the beginning of the twentieth century Lesotho has 
evolved from a relatively large net exporter of food to today’s 
situation where it is a large net importer. It is now highly 
dependent upon food aid imports and commercial imports from 
South Africa. While its self-sufficiency percentages are very 
low — 40 percent for maize, 90 percent for sorghum, 30
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percent for wheat, and 45 percent for vegetables — its food 
security position is debatable. On one hand Lesotho derives 
many advantages from its relationship with South Africa: 
relatively stable and secure markets for imported produce, high 
income markets and good transportation infrastructure for 
exports, and employment opportunities in South African mines. 
On the other hand, Lesotho’s economic and food security 
position is dominated by the will of a neighbour who is 
experiencing increasing political and economic turmoil. In the 
long-term Lesotho must take measures to promote sustained 
development of employment and income opportunities within its 
borders; in the short-term it must be prepared for the food 
security crisis which would result from a break-down in its 
South African employment, agricultural input and food supply 
links. In the short-term all of the options for national food 
security are very expensive, but can be clearly defined.[22] In 
the long-term the question must be asked; is self-sufficiency 
or a trading approach the best alternative for achieving 
long-term food security? No answer is given in this paper. 
Rather the paper has focussed on a particular approach to 
ag ricu ltu ra l developm ent -- coopera tion  in agricultural 
production.
The promotion of cooperation appears to have many advantages 
for the development of Lesotho’s agricultural sector. Lesotho 
has a long history of agricultural cooperation and a high 
proportion of the households are currently involved in some 
form of cooperation. If individual households would consolidate 
their landholdings into consolidated blocks, economies of size in 
production, marketing and credit may be obtained making the 
total agricultural sector more productive and better able to 
compete with South African producers.[23] However, many past 
attem pts to prom ote large production units have failed. 
T echnical and financial p roblem s have been im portant 
constraints, but the social/organizational problems may have 
also been important and have often been the most severely 
neglected.
Traditional cooperative arrangements have allowed individual 
households to exploit their key agricultural resources — land,
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labour, draught and seed — to the maximum potential, while 
leaving the household  unit intact as a separa te  entity. 
Sharecropping, the cooperative arrangement of longest duration, 
allows households to change the structure of their agricultural 
production from one season to the next in response to changes 
in their resource base. Households which contribute land to 
sharecropping arrangements are assured of receiving at least 
some return.
The irrigation and dryland production projects which have 
a tte m p te d  to  p ro m o te  large-sca le  p roduction  through 
consolidated land blocks have not left individual households as 
separate entities, but have tried to form pools of land and 
labour for common production. In some cases, households were 
actually coerced into joining cooperative production units and 
had little input into the decision-making of the unit.
The social/organizational obstacles may be overcome if the 
projects are carefully planned, are technically feasible given 
the resources of the households, and provide reasonable and 
timely returns to the households involved. The bottom line of 
any productive enterprise is profitability, no project will be 
successful if it cannot generate returns for its members.
The spirit of cooperation is alive and well in Lesotho. 
Development efforts may be able to harness that spirit for the 
overall benefit of the nation. However, individual households 
will always form the basis of cooperatives, and their goals and 
constraints must be clearly taken into consideration.
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POLICY ISSUES FOR 
FOOD SECURITY IN ZAMBIA
Kapola Sipula
Introduction
The term Food Security has basically been defined similarly to 
the definition found in the World Bank Report "Poverty and 
Hunger".[1] The report defines the term as; "access by all 
people at all times to enough food for an active healthy life". 
The report adds that food security has two essential elements, 
namely; the availability of adequate food and the ability to 
acquire it. Individuals and households (or nations) must not 
only have access to reliable food supplies, but the food has to 
provide nutritionally adequate diets. The report also identifies 
two types of food insecurities. The first type (transitory food 
insecurity) is that of a temporary decline in access to adequate 
food due to a drop in production levels, household incomes or 
instability in food prices. The second type of food insecurity, 
chronic food insecurity, is that of a continuously inadequate 
diet caused by the inability to acquire food. The definitions 
described above will apply in this paper.
Food insecurity does not only arise due to lack of adequate
food but also due to poor distribution and inadequate
purchasing power of the people. There is an abundance of
food world wide and countries with money to purchase on the
world market are able to do so easily. It is, however, quite 
clear that millions of people go without adequate food. 730 
million people are estimated to be on poor food diets in the
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world.[2] The situation is so on both the international level, 
and the national levels. A good percentage of the national 
populations in sub-Sahara Africa and elsewhere do not have 
adequate food for an active life. A country may attain a rapid 
in c re a s e  in food  p ro d u c tio n  and  even  re a c h  food  
self-sufficiency but this does not guarantee food security for 
some households. In sub-Sahara Africa people had declining 
diets from 1970 to 1980. The declining diets were closely tied 
to declining per capita income growth. To a smaller extent 
food security disparities can also be found within a household. 
Children and women (especially lactating mothers) do not get 
adequate food requirements for an active life.
In Zambia, the problem of food security affects an estimated 
number of 3 million people. This paper will try to identify the 
groups of people threatened by food insecurity before assessing 
the national level situation. The paper will then discuss the 
causes of Zambia’s food problems and thereafter provide some 
policy options for the country towards achieving Food Security.
The Zambian Food Security Situation
Zambia experiences both chronic and transitory food insecurity 
amongst its population. People who are normally affected by 
both temporary and chronic food shortages are mainly food 
producers, particularly subsistence and small scale farmers. In 
the urban areas the poor urban dwellers face basically chronic 
food insecurities. The causes of food insecurities between the 
two groups differ. The urban poor may face the problem due 
to a cut or drop in the income level or face high prices and 
thus have lower purchasing power. Small scale farmers (those 
who sell about 50% of their produce) who are net sellers face 
more problems other than lack of income or low purchasing 
power. The small scale farmers face also natural disasters and 
institutional problems. The causes of food insecurities will be 
discussed in detail later. Other groups that face mainly 
transitory food shortages in Zambia would include, refugees 
from Angola found in the North-western and Western provinces 
and from Mozambique found in Lusaka, and Eastern provinces.
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Displaced groups, like those of Gwcmbc valley who were moved 
in order to give way to the Kariba dam and were again moved 
for a new agricultural project, are also victims of food 
insecurity. Chronic food insecurities in urban areas affect 
mostly those who are unemployed, the lowly paid workers in 
employment and in the informal sector people involved in petty 
trading. The construction industry has also a large number of 
people who work on temporary basis and such people face 
transitory food insecurities if not chronic food insecurities.
Zambia is a highly urbanised country with almost half of the 
population (48%) living in the urban areas. The labour force 
for the country was estimated at 3.3 million people in 1980 and 
about 350,000 people are employed in the formal sector leaving 
about a 30% unemployment rate. The rest of the people are in 
the informal sector. The majority of the unemployed people 
are young, most of whom are in the Lusaka and Coppcrbelt 
provinces. The Copperbelt has the largest number (23.5%) of 
the unemployed people.[3] The unemployed together with petty 
traders and poor wage earners are normally found living in 
peripheral areas of big cities in what are known as shanty 
compounds. This group of people has been reported to suffer 
from food intake inadequacies. A survey carried out in 1980 
showed that 100 Kwacha per month was needed for the 
minimum nutritional requirements of six persons in a family. 
Twenty six percent of the urban families fell below such a 
m odest e s tim a te .[4] In fact an earlier survey done in 
1974-75,[5] had found that 26% of the urban households (80% in 
case of rural households) had less than K50 per month (US 
$57.4) income. Within the urban areas, and among the poor the 
women and children get even less food. Malnutrition is very 
high among children aged five and below. Nationally at least 
20-40% of the children die after their first week of life 
partially due to malnutrition. A 1970-71 survey [6] reported 
that 20% of children under five had second or third degree 
m alnutrition  and that the nutrition  status had not been 
improving in the urban areas. The situation now should be 
worse considering what was reported in the Zambian Daily Mail 
[7] that malnutrition cases were on an increase even among the 
"well to do".
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The people in the rural areas mostly affected by continuous 
food security problems are the subsistence and small holder 
farmers. Rural malnutrition exceeds urban malnutrition both in 
prevalence and in severity. The problem is worse in provinces 
that are least developed. Most of the malnutrition is a result 
of chronic food deficiencies and occasionally it may be due to 
drought. Other people affected by food insecurity are rural 
farm workers and the unemployed. In the rural areas, children 
and women are, like in urban areas, the worst affected people. 
In provinces like Northern and Luapula provinces due to the 
migration patterns, 25 to 30 percent of the households are 
headed by females. The households experience more problems 
in meeting their food requirements due to labour shortages at 
agricultural production peak periods. In rural areas seasonal 
changes aggravate food problems especially during the rainy 
season , particu larly  between January and M arch before 
harvesting.
On the national level, it is estimated that 3 million Zambians 
are malnourished or are at a high risk of malnutrition. Protein 
calorie malnutrition is a serious health problem in the country. 
An FAO report [8] had showed that 1947 calories on average 
(excluding alcohol) as against the recommended 2,038 calories 
per capita per day were being consumed. The average energy 
deficit among the malnourished in 1980 was estimated at 360 
calories daily. Maize provides 60% of all the calories with the 
rural poor consuming even more. In Northern, Luapula and 
North-western provinces cassava is also important.
The situation in Zambia points to the fact that almost half the 
population of Zambia is under the threat of food insecurity. 
The rural areas and the urban poor are the worst affected 
people and that the number of people threatened by inadequate 
food is in c re as in g . T his is in d ic a te d  by in creas in g  
unemployment, increasing income gap (between rural and urban 
areas and between households) and the reduction in the per 
capita income which recorded a loss of 15% from 1980 to
1986.(9] Within those people affected, the children especially 
those below the age of five are the worst victims. More than 
half of the country’s pre-school children are at a risk of
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inadequate and poor nutrition.
Causes of Food Insecurity in Zambia
Since the 1970s, per capita food production has been decreasing 
in sub-Sahara Africa. From 1970 to 1986 a decrease of 20 
percent was recorded.[10] According to reports, the decrease 
was due to a rapid increase in population growth, decline in 
food  p ro d u c tio n , n a tu ra l  c a la m itie s  (e .g . d ro u g h t) , 
mismanagement and neglect of the ecology and the lack of 
incentives to farmers.
Similarly in Zambia the performance of the agricultural (food) 
industry has been declining since 1971. Both total and per 
capita crop production have had declining trends. Like most 
developing countries the goals set by the government have not 
been reached, especially those of self-sufficiency and income 
distribution. The Zambian First, Second and Third National 
Development Plans (FNDP 1966-1970, SNDP 1967-1976, and 
TNDP 1979-1983, respectively) have all emphasized the need for 
food self-sufficiency. The government realizes that almost all 
Zambian food requirem ents can be met within the country 
without having to import in view of the declined foreign 
exchange earnings from the mining industry. The government 
does also recognise that food self-sufficiency in itself would 
not provide adequate food to every Zambian. They, therefore, 
place an equal importance on reducing income disparities 
especially between the rural and urban households.
Like most, if not all, the developing nations, Zambia wants to 
provide its population with an adequate diet and to promote a 
more productive and efficient agricultural sector. The goals 
have not been achieved due to a variety of reasons ranging 
from population, agricultural policies, natural calamities to 
external factors. Some of the contributing factors to poor 
food security for Zambia are presented below.
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Population Growth
Zambia has one of the highest population growth rates due to a 
high birth rate of 3.2%. In 1980 the population of Zambia was 
marked at 5.7 million people (1984 estimates give 6.4 million) 
and it is estimated to reach 11.8 million by the year 2000. The 
population growth rate has been around 3.4% per annum.[ll] 
The high population growth rate has meant that more social 
services (e.g. health and education) are needed at the expense 
of economic investments. It also means that food production 
has to match the population growth rate. The problem for 
Zambia is then that of also satisfying the food needs of the 
rapidly growing population and achieving an adequate degree of 
food security for all the population. A population policy in 
Zam bia does not ’exist’ but is being formulated and will 
consider reduction of the population growth rate to manageable 
levels.
Migration Patterns and Unemployment
As previously mentioned, almost half the population of Zambia 
is in the urban areas. Zambia is characterised by a dual 
economy, with the urban areas having better facilities and 
better incomes as compared to the rural areas. The terms of 
trade between the rural areas and the urban areas in 1974 were 
put at 3.5 times more for the urban dweller than the rural 
dweller. In cash terms it was 6.3 times m ore.[12] The 
disparities were found to be in favour of the urban poor when 
compared to the rural poor even after considering the high 
cost of living and the unsteady nature of jobs in the urban 
areas. These income disparities have forced many people, 
especially the energetic youth, to leave the rural areas for 
towns. The rural areas are, therefore, left with mostly women, 
old people and children. In some rural areas, as stated before, 
as many as 30% of the households are female-headed. The 
migration pattern has had an adverse effect on food production 
in the rural areas, especially among the subsistence farmers. 
One notes that women are not only burdened with crop 
production and household chores but their access to agricultural 
inputs is very difficult. Within the rural areas are found
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commercial farmers with high incomes and subsistence farmers 
with low incomes and inadequate food intakes. The subsistence 
farmers are far more in numbers than commercial farmers.
For those who have left the rural areas, they have been faced 
with the problem of unemployment. In Zambia the labour force 
was growing (1975-1980) at 3.5% per year and wage employment 
at 1.1% per year.[13] In order for the labour force to be 
absorbed a growth rate of 17% per year of wage employment 
creation was needed. The figures show that not only is the 
number of people threatened with food security increasing in 
urban areas but it will continue to increase. The rural areas 
on the other hand are losing labour and food production is 
threatened.
Income Distribution
Zambia’s per capita Gross National Product (GNP) has been 
decreasing since the 1970s. From 1965 to 1984 a negative 
average growth rate of 1.3% was attained.[14] In 1980 per
capita income was K351.40 and this dropped to K310.50 in
1985.[15] An article by Chikwanda reflected on the fact that 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) had decreased by K1.95 billion in 
1985 from 1980. Chikwanda attributed the decline in GDP to 
the decline in capital formation. He also noted that Zambia 
has an uneven income distribution which is due to "lack of a 
meaningful level of production". The income distribution in 
Zambia as indicated in the World Bank Report 1986, shows that 
in 1976 twenty percent of the population had 61.1% of the total 
dispossable household income accruing to them (see Table 1). 
The highest 10% had 46.3%. The data covered both rural and 
urban areas.
The World Development Report (1986) also showed the presence 
of an increasing average annual rate of inflation in percentages 
for 1965 to 1973 and for 1973 to 1984 as 5.8 and 10.4 
respectively. The Zambia Daily Mail of December 13th, 1986 
provided some up-to-date figures regarding inflation. The 
paper said that from 1982 to April 1986 the relative inflation 
for the high income groups was 165.2% but for the low income
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Table 1: Income Distribution in Zambia, 1976:
Percentage
households
share of household income, by percentile groups of
Lowest
20X
Second 
Quintile
Third Fourth 
Quintile Quintile
Highest
20%
Total
3.4 7.4 11.2 16.9 61.1 100X
groups it was 172.5%. The figure for the low income groups 
was actually a moderate estimate but nonetheless showed the 
rapid decline in the purchasing power and widening gap in 
income levels of the Zambians. Not only is there poor income 
distribution but there is an even more serious problem of a 
rapid decline in the purchasing power of the people and hence 
increase  in m aln u tritio n  even am ong the "well to do" 
households.
Consumption Patterns
The inability to purchase food or grow enough food, are not 
the only problems to acquiring adequate food. Consumption 
patterns do also contribute to problems of food security. In 
Zambia, in the past 15 years the consumption of wheat has 
increased at the expense of cassava, maize, sorghum and millet. 
More and more people in urban areas are depending on wheat 
products. Zambia does not have any advantage in growing 
wheat and so far has had to depend on imports and aid. Due 
to subsidies on wheat, the consumption pattern of the urban 
dweller (including the poor) is shifting towards wheat from 
maize. Maize itself was promoted in every part of the country 
as a staple food crop. This resulted in people, especially in 
non-traditional maize growing provinces abandoning cassava, 
sorghum, and m illet. They thus put their food security 
situation at risk, since maize like wheat is an expensive and
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risky crop to grow. The urban poor in Zambia have over the 
years come to consume breakfast mealie meal over roller meal. 
Roller meal has a lower extraction rate and thus is more 
nutritious with 88% calories. Breakfast mealie meal which is 
preferred has a smoother texture and is whiter but contains 
only 60% calories and uses up more maize in its production. 
Although it is more expensive than roller meal, it is still 
relatively cheaper since it is subsidized. The price difference 
of the two commodities has not led to low income groups 
purchasing roller meal and thus saving the much-needed maize. 
This "taste problem" became even more pronounced when the 
government tried a selective subsidy application in November,
1986. The government withdrew all the subsidies on maize 
intended for the production of breakfast mealie meal and 
Chibuku (a local beer). Subsidies for maize intended for roller 
meal production were going to continue. This resulted in 
price-hikes of breakfast mealie meal of more than 100% (see 
Table 2). The people, the urban poor, who were the targets 
for m aintaining the ro ller meal subsidy rioted over such 
increases because they are used to consuming breakfast mealie 
meal and could no longer afford it. The following month the 
prices were nullified and reduced to their original levels.
Table 2: Prices for Breakfast and Roller Heal
BREAKFAST ROLLER HEAL
Weight(kg) Subsidised(K) Unsubsidised(K) Subsidised(K)
25 19.15 38.65 14.85
50 37.32 76.30 28.70
The problem presented above is indicative of the fact that food 
security problems in Zambia can to some extent be solved by 
red is tr ib u tio n  of the existing food sources w ithin the 
population.
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Agricultural Development
Since 1971, both total and per capita crop production has been 
declining in Zambia. The reasons for this, apart from the 
natural calamities like the droughts of 1981 to 1984, have been 
largely due to policies. Cash crops (non-food and food) like 
cotton, tobacco, wheat, soyabeans and sunflower have shown 
some increased production due to the price incentives to 
grow ers. Livestock production has also recorded some 
improvements except for the poultry industry. Maize the staple 
crop has been dependent on weather and as such there has 
been an erratic production pattern. The agricultural industry 
in general has not performed well to increase its share of the 
GDP in view of the diversification objective. Table 3 shows 
the shares of each sector to GDP for selected years. The 
agricultural sector has not improved its share even though it 
has been a priority industry since FNDP. The service industry 
has increased its share and thus has contributed to the need 
for more marketed food requirements since more people are net 
buyers of food. This reduces the guarantee for food security 
in a country were foreign exchange for importing food is a 
serious problem.
Table 3: Sectoral Shares in GDP-selected years (X of total GDP
at current market prices)
Sector 1965 1970 1975 1978 1981 1982 1984
Agriculture,
Forestry & Fishing 14 11 13 16 16 14 15
Mining & Quarrying 41 36 14 13 14 11 >
Construction & > 39
other industry 6 8 10 18 05 05 >
Services & other 32 35 45 46 47 51 46
Manufacturing 7 10 14 13 18 19 21
Source: CSO Monthly Digest of Statistics (quoted in World Bank
Report, 1984).
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The problem of the staple food crop maize is discussed below 
in order to illustrate some policy issues that have affected the 
food security situation for both the urban and the rural poor.
Maize which is produced mainly by small scale farmers (60% of 
marketed maize) has had adequate quantities produced in 1976, 
1977, 1981 and 1986. National requirements for the crop are 
estimated at 8 million. Whenever there is a shortfall the 
government has had to import maize to make up. However, 
since the mining industry started having problems in generating 
foreign exchange, food aid has been playing a significant role 
as Table 4 shows.
Table 4: Maize Imports and Aid (in Metric Tonnes):
Year Total imports Commercial Food aid
1976/77 - - -
1977/79 122000 91000 31000
1983/84 205000 129000 76000
1984/85 335000 120000 215000
Source: Agricultural Marketing and Input Distribution Study,
1986.
The importation of maize and food aid have had a negative 
effect on the producer price of the commodity with respect to 
the world price. This has been so because of the tendency for 
the Zambian policies to lean towards investments as dictated by 
the needs of the dom inating urban areas. One of the 
objectives of the government’s food pricing policies has been to 
ensure food availability at low and stable prices for the urban 
centres. As a result the government has had to regulate prices 
of both domestic and imported maize. The price of maize has 
been below the world price. The producer price consequently, 
has not been conducive for optimal maize production. In 
addition, uniform pricing has encouraged maize production in
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areas which are not suitable at the expense of traditional crops 
like sorghum, millet and cassava. The promotion of maize all 
over Zambia discouraged food self-sufficiency on a provincial 
level and provinces with comparative advantage were not fully 
exploited.
The marketing and distribution of maize has been done through 
a statutory board, the National Agricultural Marketing Board 
(NAMBOARD). Until late 1986, the price of maize was fixed 
and uniform throughout the country and throughout the year. 
For farmers it was more profitable to sell off their maize as 
soon as possible and not be faced with storage problems. This 
created a big problem for NAMBOARD which had to collect 
maize from numerous collection points before the following 
rains. NAMBOARD (later together with cooperative unions) 
could not cope with the collection of maize and losses where 
high.
In addition to losses through collection points maize is also 
lost through poor storage. Proper central storage facilities are 
few and located in urban areas. The rest of the cereal is 
poorly covered in tarpaulin material. Small scale farmers in 
remote rural areas retain about 50% of their maize (usually the 
local variety) for home consumption. Despite the use of the 
local variety of maize which stores better, losses of up to 30% 
have been recorded. The small scale farmers who do not retain 
m aize find them selves selling the maize they need for 
consumption. They then purchase processed maize (mealie 
meal) which is cheaper due to government subsidies. They risk 
food security which arises when the income so realised is spent 
on other consumer goods. This problem is also common among 
the farmers who grow non-food cash crops like cotton. Studies 
have found that such farmers spend their incomes on luxuries 
like beer. A constant price for the whole season and the 
subsidy provided by the processed products and transportation 
have discouraged own farm food storage in most parts of the 
country. As a result the burden on the central storage has 
been heavy. Currently there are enough storage facilities for 
maize in Zambia. A total of 111360 metric tonnes capacity is 
available (Table 5).
215
Table 5: Storage capacity for maize by type and ownership:
Si los Sheds Hard standings
Namboard 110700 294000 417780
Provincial Coop. Unions 12727 278400
Total Capacity 111360
Source: Agricultural Marketing and Input Distribution Study. 1986.
The problem is that the storage facilities are located along the 
line of rail and in some cases away from production areas. 
The storage facilities were constructed for serving the urban 
areas by storing locally produced maize and imported maize.
With proper post-harvest management, particularly storage and 
early collection of the cereals the problem of food security on 
a national level would be arrested to some extent within the 
existing facilities.
External Factors Influencing Food Security
Zambia was, and still is, highly dependent on copper exports 
for generating foreign exchange. Since the price of the 
mineral started going down in the early 1970s, the country has 
faced serious problems in the balance of payments. The 
situation was aggravated when oil bills rapidly increased in 
1973. Low foreign exchange generation implies that the 
country has to depend more and more on internal food sources. 
Food aid plays an important role in solving transitory food 
shortages. It, however, has a tendency to decrease domestic 
producer prices in the long run. It also tends to change the 
consumption patterns of the local people. Wheat consumption 
is a case in point. In the short run, food aid can be used 
positively as first aid. In the long run, food aid can be helpful 
if used as a temporary solution to transitory food shortages 
and investm ents into developm ent of in frastructu re  are
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undertaken for purposes of increasing food production.
Agricultural export earnings in Zambia come from beef, coffee, 
tea, tobacco and strawberries. Food imports are mainly of 
wheat. Since the auctioning system of foreign exchange (which 
resulted in the devaluation of the Kwacha) was introduced in 
October 1985, protectionist policies towards external trade have 
been relaxed. This has seen the use of foreign exchange on 
luxury goods such as canned beer, chocolates and wines in 
supermarkets. A large part of the population is not able to 
purchase such goods and the foreign exchange used could have 
been put to use in capital goods. Zambia like other developing 
countries exports primary products and the international market 
for such products is unfavourable. The terms of trade are 
heavily against the country.
The problem s of unem ploym ent, ru ral-u rban  m igration, 
consumption patterns, income disparities, low purchasing power, 
poor post-harvest management, poor marketing and distribution, 
agricultural price policies and so on have contributed to the 
poor situation in Zambia’s food security. Having presented 
some of the causes of poor food security, policies which are to 
be directed at specific populations to improve the food security 
in the country, are discussed below.
Policies for Improved Food Security
The main concern of the government has been to secure access 
for a ll Z am b ian s  to  a d e q u a te  food supp lies th rough  
self-sufficiency. Other concerns have been those of improving 
the economic sitution of the rural population by increasing 
output of both food and cash crops and the creation of 
linkages between agriculture and other industries like the 
agro-processing industry so as to create employment. In view 
of the poor performance of the mining industry in generating 
foreign exchange, the government has placed importance on 
improving agriculture so that it could replace the mining 
industry as the main export commodity. Despite the objectives 
of the government towards agriculture and food security (these
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objectives are laid out in the FNDP, SNDP, and TNDP) the 
performance of agriculture has been far from reaching its goals 
due to the general economic policies. Generally the well 
in tended  policies have tended to create a bias against 
ag ricu ltu re  in favour of the service and m anufacturing 
industries which are mainly based in the urban areas. Policies 
that were aimed at helping the poor, like subsidies, have 
resulted  in the poor being more so especially the rural 
subsistence farmers who have had to face high prices for their 
consumer goods. Policies in particular have limited the growth 
of agricultural production and hampered efforts to reduce rural 
poverty because of poor price incentives.
Food security goes beyond reliability of supply, be it through 
domestic production or through external trade or aid. It has 
to be extended to different social groups within the country. 
The people within a nation who are not enjoying food security 
have to be identified and policies have to be formulated to 
help as much of the population as possible.
D. Evans and J. Jiggins made an observation that, generally to 
help the most food security vulnerable groups in both urban 
and rural areas, there is need for economic and psychological 
changes in the decision-makers and planners. They said that 
for quicker results, project type of actions are needed.[16] 
These could aim at improving productivity, income and rural 
industrialisation. A more permanent solution can on the other 
hand be a tta in ed  through investing in education , and 
streamlining administrative practices and attitudes within the 
country. They noted too that there was need for structural 
changes looking at issues such as the land tenure system, food 
distribution, food consumption, and food production in terms of 
quantity and quality. Finally, Evans and Jiggins tell us in their 
report that in the presence of shortfalls in food supplies, food 
imports are necessary. The observations made by the two 
authors are mainly aimed at helping the vulnerable group that 
has direct access to food. For the urban poor, policies aimed 
at employment creation, stable prices, stable food supplies, 
better purchasing power, and so on, may be more relevant.
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In Zambia, transitory food insecurities normally occur due to 
lowered food production as a result of poor weather conditions. 
In such cases the country imports its food and/or obtains food 
aid from food surplus countries. For a household that is a 
food producer or net-seller, the problem may arise due to a 
drop in production levels. The household in such a case may 
resort to selling its assets like animals, or some members of 
the family may go and seek employment in neighbouring areas 
or it (family) may depend on remittances from relatives to 
cover the food shortfall period. Policies that may help solve 
this problem should therefore be aimed at stabilising food 
production through the use of drought resistant varieties, 
drought resistant crops, building of dams and irrigation 
infrastructure (or drainage where applicable) and improvement 
of storage facilities. On the national level, the capacity to 
import food has to be stabilized if buffer stocks are found to 
be too expensive to maintain. In Zambia, a study by the 
M inistry of A griculture and W ater Development into the 
Agricultural Marketing and input distribution, found that a 
minimum acceptable food reserve level for Zambia would be for 
3.77 months maize consumption equivalent stock kept at the 
end of April.[17] A maximum equivalent consumption level 
should not be for more than 6 months. The stocks could also 
be used to monitor and stabilize prices throughout the year.
C hronic food insecurity solutions call for m ore general 
economic development policy when compared to transitory food 
insecurities. The World Bank Report for example, notes that 
”economic growth ultimately provides most households with the 
incomes to acquire enough food. Only the sick, elderly, 
unemployed, unemployable or other disadvantaged groups then 
need transfer o f payments from relatives or the rest o f the 
society”.[ 18] The solutions, therefore, lie in economic growth, 
increase and equitable distribution of real income.
Policies that promote agricultural production in Zambia are 
more likely to improve the incomes of many poor people. The 
immediate problem in the country may be that of satisfying the 
food needs of a rapidly growing population and achieving an 
adequate degree of food security. Per capita food production
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in Zambia has been decreasing when the population growth rate 
is very high. A population policy to reduce the population 
growth rate to a manageable size could also be a step towards 
achieving food security in the nation.
The government has been liberalising the economy in order to 
enhance economic growth. The new policies are aimed at 
im proving the efficien t use of resou rces and reducing 
government involvement in the production process of goods. 
Although the producer prices have increased, there is still need 
for more improvements in the input and output price relations 
in order to change the terms of trade between the cheap 
agricultural products and the expensive industrial goods. 
Subsidies on inputs have drastically been reduced. In order to 
help the poor small-scale farm ers absorb the high input 
fertilizer prices, for example, the government provided K80 
m illion as c red it facility  to farm ers belonging  to the 
cooperative movement as a form of a selective subsidy. A 
selective subsidy targeted at the poor urban people was also 
applied on the staple food, mealie meal. The events that 
followed the withdrawal of subsidies on breakfast mealie meal 
indicated that people were not yet ready for such subsidies 
which can be used to help the poor acquire adequate food. In 
Zambia the problem of implementing such a policy appears to 
be a difficult one. The government should nontheless apply 
selective subsidies to help disadvantaged target groups.
Employment policies are also required in order to provide 
incom e to people without any source of income. The 
government has come to realize that the private industry has a 
high potential for employment creation. The informal sector in 
particular can absorb a lot of people in small industries. The 
government, therefore, supports the creation of small-scale 
industries through Small Industries Development Organisation 
(SIDO), Village Industries Services (VIS) and Small Enterprise 
Promotion (SEP). For those who cannot be absorbed in small 
scale industries, the government is in the process of drawing 
up a Nation Service Rural Reconstruction Programme which will 
train the unemployed people in agriculture. Food security will 
be enhanced with more people finding employment or involving
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Consumption patterns, unfortunately, cannot be changed within 
a short time. The best solution to changing consumption 
patterns is to let the actual prices of the commodities prevail. 
Zambia for example should not let the wheat donations suppress 
the domestic wheat prices and thus make wheat products cheap 
(Zambia Daily Mail of 24th September, 1986, reported donations 
of wheat worth 5 million US dollars and 3.5 million US dollars 
from the United State of America and Holland respectively). 
This may lead to Zambia consuming more wheat which they 
have to import and thus reduce the food security of the 
country.
The government should also try to invest in basic services for 
the rural areas in order to retain those already there and 
attract the urban unemployed. The terms of trade between the 
rural and urban areas have to be reversed in favour of the 
rural areas. Basic infrastructure like roads, and hospitals 
should be provided. Rural marketing and input supply networks 
need to be improved upon. Agricultural development and thus 
economic development cannot be achieved without the small- 
scale farmer. Policies, therefore, should continue to shift in 
favour of this category of farmers. Research programmes 
should concentrate on traditional crops like sorghum, millet and 
cassava which are drought resistant and cheaper to grow. 
Extension services also need to be increased and improved. 
The small-scale farmers are also capable of producing export 
crops like confectionary groundnuts, cotton, soyabeans, tobacco, 
beef, and coffee. Although Zambia has a higher potential for 
import substitution crops, export crops cannot be ignored.
Conclusions
The paper has tried to identify the groups that are highly 
vulnerable to food security. The unemployed, petty traders, 
lowly paid workers and workers holding temporary jobs are 
seen as the vulnerable groups in the urban areas. The rural 
areas have also subsistence farmers and the small scale farmers
themselves in small-scale industries and farming.
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who are mostly victims of chronic food insecurity. The rural 
areas have more food security problems than the urban areas. 
It is estimated that 3 million Zambians have no access to 
adequate food. Children and women are the worst victims in 
acquiring adequate food.
The causes of poor food security have been noted as, the 
general decline in per capita food production, high population 
growth rate, migration patterns, unemployment, consumption 
patterns, poor income distribution, low purchasing power, lack 
of export earnings, and the lack of proper incentives for 
agricultural development.
Food security, which has two components; availability and the 
ability to acquire food, can be solved to some extent within 
Z am bia through  p roper post-harvest m anagem ent, food 
distribu tion , changing consum ption patterns, reducing the 
population growth rate and providing income through job 
creation opportunities for those who are unemployed.
The solutions to the food security problem are seen in the 
improvements of agriculture. Agricultural development will 
bring about economic development which will provide incomes 
to the majority of people and thus help them in food security. 
Investments in rural infrastructure research and extension are 
necessary to achieve agricultural development. Population 
policies that call for family planning and thus help reduce the 
population growth rate are necessary to help improve the per 
capita food situation. Employment generating policies through 
the encouragement of the private sector could help absorb 
people not in employment. Selective subsidies targeted at the 
lowly paid people can help the majority of the urban poor. 
Subsidies on credit and inputs to selected farming targets can 
help improve agricultural production and productivity and hence 
food security for producers. Food aid which is seen as a 
temporary solution to food insecurity, should never be allowed 
to suppress domestic producer prices in the long run. On the 
national level, adequate stock could be kept not only for 
emergency needs but also for regulating and stabilizing food 
prices.
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The potential for Zambia to attain food security is high. The 
answer lies in agricultural development which is seen as the 
engine of growth for economic development. Policies have to 
be directed at the improvement of the subsistence and small 
scale farmers in order to obtain the best results out of the 
resources available within the country.
NOTES
1. Poverty and Hunger Issues and Options for Food Security 
in Developing Countries. World Bank Policy Study. 
Washington Dec. 1986. p 1.
2. Ibid. p 1.
3. R. B a rd o u ille , R ecen t Trends in M anpower and  
Employment Zambia. Some Policy Issues for Discussion. 
Paper presented at the IAS Seminar held from 18 to 19th 
June, 1986. p 14.
4. Zambia Population, Health and Nutrition Sector Review. 
World Bank Report Number 4715-ZA. May 16th, 1984. p 76.
5. Ibid. p 32.
6. Ibid. p 31.
7. M alnutrition Cases on Increase. Zambia Daily M ail. 
October 14th, 1986. p 5.
8. Zambia Population, Health and Nutrition Sector Review. 
World Bank Report Number 4715-ZA May 16th, 1984. p 76.
9. A. Chikwanda, It’s Time for Reflection and Introspection. 
Zambia Daily Mail. 18th December, 1986. p 7.
223
NOTES
(Continued)
10. Zambia Population, Health and Nutrition Sector Review. 
World Bank Report Number 4715-ZA. May 16th, 1984.
11. Sound Population Policy in Offing, Zambia Daily Mail. 
30th December, 1986. p 5.
12. R. Bardouille, Op cit. p 4.
13. J.T. Milimo and Y. Fisseha, Rural Small Enterprises in 
Zambia, Results o f a Country Wide Survey. UNZA, RDSB. 
September 1985.
14. World Bank Report 1986. The World Bank. 1986. p 180.
15. A. Chikwanda, Op cit. p 7.
16. D. Evans and J. Jiggins, The Capacity o f Developing 
Countries to Meet their Food Requirements. A Research 
Outline for the Zambian Case. University of Zambia. 
RDSB. 1980.
17. Agricultural Marketing and Input Distribution Study. 
MAWD 1986.
18. Poverty and H unger. Issues and Options for Food 
Security in Developing Countries. World Bank Policy 
Study. Washington DC 1986. p 28.
224
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)
11)
12)
CONFERENCE PAPERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
(Available through the Institute of Southern African 
Studies. National University of Lesotho.)
The Concept of Food Security and Food Self-Sufficiency 
KJ.M. Dhliwayo
Man Does Note Live by Bread Alone but Man Cannot Live 
Without Bread. fCIC Prah
Food Systems Approach to Concepts as Food Security and 
Food Security Issues. P. Hebinck
Food Security: Hunger, Poverty and Policy. D. Faber
T he Food S ecu rity  E quation  in Sou thern  A frica . 
M. Rukuni and C.K. Eicher
Finance for Food Security in the SADCC Countries.
A. Tibaijuka
Impact of Water Resources on Food Self-Sufficiency in the 
SADCC Region. Z.M. Kasomekera
I rr ig a tio n  and Food Security  in Sou thern  A frica . 
M. Rukuni and J. Blackie
The Agrarian Question and Food Production in Southern 
Africa. A. Mafeje
Some Factors Which Militate Against Food Stability in 
Southern Africa: The Case of Swaziland. B.B. Sikhondze
Agrarian Practices: Agrarian Issues and Food Security:
The Case of Botswana. N.T. Morapedi
Patterns of Food and Population Growth in Southern 
Africa and Some Suggested Strategies for Food Security 
in the Region. G. Ahmed
225
CONFERENCE PAPERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
(Available through the Institute of Southern African 
Studies. National University of Lesotho.)
13) Policy Consideration and Instruments for Food Security in 
the Context of Botswana. F. Mokobi
14) Food Security in Lesotho: The Challenge and Strategy.
A. Tola
15) Cooperative Agricultural Development and Food Production 
in Lesotho. B.M. Swallow and B. Borris
16) Household Food Security and the Role of Women with 
Special Reference to Lesotho. J. K. Rwelamira
17) Food Security: Concepts, Policies and Strategies in
Lesotho. R. E. Olsen
18) Food Security Issues in Lesotho. D. Phororo
19) Food Insecurity Versus A gricultural Security in the
Southern African Region: The Facts and Potential; the
Case of Zambia. fC Nyirongo
20) Policy Issues for Food Security in Zambia, the Hunger in 
the Midst of Plenty. K. Sipula
21) Food Aid to Sub-Saharan  A frica: The Ethiopian
Experience. D. Aredo.
226
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
1) MR. A. ADDY 
Attorney-at-Law 
6th Floor
Lesotho Bank Centre 
Kingsway 
Private Bag A70 
MASERU 100
2) DR. G. AHMED 
Department of Demography 
University of Botswana 
Private 0022 
GABORONE
Botswana
3) MR. DEJENE AREDO 
Department of Economics 
University of Addis Ababa 
P.O. Box 1176
ADDIS ABABA 
Ethiopia
4) Miss B. BORRIS
Department of Agricultural Economics 
University of Idaho 
Moscow, Idaho 
U.SA.
5) Mr. K.J.M. DHLIWAYO
SADCC Food Security Technical and Administrative Unit
Ministry of Land
Agriculture and Rural Settlement
Private Bag 7701
Causeway
HARARE
Zimbabwe
227
6) MR. F.H. DRANE
SADCC Food Security Technical and Administrative Unit
Ministry of Lands
Agriculture and Rural Settlement
Private Bag 7701
Causeway
HARARE
Zimbabwe
7) DR. C.K. EICHER 
Food Security Project 
Mount Pleasant 
P.O. Box 167 
HARARE 
Zimbabwe
8) DR. D.C. FABER
Centre for World Food Studies
P.O. Box 14
67000 AA
Wageningen
Netherlands
9) MS. A. FRANKLIN 
Department of Politics 
University of Leeds, L529 ST 
U.K.
10) MR. P. HEBINCK
The Third World Centre 
Thomas V. Acquinostraat 
Catholic University of Nijmegen 
P.O. Box 9108 
6500 HK NIJMEGEN 
The Netherlands
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
(Continued)
228
11) DR. Z.M. KASOMEKERA 
Bunda College of Agriculture 
University of Malawi
P.O. Box 219
LILONGWE
Malawi
12) MS. I. KIMANE
National University of Lesotho
P.O. Roma 180
Lesotho
13) PROF. A. MAFEJE 
American University of Cairo 
113 Kasr Aini Street 
CAIRO
Egypt
14) DR. G. MALAHLEHA 
Director
Institute of Southern African Studies 
National University of Lesotho 
P.O. Roma 180 
Lesotho
15) DR. ASSOUMOU MBA 
Centre Technique de Cooperation 
Agricole et Rurale (CTA)
de Rietkampen 
Galvanistraat 9 Ede 
6700 AJ Wageningen 
The Netherlands
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
(Continued)
229
16) REV. K.F. MOKOBI 
Director
Department of Food Resources
P.O. Box 96
GABORONE
Botswana
17) MR. N.T. MORAPEDI 
National Institute for Development 
Research and Documentation 
University of Botswana
Private Bag 0022
GABORONE
Botswana
18) MR. T.M. NARAIN
Centre Technique de Cooperation
Agricole et Rurale (CTA)
de Rietkampen
Galvanistraat 9 Ede
67000 AJ Wageningen
The Netherlands
19) MRS. N. NGQALENI
Institute of Southern African Studies 
National University of Lesotho 
P.O. Roma 180 
Lesotho
20) MR. K. NYIRONGO 
University of Zambia 
Institute for African Studies 
P.O. Box 30900 
LUSAKA
Zambia
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
(Continued)
230
21) MR. R.E. OLSON 
Planning Division 
Ministry of Agriculture 
MASERU 100 
Lesotho
22) MR. K. PATELA
Food and Nutrition Coordination Office
MASERU 100
Lesotho
23) DR. D. PHORORO 
Ministry of Agriculture 
MASERU 100 
Lesotho
24) PROF. K. K. PRAH
Institute of Southern African Studies 
National University of Lesotho 
P.O. Roma 180 
Lesotho
25) MR. M. RAMAEMA 
Planning and Formulation Section 
Ministry of Agriculture 
MASERU
Lesotho
26) MR. T J. RAMOTSOARI 
Planning Office 
Planning Division 
Ministry of Agriculture 
MASERU
Lesotho
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
(Continued)
231
27) DR. M. RUKUNI 
Food Security Project 
University of Zimbabwe 
Mount Pleasant
P.O. Box 167
HARARE
Zimbabwe
28) MRS. J.K. RWELAMIRA 
UNICEF
MASERU 100 
Lesotho
29) MR. S. SANTHO
National University of Lesotho
P.O. ROMA 180
Lesotho
30) MR. R. SHARP 
World Food Assembly 
5 Harrowby Court 
Harrowby Street 
LONDON W1H 5FA 
Tel. (01) 262-6969
31) DR. B.B. SIKHONDZE 
University of Swaziland 
Private Bag 
KWALUSENI 
Swaziland
32) MR. K. SIPULA 
University of Zambia (RDSB)
P.O. Box 30900
LUSAKA
Zambia
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
(Continued)
232
33) MS. L. SOPENG
Institute of Southern African Studies 
National University of Lesotho 
P.O. Roma 180 
Lesotho
34) MR. B.M. SWALLOW
Institute of Southern African Studies 
National University of Lesotho 
P.O. Roma 180 
Lesotho
35) DR. A. TIBAIJUKA 
Economic Research Bureau 
University of Dar-es-Salaam 
P.O. Box 35091 
DAR-ES-SALAAM 
Tanzania
36) DR. A. TOLA
National University of Lesotho
P.O. Roma 180
Lesotho.
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
(Continued)
233
53535323535348485323234823
This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons
Attribution -  Noncommercial - NoDerivs 3.0 License.
To view a copy of the license please see: 
http://creativecommons.Org/licenses/bv-nc-nd/3.0/
This is a download from the BLDS Digital Library on OpenDocs
http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/
i
®  *V|nstitute of
Development Studies
